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INTRODUCTION 
 
           The origins of the non-profit sector are strictly connected with the power and the 
influence of the Roman Catholic Church. In fact, since the early middle age (III-IV century), 
people used to donate personal resources on behalf of ecclesiastical and secular 
institutions/individuals  with the belief that those actions would have purified one’s soul. 
On one hand, such benevolence could well be considered as a strictly religious 
charity in the sense that the purpose of the donation was basically represented by the need to 
satisfy an inward spiritual feeling.  It is true, the Canon law clearly established that one 
quarter of the resources of the Church had to be employed for the relief of the poor and the 
sick. Yet this was just an internal rule so that nobody could advance complaints about the 
disloyal administration of the funds.  
  On the other hand, such benevolence could also be considered as an extended 
religious charity in the sense that the purpose of the donation was not only represented by 
the need to satisfy an inward spiritual feeling but also by the concrete desire to give a 
contribution for the relief of the disadvantaged people.  
 The difference between the strictly religious and the extended charity could be 
detached through the way with which the benevolence was accomplished. In the first case, 
the benevolence was accomplished through a material transfer of the resources, that is 
through an executed contract while in the second case the benevolence was accomplished 
through an inter vivos or mortis causa act which contained specific provisions about the 
charitable employment of the resources.  
  The problems generated by such executory contract were already and promptly 
caught by the Codex Theodosianus and Justinaneus which introduced the rule according to 
which whoever had had an interest in the fair management of the funds would have been 
allowed to sue the administrator.  
 The extended religious charity experienced a sharp increase when in the XIII century 
a papal bull promised salvation to all those who had bequeathed their properties for pious 
causes.   
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 It is true, in England the donations on behalf of the Church lasted until the XVI 
century, that is when the suspects on the disloyal behavior of the ecclesiastic administration 
led to a Reformation and, as a consequence, to a secularization of the public services.  
 Whereas the donations continued to be accomplished, the donee began to be rather 
represented by a lay individual or institution, so that from an extended religious charity one 
assisted to a shift into a sociological charity. In other words, people continued to make 
donations more with the specific purpose of giving a contribution for the relief of the needy 
people than with the one of satisfying an internal and spiritual call.  
 Despite this change in terms of donee, the problems related to the fair administration 
of funds did not disappear. A very important role concerning the correction of such abuses 
was exerted by the Court of Chancery and by the Charity Commissions.  
 As regards the first, it is extremely important to underscore that it introduced the 
institute of trust, that is a legal device which proved perfectly suitable to accomplish 
charitable donations. In particular, thank to this institute it was possible to render the donee 
accountable in relation to his administration as well as to ensure perpetuity to charitable 
funds by separating them from the personal properties of the trustee.  
 As regards the second, they were introduced by the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses 
in order to fill the vacuum left by the Court of Chancery which meanwhile had become too 
formal and expensive to be resorted.  
 The Statute of Charitable Uses was actually flanked by other Acts, known as the 
Poor Laws. These were more concerned with establishing a “public” welfare system of 
charities through a system of taxation.  
 The combination of private charities with public ones promoted by the above 
mentioned Acts represented the peculiar aspect of the non-profit sector of the Middle Age 
England. 
 After a period defined as “dark age of philanthropy” that characterized the XVIII 
century, in England the need of the private contributions for the provision of public services 
became urgent. Thus, in the XIX century, the Government intensified the controls over the 
old charities and, in 1850, established a permanent charity commission whose structure 
would have lasted until the current days. The penetration of the public authorities into the 
administration of the private charities conferred to these organizations a strong political 
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dimension. Charities in fact were not longer conceived as institutions providing simple 
assistance, but as institutions whose role was that of giving a contribution to the 
accomplishment of the equality of people.  
In the US, the public approach to the non-profit sector lasted only until the end of the 
XVIII century, that is when the American Revolution disestablished the tax system and, 
hence, reduced the great part of the financial resource of non-profit institutions.  
 The US non-profit organizations were initially established with the same purposes of 
those established in the Old-Country, that is they represented a sociological charity. Yet, 
after 1873 other kinds of non-profit organization began to be formed.  
 In particular, certain non-profit organizations were established by those rich 
entrepreneurs who understood that the belonging to an elite class was not a birth’s right. For 
these reasons they established and funded institutions with the aim of replacing the 
government in the provision of public services and of ensuring a substantial equality among 
people. Thus, while also in the US the non-profit sector assumed a political role, differently 
from England the US non-profit organizations maintained a private dimension. No charity 
commissions were in fact established even if the Attorney General – so a public office –  
remained responsible for the control of the organizations.   
After 1960, the US non-profit sector experienced a significant proliferation of 
organizations whose role from political commenced to become economic. Entrepreneurs 
would have rather established ex-novo non-profit corporations for these could ensure a better  
outcome than business ones, while the directors  of the old non-profit structures would have 
hired business professionals for ensuring the survival of the firms themselves.   
 Meanwhile, since the XIX century the complexity of these organizations had 
required them to be incorporated.   
The marketization and the incorporation of non-profit organizations had led to new 
dimensions of the agency problems.  In fact, from the very traditional problems related to 
disloyal behaviors of administrators, problems related to the economic choices adopted by 
the management began to be considered. It is true the incorporation of the non-profit 
structure would have added a new principal – or new principals – to the donors/trustees 
relationship.  
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For the law, the relevance of this new principal – or these new principals – and of its 
– their – interest(s) would have depended on the particular dimension conferred to the legal 
concept of corporation.   
For the lawyer who is currently concerned with the study of the agency problems in 
non-profit corporations, the identification of the legal concept of non-profit corporation 
would have proven rather difficult for two reasons.  
The first is that there are three different theories that have been trying to define the 
legal concept of corporation. The second is that these theories have originally been 
developed taking into consideration the activity of business corporations. Therefore, in order 
to find out which are the principals of a non-profit corporation and what kind of interests 
they pursue, it would be first of all necessary to analyze those theories issued for business 
corporation and hence verify how these could be applied to the non-profit activity.  
To begin with, the institutional scholars deem the corporation as a public structure 
whose interests are represented by those of the shareholders, of the corporation as legal 
entity and by of all the other stakeholders. 
 On the contrary, the contractarian scholars deem the corporation as a private 
structure whose interests are exclusively represented by those of the shareholders.  
Finally, for the new-institutionalism scholars, the corporation is a sort of public-
private hybrid form. According to them, the problem is not to identify the interests involved. 
In fact, they assume that the interests of corporation, shareholders and other stakeholders 
deserve protection.  Rather, they are concerned with establishing to which extent the 
pursuing of shareholders interests is to be limited by the need to consider other interests.   
To resolve this question, new institutionalism scholars propose a model that focus the 
attention on the procedural rules to be observed in occasion of the decision making process.  
 The lawyer would find that the institutional theory findings well reflect the 
dimension of the non-profit corporation for two reasons. The first is represented by the 
absence of shareholders while the second by the non-discussable public dimension of the 
organizational charitable purposes which traditionally involve both the accomplishment of 
high quality/big quantity output and the respect of social, altruistic and ethic values in the 
adoption of organizational decisions.   
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Moreover, the institutional approach to the non-profit corporation assumes that the 
interests of the patrons, of the corporation and of the other stakeholders coincide and, as a 
consequence, the role of the non-profit sector is that of supporting the market with structures 
which do not overlook the ethical, altruistic and social values of the community.  
Instead, the lawyer would find that the contractarian theory findings reflect the 
dimension of the non-profit corporation only in part. Their shortcoming is represented by the 
fact that they focus the attention only on the output of the firm. According to these scholars, 
either donors and consumers of a non-profit corporation are attracted exclusively by the 
higher quality and bigger quantity of the products/services provided and ensured by the non-
distribution constraint. According to them, the role of the non-profit sector would be 
therefore that of supporting the market with structures that offer better goods than those 
offered by the business counterparts. 
This means that the contractarian theory of the non-profit corporation denies that the 
interests of the patrons are the same of the corporation and of other stakeholders and argues 
that only the interests of the former deserve to be protected by the law.  
The new-institutionalism approach to the non-profit corporation would assume that 
the interests of the donors, corporation and other stakeholders deserve to be protected by 
law. Yet, the attention would be focused on the fact that these interests might not 
correspond. The respect of the procedural rules in occasion of the decision making process 
shall ensure that the interests involved in a certain non-profit corporation have been 
protected. According to this stream of thought, moreover, patrons would be allowed to bring 
suits directly against the management, for the relationship between them is represented by an 
incomplete contract.  
It is true, the analysis of the legal nature of the non-profit corporation, of its role and 
of the interests involved discloses crucial information about the concept of non-profit 
performance.  
While for institutionalist scholars the non-profit performance must be measured 
according to the efficacy, for contractarians it must be measured against parameters of 
efficiency.    
The contrast efficiency-efficacy represents an agency cost which is peculiar to non-
profit corporations. Yet, it is not the only one. As seen earlier, similarly to business 
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corporations, also non-profit corporations are exposed to the agency costs arising from 
opportunistic behaviors. Actually, the costs related to opportunism characterize all the 
agency relationships. These costs involve misappropriation of funds and self-dealing 
transactions whose accomplishment is facilitated by the information asymmetry occurring 
between the principal and the agent. Theoretically, non-profit corporations are more exposed 
to opportunistic behaviors of directors for these structures are unowned.  
   The costs related to the constrast efficiency-efficacy are actually due to the conflict 
of cultures which characterize the non-profit board of directors. When after the ’60 non-
profit organizations became direct competitors of business corporations, the board of 
directors felt the exigency of hiring business professionals.  
Although they speeded up the financial conditions of non-profit structures, their 
decisions might not reflect the values on which the corporation had been established. This 
problem would have actually occurred also for the non-profit corporations that had been 
recently established by entrepreneurs. Even if these had chosen the non-profit form for 
market reasons – better outcome than a for-profit –, still they would have attracted donations 
for altruistic, ethical and social values that the very nature of the non-profit structure was 
expected to promote.  
An example of economic choices that would have not reflected the intrinsic values of 
a non-profit corporation is represented by the choice of taking short-term oriented decisions 
rather than long-term ones. It is clear how a short-term decision while ensuring a momentary 
high level of output, it would  potentially threat the future of the organization and, hence, all 
the public services it provides.   
In the light of the marketization of the non-profit sector, therefore, the interests of the 
corporations, of the community and of the patrons – assumed that these financed the non-
profit corporation while driven by altruistic, ethical and social motivations rather than output 
bent ones – would be jeopardized if judges and legislative power considered the non-profit 
corporation as a structure which is closer to a business corporation rather than to a  
charitable trust. In fact, should this be the approach, the non-profit directors would be 
accountable only in those cases for which the violation of the duty of loyalty or duty of care 
brought an economic loss to the corporation.  
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 As regards the violation of the duty of care, the US courts have confirmed the 
application of the business judgment rule also to the non-profit corporations. This would 
mean that it would be quite hard to challenge a managerial decision that has preferred the 
efficiency in detriment of efficacy by arguing that the directors violated their duty of care, 
that is their duty to have the competence required for a non-profit office.  
 That decision might better be challenged by advancing a breach of the duty of 
loyalty, arguing that the decision would betray the altruistic, ethical and social values of the 
corporation.  
It is clear that the discussion on the enforcement of non-profit directors’ fiduciary 
duties from the Attorney General suggests the unsuccessful functionality of the internal 
control, that is the impossibility as well as the unwillingness of non-executive directors to 
exert control on the business oriented managers. The passivity of the non-profit board of 
directors is in fact considered as a duplication of the agency costs due to opportunistic and 
incompetent/negligent behaviors.    
Other than the Attorney General, however, US Courts have acknowledged to patrons 
the right to bring suit against directors’ misbehaviors. On one hand, the donation has been 
considered as an executory contract whose implied terms are contained in the by-laws of the 
non-profit organization. On the other hand, the Courts have even acknowledged the right to 
bring suits against management for breach of fiduciary duties to peculiar classes of 
beneficiaries (consumers).  
 Although the Italian and US non-profit sector origins date back to the donations 
accomplished in the early middle age for religious purposes, the respective development has 
been influenced by different circumstances.  
 In particular, and obviously, the US non-profit development has been influenced by 
the English Old-country. The major difference between England, US and Italy is represented 
by the fact in the former countries two circumstances created the basis for developing a 
strong private non-profit sector: the institute of trust created by the Court of Chancery and 
the Reformation. 
 The Roman law that applied in Italy until 1865 and the 1865 Civil Code did not 
envisage, in fact, a legal institute through which it was possible render certain properties or 
goods bounded to a perpetual burden.  Only with the decision of the 1942 Civil Code it was 
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finally introduced the concept of foundation which, although different in nature from that of 
trust, was capable to produce somehow the same effects.  
 Moreover, a sort of Reformation occurred in Italy just after the Unification with the 
Crispi Government. This means that until the end of the XIX the charitable activities were 
basically carried out by the Church, continuing the tradition that had been commenced in the 
early middle age.  
 The sort of Reformation, the introduction of the legal institute of foundation and the 
crisis of the welfare state happened during the 70’s, all represented factors that could boost 
the non-profit sector.  
 The Italian governments involved non-profit organizations in the provision of public 
services establishing a significant number of  private-public partnerships.  
To render more trustworthy the non-profit organization, in 2006 the Italian legislator 
introduced a new firm model known as “impresa sociale”. This Act is extremely important 
for the study and the resolution of agency problems in Italian non-profit firms as it renders 
applicable the theories of corporations also to the entities disciplined in Libro II of the Civil 
Code.  
 Of course, the remedies provided by the Italian legal order against corporate directors 
misbehaviors’ are exactly not based on the distinction fiduciary duties and other duties. On 
one side this implies that the breach of trust performed by an Italian director is hardly 
challengeable if it does not bring any loss to the firm and that remedy shall be always 
represented by the recover of damages.   On the other side, a negligent decision adopted by a 
foundation director shall be measured against the discipline of the “mandato”, that envisage 
pretty low standards. Therefore, as regards the violation of duty of care, Italian directors 
would be exposed to similar responsibilities of the US colleagues.  
As concerns the external controls, differently from the US latest tendency, it seems 
rather difficult for Italian donators to sue non-profit directors unless the relevant relationship 
is considered as mandato contract pursuant a donazione indiretta.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
RESEARCH  METHOD 
 
§1. History and Comparison 
 
The comparatistic method imposes to the scholar a historical analysis of the legal 
institution  that she is investigating on. “Comparison involves history” [Gorla, 1964] and 
“history involves comparison” [Maitland, 1911] are very well known dicta for every good 
comparative lawyer.  
In particular, the necessity of the historical investigation had already proven clear when  
 
“the studiosous of roman law extended their interests to 
other ancient laws, through a deeper research on the whole 
vastness of law, of the “ius privatum”, of the “ius 
publicum”, of the “iura civilia” and of the “ius gentium”; 
considering the history of the several Greek laws and the 
common idea of a superior law to all of them; of the laws 
and eastern legal culture that employed the cuneiform 
writing…, of the mediterranean basin in the antiquity…” 
[Wegner in Zweigert and Kotz, 1998]. 
 
 The most difficult task is represented by the identification of the historical moment 
from which the study must be set forth. This is due to the fact that every historical moment 
is always the result or the effect of something that has happened before so that is very hard 
to individuate a watershed.  
 
 Thus, when the object of the research has been already dug in literature, the new 
generation of scholars might take advantage of the efforts accomplished by their 
precedessors. For instance, if this research had aimed at studying joint stock companies, it 
would have been quite fair and simple to elect the 17th century as the crucial historical 
moment. In fact, in that period, for the first time corporations characterized by free 
transferable shares were constituted1.  
 
                                                 
1 The Indian East Company was constituted in 1602.  
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 As regards non-profit corporations, it seems that it is much more complicated to 
identify a prototype to which researchers may refer to for outlining a historical analysis.  
That is not much because non-profit corporations have been overlooked by literature – 
although they have received far less attention than business corporations2 – but because it is 
first of all very hard to establish which is their distinguishing element.  
 It is true, non-profit corporation can be distinguished according to their purposes or 
according to the nondistribution constraint (NDC). 
Both these elements have historically been expressed through  organizational 
schemes that not necessarily presented the corporate form.  
To put it clearer: the distinguishing element of joint stock corporations is the free 
transferability of shares3. Scholars concerned with these institutions and with the relevant 
evolution have had to establish when and through which structures that element had 
emerged in the market. As mentioned earlier, clauses regarding the transferability of the 
shares appeared during the 17th century through the legal form of corporation.  
One of the two distinguishing element of non-profit corporations is the NDC. This 
can be defined as the limit on the distribution of the surplus on behalf of whoever exerts 
control over the entity [directors, managers, employees] and the prescription that any surplus 
must be reinvested for the  organization’s targets or somehow towards its interests 
[Tamburrini, 2009].  Scholars concerned with non-profit corporations and with the relevant 
evolution are expected to identify when and through which forms the NDC has been 
introduced in non-profit corporations. As quoted earlier, the NDC has not been expressed 
only by corporate forms, rather another legal/economic scheme known as use or trust has 
been involved.  
 The same can be said as regards the second distinguishing element of non-profit 
corporations, that is the charitable purposes. These purposes have not been pursued only by 
corporate forms, rather the incorporation is a practice that began to be diffused only during 
the XIX century. Before that, the legal/economic scheme employed was the trust.  
                                                 
2  “... less highly developed statutory treatment, fewer judicial interpretations, greater dependency on 
admnistrative fiat..., paucity of creative writin by academicians” [Lesher, 1967]. “...the law historically has 
given non profit organizations, like Cinderellasm the hand-me-down of their half-siblins, the business 
corporations [Henn  and Boyd, in Zoppini, 1999] 
3 The free transferability of shares may be limited by the articles of association. 
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 This means that while the transferability of shares represents the distinguishing 
element of  the joint stock corporations, the NDC represents not only the distinguishing 
element of the non-profit corporations but also the distinguishing element of the charitable 
trusts as well as the charitable purposes represent an element of the charitable trust and of 
the non-profit corporation.  
 Therefore, the question becomes to establish if for the purposes of this research it is 
necessary to study both the forms or instead it is enough to focus just on the corporate one.  
 For representing an evolution or a more articulated version of the charitable trust, the 
non-profit corporation has been borrowing  from it the basic principles concerning the rules 
of governance.    
 This explains why it is necessary to study which were the rules of law when non-
profit organizations were organized as charitable trusts. In particular, such analysis is crucial 
to find out which were the interests involved and how the law protected them against 
managerial misconduct and what the managerial misconduct itself consisted in.   
 Other scholars likely concerned with non-profit sector, but driven by research 
questions which were different from the study of the agency problem, decided to start their 
analysis  from further perspectives.  
 For example, as regards law and economic literature, Hansmann [1989] opted to take 
into account the moment within which the non-profit sector began to operate through the 
corporate form even if, according to him, non-profit corporations had been existing for more 
than a millennium.  The Hansmann choice was justified by the fact that his intention was not 
to understand which were the interests involved in the non-profit corporations, in fact, in his 
opinion, the current role of non-profit enterprise assumed that only the interests of the 
patrons in a high quality / great quantity service/good deserved a legal protection. The target 
of Hansmann was not to discuss the interests involved, rather to devise legal strategies to 
protect those of the patrons.  
  As concerns socio-political literature,  Dowie [2002] began his study of non-profit 
organizations since the ancient times:  
“in ancient Persia the practice of establishing small trust 
funds called vaqfs (pronounced waffs) for charitable 
purposes has existed for a thousand years or more. In 
pre-revolutionary France there were also numerous large 
foundations; they were eliminated after 1789, however, 
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by a regime that repudiated plutocracy and envisioned a 
state far better able to serve the interests of charity”, 
while Hammack [1984] whose interest was focused only on the American non-profit, 
preferred to refer to the late middle age: “very few independent, non-governmental, non-
profit  organizations were to be found in the American colonies” 
 Still regarding socio-political literature, Roelofs [2003] found the best moment to 
develop his discussion in the modern age: “the great foundations arose in the early twentieth 
century when the new millionaires sought a systematic way to dispose of their fortunes”.  
 The noteworthy consideration of literature which is not specifically legal or 
economic might sound weird for a comparative law work. Yet, the non-profit sector is  by 
definition a multi-disciplinary subject and study of the agency problem requires a deep 
understanding of the role that non-profit institutions – in the forms of charitable trusts and 
corporations – have played in certain economic, sociological and political circumstances.  
 This justifies the fact that many of the books and articles employed for developing 
this discussion have been taken into the libraries of Faculty of Art, Social Sciences and 
History.  
 In this monographic work, the discussion shall be set forth through the presentation 
of  two Acts – The Statute of Charitable Uses and the Poor Law – enacted  by Queen 
Elizabeth I in 1601. 
 The choice of that particular historical moment is due to several reasons.  
 To begin with, they represent the first instance of normative acts expressly directed 
to institutions characterized by the NDC and by charitable purposes.  
 Secondly, although by a different extent, they deal with the core issue of this work, 
that is the agency problem.  
 Finally, their prolixity provides fundamental hints about the functioning of the non-
profit sector. More accurately, the analysis of these Acts  does not represent only an 
occasion to establish an initial date for an onward observation of the non-profit sector role.  
In fact, it also represents an occasion to understand what non-profit sector had been until that 
moment.  In particular, it is assumed that when law intervenes then it means that a 
determinate social-economic phenomenon has reached an extension for which it is no longer 
possible to control the relevant problems only relying on the basis of spontaneous behaviors 
of the people involved. Therefore, if legislation is a result of a process, then the analysis of 
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the first legislation concerning the non-profit sector may reveal to the studious when that 
process has begun, that is to say, it may reveal when the non-profit sector has begun to exert 
a significant role in the economy and what that role consisted in.  
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§1.1 STRICTLY AND EXTENDED RELIGIOUS CHARITY 
 
 In the course of time, the concept of non-profit sector has expressed several social, 
economic and legal meanings.     
 For sure, in the very beginning of its development, the non-profit sector could be 
identified in charity activities.  
If charity can “be popularly defined as the habit, desire, or act of relieving the 
physical, mental, moral, or spiritual needs of one’s fellows”4 [Ryan, 1908] then, in the Early 
Middle Age, that is the era of the persecution (I to V century) the non-profit sector was 
basically represented by a “strictly religious charity”. By “strictly religious charity” one 
means charity practices mostly founded on a religious base.  
This was the reality not only of the British territory, but of all the Roman Empire.  
The “habits, desires and acts of relieving” were to be realized by the transfer of 
personal resources – money, movable goods, immovable –; from a legal perspective, it was 
possible to detach three different ways to accomplish such transactions.  
In particular, people used to donate through:    
a)  material almsgivings, consisting in natural products such as oblations or 
collectae and in money contributions from rich people left on the altars for the 
Church.    
                                                 
4 The Christian definition of charity is provided by Ryan [1908]: “As a virtue, charity is that habit or power 
which disposes us to love God above all creatures for Himself, and to love ourselves and our neighbours for 
the sake of God. When this power or habit is directly infused into the soul by God, the virtue is supernatural; 
when it is acquired through repeated personal acts, it is natural. If, in the last sentence but one, for the words, 
"power or habit which disposes us to" we substitute the words, "act by which we", the definition will fit the act 
of charity. Such an act will be supernatural if it proceeds from the infused virtue of charity, and if its motive 
(God lovable because of His infinite perfections) is apprehended through revelation; if either of these 
conditions is wanting the act is only natural. Thus, when a person with the virtue of charity in his soul assists a 
needy neighbour on account of the words of Christ, "as long as you did it to one of these my least brethren, you 
did it to me", or simply because his Christian training tells him that the one in need is a child of God, the act is 
one of supernatural charity. It is likewise meritorious of eternal life. The same act performed by one who had 
never heard of the Christian revelation, and from the same motive of love of God, would be one of natural 
charity. When charity towards the neighbour is based upon love of God, it belongs to the same virtue (natural 
or supernatural according to circumstances) as charity towards God. However, it is not necessary that acts of 
brotherly love should rest upon this high motive in order to deserve a place under the head of charity. It is 
enough that they be prompted by consideration of the individual's dignity, qualities, or needs. Even when 
motivated by some purely extrinsic end, as popular approval or the ultimate injury of the recipient, they are in 
essence acts of charity”.   
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Church revenues were therefore divided into four parts, of which one went to the 
bishop, another to the clergy, a third to the maintenance of worship, and the 
fourth to the relief of distress5.  
b) wills; 
c) inter vivos acts. 
Among the three mentioned ways, the one described in point a) was the most 
practiced. This explains why the definition of “strictly religious charity” has been adopted to 
describe the non-profit sector of the Early Middle Age. In fact, there seems to be no that by 
leaving almsgiving on the altar of the church people did not mean anything else than atoning 
their own sins (that is these contributions were made not to reach a certain external purpose, 
but to satisfy an inward feeling). Of course people had to know the canon rule according to 
which the quart part of their resources was expected to be dedicated for pious causes, still 
the historical and social context, characterized by a strong influence of the Church, would 
suggest that donors would have reached full satisfaction just with the material delivery of the 
goods. Therefore, strictly religious charity represented acts of benevolence whose (inward) 
motivation was much more important than the (external) purpose they were expected to 
pursue.  
Actually, also wills and inter vivos act could give room for a strict religious charity.  
Yet, while for material almsgiving it was hard to establish if the donors were only meant to 
satisfy an inward motivation or if they did gifts counting on the canon law rule according to 
which part of their resources would have been distributed for charity purposes, for inter 
vivos and mortis causa acts such assessment would have been easier for these were 
sometimes supported by documents-evidences that might expressly disclose the intentions of 
the donors. Thus, in case donations were realized through oral agreement and oral wills, the 
assessment of the intentions of the donors would have been as hard as  in case of material 
almsgivings.  
Now, as regards the hypothesis of donations supported by documents, the donors 
could either make simple donations or they could envisage in their acts (wills or contracts) 
that the object of the donation had to be employed in a certain manner.  This certain manner 
                                                 
5 It shall be seen how Actually, during the late middle age, and in particular after the reformation, almsgivings 
were delivered directly in the hands of the beneficiaries, such as poor, idles, etc. .  
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still could present a religious element, such as repairing a chapel, or saying masses for the 
soul etc.  or a religious/social element such as feeding the poor, healing the sick etc.  
Contributions to the poor were in fact considered as religious acts [TWD, 1862] 
In the first case, if the donations were made to the Church (as it used to happen), then 
they represented strictly religious charity; that is the donors would have satisfied their 
inward feeling just for the fact of having donated.  
If these mere donations – so donations without any burden – were made to secular 
individual or institution, they obviously could not be considered in re ipsa as charities for 
the nature of secular donees, differently from the nature of the Church donee, did not 
involve an activity qualifiable as religious or religious social activity or an activity somehow 
reflecting the above mentioned charity definition provided by Ryan [1908]. 
However, donations to secular individual or entities, might well involve charity.    
In fact, in the second case, that is donations made for specific purposes other than 
inward motivations, the benevolence represented an extended religious charity.  Also in this 
case the donations could be accomplished on behalf of secular individual or institution, yet 
the specification of the donor for which the resources had to be employed for charitable 
purposes conferred to the donations themselves a charity dimension.  
In particular, the dimension of extended religious charity was a benevolence meant 
to satisfy an inward feeling as well as to satisfy an external need.  The interest of the donor 
was represented not only by his motivation – inward feeling – to donate, but also by the 
accomplishment of the task indicated by himself.  Actually, within the category of extended 
religious charity had to fall also the donations to the Church for which the donor required 
personal religious services, such as praying for his soul, his funeral etc.  This conventional 
approach had to be explained on the basis of the fact that these donations, differently from 
the “mere” donations, underscored the importance of the purpose which, for it presented a 
religious dimension, had to be considered charitable even if it did not aim at “relieving the 
physical, mental, moral, or spiritual needs of one’s fellows”. 
The practise of extended charity was already important in the Early Middle Age. 
There are evidences, in fact, that demonstrate that in many instances the donor provided the 
same gift for the support of the indigent and for the forgiveness of his sins [TWD, 1862]. As 
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it shall be seen, the extended religious charity became undoubtedly predominant in the Late 
Middle Age in occasion of a Decree of Pope Gregory6.  
The difference between strictly and extended charity is crucial when considered 
within an analysis of the (legal) discipline of the non-profit sector. The two different 
dimensions of charity express two different roles of the non-profit sector and, therefore, two 
different perspective of legal interests involved.  
In the strictly religious charity,  the motivation to make benevolence was more 
important than the purpose of the benevolence itself or the purpose might even not exist at 
all. Therefore, the law was only supposed to protect the interest in the accomplishment of 
the transaction. While there was no problem in case of material delivery (case a) ), there 
could be some legal issues concerning case b) and case c).  For example, a donor might be 
motivated to make benevolence to atone his sins and at the same time he wanted to donate 
for pious causes. Yet, instead of giving his resources  directly to the Church7, he could 
provide that his heirs or his donees would have had to do so. The pious cause was 
represented by the choice of the Church as final administrator of the funds.  In cases like 
these, the strictly religious charity dimension of the non-profit sector implied that the law 
was not expected to protect the interest of the donor in a “fair” administration from the 
Church of the donated resources. On the contrary, the law was expected to compel the heirs 
or the donees to give the resources to the Church as established by the donor.  
In the extended religious charity, the purpose to make benevolence reached the same 
importance – or becomes even more important – of the motivation. Other than envisaging 
the donee, the donor specified for which pious causes the funds had to be employed. The 
specification added another interest that deserved to be protected by the law – other than the 
one represented by the accomplishment of the transaction.  
So, how did the law of the Empire dealt with these donations? Did it consider them 
as strictly religious charity or as extended religious charity? The fact that there were many 
instances where the donor provided the same gift for the support of the indigent and for the 
                                                 
6 See p. 27 
7  The Church was the main recipient of the donations as well as the main organization charged with 
administration of charity funds. Moreover, in those cases where the Church was not the recipient, it still would 
have played a supervisory role. In fact, Often people made donations to Hospitals which were in the matter of 
facts regarded as ecclesiatical matters. 
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forgiveness of his sins did not automatically mean that the law would have protected the 
purpose other than the motivation.  
And actually law did not protect that interest until the unceasing increase of extended 
religious charity within the Roman Emperor urged a legislative intervention. This occurred 
and aimed at:  
a) providing peculiar rules in favor of legacies to pious causes; 
b) establishing rules for the administration of the charity.  
In particular,  in the time of Valentinian and Marcian, A. C. 452,  the Codex 
Theodosianus  provided that legacies in favor of the poor should be maintained, even though 
the legatees were not designated. This provision strengthened even more the position of the 
Church in charity matters, for having been established that whereas the testator did indicate 
uncertain persons (did not indicate at all)  as administrator of charitable funds, the Church, 
in the person of the Bishop, would have taken the control over the charities. 
For example, it might well happen that a testator envisaged in his will that the 
resources had to be employed for a religious or social-religious purpose. If he failed to 
indicate who was charged with such commitment, the provision had to be declared void. The 
intervention of the law avoided that resources of public utility could be wasted – or 
remained in the hand of the heirs – and, above all, promoted the interest/intention of the 
donor in the accomplishment of the pious opera.   
The fact itself that the Church entered in possess of the devised resources did not 
actually mean that they would have been employed according to the donor’s desires. The 
favor legacies was not sufficient to guarantee the proper administration of the funds. It was 
only sufficient to ensure that the funds would have flown into the hands of an administrator 
(the Church) supposed to comply with the pious/religious requirements of the donor.  
 Therefore, law had to deal with two different problems. The first was represented by 
the donor’s choice to elect an administrator who was not the Church, while the second was 
the direct administration of the Church. Did the Roman law dealt these two administrators in 
different ways? 
In the first case, the Code provided that the bishop superintended the management, 
being required  to have a watchful eye over the charitable funds, to praise them when they 
fulfilled their duty, to chide and remove those who were negligent, and, in such case, to 
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appoint other trustees, who had the true fear of God in their hearts, and the final day of 
judgment in their eye [TWD, 1862]. 
As regards the administration of the Church, either when directly chosen by the 
donor or when intervened for lack of designation of certain person, the Roman law 
established that the Bishop was not independent from the State, to which he had to present 
reports about the administration of certain charitable funds as for example   the redemption 
of captives. 
But the most striking and surprising rule, which applied either to the Church and to 
the secular individual or entity, was represented by the acknowledgement of the right to 
bring suits on behalf of every citizen – without distinction – interested in the fulfillment of 
the charitable intentions of the donor. This scheme disclosed either the public nature of 
charity and the outstanding actuality of an ancient legal order that had already been able to 
detach and to “statutorize” the economic interest in the fair administration of the funds8.    
These rules provided by the Codex Theodosianus  and Iustinianeus came in force in 
the same period of the proliferation of monasteries (V-VI century).  
These were ecclesiastical orders chartered by the Church and run by the monks, that 
is  ecclesiastic figures who professed the Catholic religion through a very peculiar life-style 
consisting basically in the observation of a strict discipline directed to the highest elevation 
of human spirit and to the maintenance of this as far as possible from worldly temptations.  
 The importance of such Church agencies was demonstrated by their actual 
involvement in providing fundamental social services through the conduction of hospitals 
and schools. The attainment  of a lofty reputation ensured to monasteries valuable gifts of 
land and gold.  
The funds for charity experienced a sharp rise during the XIII century when a Decree 
issued by Pope Gregory promised salvation to all the people that had bequeathed in their 
wills part of their wealth to the support of pious causes.  Moreover, to ensure the salvation 
of those who died intestate (that is without leaving any will), the Church obtained the right 
to administrate their property and to distribute a portion to pious causes.  
                                                 
8 “This remarkable passage from the Code, shows that the great principle of the public nature of a charity, was 
judicially recognized to the same extent as at present, although no officer like the attorney-general was 
employed to represent the public, in a proceeding to establish the public right” [TWD, 1862]. 
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It is true, that did not mean that the decuius had to grant her funds to Ecclesiastical 
institutions (Church or monasteries) for obtaining salvation. In fact, the funds could be 
entrusted also to secular individuals or institutions. In other words, what ensured salvation 
was actually the provision that those funds had to be utilized for pious causes and not the 
subjective element (ecclesiastic or laic) of the trustee.  
As seen, the expression pious causes in turn did involve a very large category. Some 
of them were definitely religious, such as gifts for saying masses, foundation of chantries etc, 
other were disposed for the construction of bridges, roads, hospitals, etc.  Just the wideness 
of this category justified the definition of extended religious charity.  
Other than wills’ provisions, by the way, donations continued to be accomplished 
through inter vivos acts. These were normally realized by the wealthier class either in the 
form of a direct contact with the beneficiaries – as  for example giving food or clothes out in 
occasion of banquets and celebrations – and in the form of a direct almsgiving on behalf of 
the Church.   The Church, in fact, used to insist in convincing the richer people that the 
“superfluity” of goods, belonged to the poor and was common wealth to be shared in times 
of need [Sweet, 1958 in Clark 2002], such like the Late Middle Age period (XIII century). 
The papal Decree other than entailing an increase of charitable funds, implied the 
arise of agency problems in charity. It is true, the existence of agency problems had already 
been demonstrated by the provisions contained in the  Theodosianus  and Justinianeus codes 
that dealt with the designation of uncertain persons and with the administration of funds. 
Yet,  differently from the era of persecutions, the executory type donations – especially those 
envisaged by the wills – were much more in number than those of executed one, that is those 
represented by the  material delivery of resources on the alter or anywhere else. 
 Executory donations involved a certain gratuitous activity from the donee so that this 
could not be interested in doing. The increase of these conflict of interests implied therefore 
a likely increase of problems agency.   
Moreover, the difference between executed and executory donations was very crucial from a 
legal point of view, as in common law the former were considered contracts whereas the 
latter not.  
The interest in the execution of the donation belonged either to the decuius and to the 
class of beneficiaries and to all those that could have an interest in relation of the donation 
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scheme. Of course, the donation contained in the will could well not provide for any class of 
beneficiary or any indication on the ways of administration, being simply a donation on 
behalf of the Church.  On one side, this could be considered as strictly religious charity. On 
the other side, many years were passed by since the time when people did donations just in 
order to atone their own sins; after the XI century, almost all the donations to ecclesiastical 
institutions, even if it was not explicitly specified, were aimed at contributing to the charity 
activity expected to be carried out by the institutions themselves. In other words, the role of 
the non-profit sector was by now represented by the extended religious charity.  
When concerned with questions related to the fair employment of the devised funds 
it has to be remarked that since the Reign of Henry III, the Church, in person of the Bishops, 
enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction over the testaments of personality. In the exertion of such 
function, and continuing a tradition initiated by the Roman Codes of the early Middle Age, 
the Bishops were bent to show a very elastic attitude towards clauses and terms involving 
charity. In fact, although these were not correctly constructed by the testator, they still were 
not declared void for being too indefinite. This attitude of the ecclesiastical courts 
undoubtedly facilitated the collection  of resources destined to charity.  
Now, if the testator indicated an ecclesiastic institution as the executor or 
administrator of the funds, hypothesis of maladministration could hardly be challenged as 
the Ecclesiastical Courts would have not decided against their own interests.  
A secular individual or institution would have therefore been much more accountable 
for his/her administration. Yet, the remedies offered by Ecclesiastical Courts were not 
deemed very efficient by those interested in the fair administration of the decuius funds. 
There were also complains about the high fees and the delay of the litigations.  
For these reasons, people began to address their petitions to the Court of Chancery9 
that remained concurrent with that of the Bishop.   
Such choice represented a very crucial point for the discipline of charitable legacies.  
In fact, the Court of Chancery was the only judiciary body that could enforce the 
uses or trusts, that is those legal devices through which bequests and donations were realized.  
                                                 
9 This was possible because of the extra-ordinary character of this Court. In fact, its origins are connected with 
the cases within which the Common Law presented too formalistic aspects to protect a party’s interest. Thus, 
petitions were addressed to the Crown pleading for a decision taken “for the love of God and in the way of 
charity”.  Slowly such petitions began to be addressed to the Lord Chancellor whose repeated proceedings led 
to the institution of a separate court, the Court of Chancery.  
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Put it differently, just the Lord Chancellor could compel the executor indicated by the 
testator to respect the provisions of the bequest. The Ecclesiastical Courts could not do it as 
before the canon law the executor was the legal owner and, as such, he/she enjoyed full 
disposal. The Bishop could only make the feoffee account to him.   
The employment of the trust/use legal device for charitable purposes has to be 
discussed more accurately.  
To begin with, this institute originated in a practice adopted during the era of 
crusades (XI-XII century). Such practice was afterwards legally acknowledged by the Court 
of Equity, that became to be an established judicial institution since the XIV century.   
At the time of crusades, land ownership in England was based on the feudal system. 
When a landowner left England to fight in the Crusades, he needed someone to run his estate 
in his absence, often to pay and receive feudal dues. To achieve this, he would convey 
ownership of his lands to a friend, on the understanding that the ownership would be 
conveyed back on his return. However, crusaders would often return to find the legal 
owners' refusal to hand over the property. 
Unfortunately for the crusader, English law did not recognize his claim. As far as the 
courts were concerned, the land belonged to the trustee, who was under no obligation to 
return it. The crusader had no legal claim.  
The disgruntled crusader would then petition the king, who would refer the matter to 
his Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor could do what was “just” and “equitable”, and 
had the power to decide a case according to his conscience. At this time, the principle of 
equity was born. 
The Lord Chancellor would consider it unjust that the legal owner could deny the 
claims of the crusader (the “true”) owner. Therefore, he would find in favor of the returning 
crusader. Over time, it became known that the Lord Chancellor’s court (the Court of 
Chancery) would continually recognize the claim of a returning crusader. The legal owner 
would hold the land for the benefit of the original owner, and would be compelled to convey 
it back to him when requested. The crusader was the “beneficiary” and the friend the 
“trustee”.  
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With the judicial acknowledgment of the equitable and just interest of the settlor 
(who was at the same time beneficiary), the landholders devised to adopt the institute of 
“use” to avoid to pay taxes.  
In particular, the majority of these taxes were appropriated by the Crown when the 
landholder died. Thus, by placing his property in the name of another person, charged with 
administering it on behalf of the landholder himself, his heirs would not have been 
jeopardized in occasion of his death. 
As seen, the risk of a bad behavior of the trustee (feoffee) – for example after the 
death of the landholder he could refuse to transfer the land to the heirs – could not be averted 
before the common law courts. These, in fact, did not envisage a writ for such petitions and, 
moreover, the common law courts involved too formalistic procedures that rendered hard to 
demonstrate the agreements between the settlor and the feoffee [Zweigert and Kotz, 1998].   
Most importantly, not only the Court of Chancery acknowledged the agreement 
between the settlor and the feoffee but also offered typical equity remedies as for example 
the specific performance.  
In other words, even if the Common Law courts had conferred legal validity to the 
agreement between settlor and feoffee, that is even if the Common Law courts had 
considered the mentioned agreement as a contract, then the remedy that they would have 
offered was only the recover of damages.  
It is clear that a recover of damages in case of misbehavior of a person who had been 
chosen for trust questions could not content the settlor, who was definitely better and more 
completely protected by a specific performance, that is by the power of the Court of 
Chancery to enforce the obligation.  
Had the institute of trust not be devised and developed in the described way within 
the English Courts and English legislative bodies, charitable bequests and donations would 
probably have continued to be realized through Roman and Canon law institutes which, as 
seen earlier, would have not guaranteed the protection of the interest in the administration of 
the donated funds.  
 The circumstances related to need of the shift of jurisdiction demonstrated even 
more that already in the second early stage, the non-profit sector, expressed by extended 
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religious charity initiatives, was affected by what neo-classical economists define as 
problems of agency and that these concerned above all  funds granted mortis causa.  
Moreover it has to be remarked that before the Chancellor, charity still did not 
deserve a separate legal discipline (as it happened before the Ecclesiastic Court), rather it 
had to be considered within the wider law of trust. It is true, the fact that the legal 
proceedings were initiated by private individual who had an interest in the fair 
administration of the fund, reflected the private dimension of the non-profit sector and its 
relationship with the trust discipline. No attempt was made to enforce a charitable use 
through an information brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the Crown.  
The affirmation of the Court of Chancery over testament of personality increased the 
accountability of the Church and monasteries in relation to the administration of charitable 
legacies. This is true above all after 1529 when for the first time a lay man, Thomas More, 
served as Lord Chancellor.  
Anyways, the ecclesiastical matrix of the Court of Chancery favored the maintenance 
of the elastic attitude towards vague and indefinite clauses mentioned in the acts establishing 
charitable trusts.   
Moreover, the charitable trusts became even more frequent because of the enactment 
of the Statute of Uses in 1535 [Tudor, 1995].  Although this statute was strongly wanted by 
Henry VIII to stop landholders’ constitution of trusts to avoid to pay inheritance taxes, it 
actually did not slow down the adoption of such legal device.  
In fact, as Jordan [1958] explained, the preamble of the Act recited at length the 
abuses and national disadvantages flowing from the employment of uses, while the text of 
the Act cured the tax payment problem simply by confirming that the legal estate belonged 
to the cestui que use (the person who had the use).  
So the Statute did not forbid the uses, as Henry VIII actually would have preferred, it 
just stated that the equity owner was treated as a “normal” legal owner (and not as beneficial 
owner)  and as such he would have bore all the responsibilities connected with the land; in 
other words the statute ensured Henry VIII that someone would have paid the taxes.  
Now, the consequence of conceiving the feoffee as the legal owner implied that 
possible cases would have been dealt with before the Common Law courts. Yet, it remained 
possible to separate the beneficial interest from the legal title and therefore, the competence 
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of the Court of Chancery resisted. In fact, it was held that when the trust was active, when 
real and active duties were vested in the trustee in relation to the beneficiary, the act did not 
prohibit, as was the construction of the statute when a use was established for a term of years 
[Jordan, 1958; p. 111].  
Put it differently, as the scope of the Statute was just that of striking cunning 
landholders, if the trustee were not simply a prestanome but was actually a person charged 
with doing something that the settlor needed, then the use would have been dealt as 
conferring equitable interests and the Court of Chancery would have decided possible cases.  
Therefore, the old principles continued to be in force under a different perspective 
represented by the conception according to which equity cares “to the intent rather than the 
form” [Stalteri, 2002].  
In the same period Henry VIII broke up with the Catholic Church (1529-1536) and 
initiated a process of Reformation aimed at vanishing the existing ecclesiastic privileges. 
The distrust against the Church was due to several reasons, both personal of Henry VIII 
himself and political.  
To begin with, the king instituted a royal commission charged with reporting the 
conditions of Monasteries that in the meantime had gradually lost their good reputation;  
“The commissioners reported about one-third of  the houses to be fairly well conducted, some of them models 
of excellent management and pure living; but the other two-thirds were charged with looseness beyond 
description. The number of inmates in some cloisters was kept below the required number, that there might be 
more money to divide among the monks. The number of servants sometimes exceeded that of the monks. 
Abbots bought and sold land in a fraudulent manner; gifts for hospitality were misapplied; licentiousness, 
gaming and drinking prevailed extensively. Crime and absolution for gold went hand in hand. One friar was 
said to have been the proud father of an illegitimate family of children, but he had in his possession a forged 
license from the pope, who permitted his wandering, "considering his frailty." Froude, in commenting upon the 
report, says: "If I were to tell the truth, I should have first to warn all modest eyes to close the book and read no 
farther."”  [Wishart, 2006] 
The report led the Parliament to order the suppression of all the monasteries. 
Although such Act could not be considered as legislation concerning charity, in the matter of 
facts it involved charity for monasteries being institutions strongly involved in providing 
social/public services. 
Other than demonstrating a negative attitude against the Church as administrator of 
charity funds, the Tudor Government (1485-1603) intervened also to exclude religious 
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purposes from the (legal) conception of charity. This normative better reflected the Ryan 
[1908] definition of charity which, since that the adoption of the normative itself, more and 
more lost its religious dimension on behalf of a socio-economic one. Thus, while strictly 
religious charity had basically lost its importance, the extended religious charity resisted 
only to the extent to which certain donations were still motivated by religious feelings.  
In particular,  with the adoption of 23 Henry VIII cap. 10, in 1532, the government 
disciplined the endowment of chantries. It provided that all feoffments made, inter alia, “to 
uses and intents to have obittes perpetuall, or a conintuall service of a Priste for ever” were 
declared void, being much prejudicial to the King […] and land so conveyed was to 
escheat10 to the mesne lord.   
In 1545, another normative intervention established that the endowments of chantries 
had to be appropriated to the Crown11.  King Henry VIII had to convince people that the 
funds would have been used for charity purposes.  
As on the death (1545) of Henry VIII the right of the Crown to appropriate chantries  
had lapsed, in 1547 Edward VI proceeded to restore it12. Yet, the King gave much more 
importance to the religious aspects than to the questions related to maladministration.  
 Such kind of legislative activity conferred to the agency problems  of charity a new 
perspective that concerned at least three aspects.  
 The first was related to the interests of donors. These were no longer free to choose 
for which purposes their property had to be used so that the private dimension of charity 
became restrained. The circumstance by which property devised for religious purposes had 
to be transferred to the Crown implied a strong public intrusion in charitable doings.  It is 
clear that Tudor Government was meant to take advantage of the private benevolence for 
facing the critical economic and social conditions of their times. In practice, the interests of 
the donors became compulsorily connected with those social duties expected to be executed 
by the State.  
                                                 
10 Escheat is a common law doctrine that operates to ensure that property is not left in limbo and ownerless. It 
originally referred to a number of situations where a legal interest in land was destroyed by operation of law, so 
that the ownership of the land reverted to the immediately superior feudal lord. Most common-law jurisdictions 
have abolished the concept of feudal tenure of property, and so the concept of escheat has lost something of its 
meaning. Even in England and Wales, where escheat still operates as a doctrine of land law, there are unlikely 
to be any feudal lords to take property on an escheat, so that in practice the recipient of an escheated property is 
The Crown. Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escheat  
11 37 Henry VIII cap. 4.  
12 Statute I, Edward VI cap. 14.  
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 The second aspect concerned the shift in the administration of the funds. The 
suspects over Church administration of charitable legacies, translated into the mentioned 
three normative Acts and  the fact that after the Reformation  “the objects of charity were to 
become more secular as the majority of Englishmen reflected less on the fate of their souls 
and became more concerned with the worldly needs of their fellow men” [Jordan 1958,  in 
Jones 1969], marked an important step towards the preference of a secular charity.  The 
connection between the first and the second aspect was represented by the fact that the 
interests of people in public services was not only a consequence of the statutory prohibition 
to dedicate funds to religious scopes, but also a consequence of an inward change of their 
preferences.  
 The third aspect also regarded the shift into the administration of charitable funds. 
The mentioned statutory provisions already suggested the participation of the King into the 
supplying of charity. Yet, this involvement was not only limited to the appropriation of the 
properties devised for religious purposes, but was also promoted by specific statutory 
legislations.  
 As seen, the dissolution of the monasteries was followed, other than by legislative 
provisions aimed at disciplining private charities, even by others concerned with 
establishing public units for poor relief.  
 These Acts were extremely important since they consecrated charity on a two-fold 
dimension: public and private. The Welfare State was the result of this public-private 
partnership initiated  by the Tudors (1483-1603).  
 In particular,  
“by the Act of 1536 (Henry VIII c. 25), the churchwardens were 
to raise charitable contributions for the relief of the poor within 
their area, thus being the first to be made statutorily responsible 
for the poor. The voluntary nature was largely transformed into 
indirect compulsions in 1552 by the next Act ( 5 & & Edw.  VI. 
C), which also order the appointment for each parish of two 
collectors”. Compulsory measures were definitely adopted in 
1563 (by 5 Eliz., c. 3), although the contributions were still 
termed “charitable alms”. With the codifying Act of 1572 (14 
Eliz., c. 5) , we have the first statutory appointment of “overseers” 
who were to be associated with the “collectors” in each parish. An 
important development was shown by the Act of 1576 (18 Eliz., c. 
3) which directed the justices of the peace to “ appoint and order 
stocks of wool, hemp, flax, iron or other stuff”, in order that the 
able bodied poor should be set to work there on   
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 (The stock thus produced could then be sold and the profits used to purchase supplies for 
the direct relief of indigent).   
Nearly a generation then passed with only minor changes in the 
Poor Law, until the great scarcity of corn in 1594-1598, causing 
the price at one period to be nearly trebled, resulted in 
disturbances and general distress. This led to the consolidation 
of the legislation of the previous half-century by the Act of 
1597 (39 Eliz., c. 3); though incorporating little fresh matter, it 
aimed at a drastic enforcement of the Poor Law throughout the 
country. The Act of 1601 (43 Eliz. C. 2) was practically a re-
enactment (with trifling alterations) of the temporary Statute of 
1597 and still forms the basis of our English Poor Law.  
 
(In fact, the 1601 Act – 43  Eliz. C. 2 – extended  the tax base by adding categories of people 
obliged to pay). 
That the machinery provided in 1597-1601 was shortly 
afterwards put into operation in the more populous parishes is 
generally regarded as probable, though it must remain largely 
hypothetical until the parish records in many counties have been 
catalogued. It is more likely that the majority of rural parishes, 
then very small population, did not need a compulsory poor rate 
until a generation later at least;  and it is almost certain that the 
number of country parishes which had adopted a definite 
scheme of relief before 1597 were very few [Emmison, 1931]”. 
  
 To present schematically the organization of the parish in relation to poor relief, 
one may  illustrate as follows:  
a) the Churchwardens were  elected at the Vestry meeting each Easter and appointed for 
one year. The Vestry was what would today usually be called a parochial church 
council. By 1536 Churchwardens began responsible to collect resources for poor 
relief. In practice, their  job  consisted in establishing the amount of the poor rate, 
who had to pay the rate and, therefore, keeping and organizing the registers of the 
parish-church they worked for.  
b) the Justices of the Peace was an office whose origins dated back to 1195. Richard I in 
that year commissioned certain knights to preserve the peace in unruly areas. They 
were responsible to the King for ensuring that the law was upheld. They preserved 
the "King's Peace", and were known as Keepers of the Peace. The title Justices of the 
Peace derives from 1361, in the reign of Edward III. An Act of 1327 had referred to 
“good and lawful men” to be still appointed  by the Crown in every county in the 
land to “guard the Peace”. 
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As concerns poor relief system, the justices of the peace had to appoint the overseers 
of the poor and play a supervisory role on the job of the latter;  
c) the Overseers of the Poor were actually instituted only in 1597.  In fact, the above 
mentioned Act of 1572 required each parish to appoint an Alms Collector, and a 
Supervisor of Rogues and Vagabonds; these two offices were only later combined 
into that of Overseer of the Poor. 
Basically, the Overseers of the Poor were nothing but Churchwardens charged with 
the administration of the poor law system.  So the difference consisted in the fact that 
the former had a specific competence.  
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§1.3 THE SOCIOLOGICAL CHARITY 
  
 The changes related to the interests to be pursued – from strictly and extended 
religious interests to sociologic interests – and to the subject charged with the administration 
of charitable funds – from the Church to laic and public individuals or institutions –   shaped 
new dimensions of the agency problems.  
 On the private side of charity, it has been seen how both the distrust in Church 
administration of charitable funds and the awareness that salvation did not depend on the 
bequests  left to Church for pious causes led people to put their properties into secular 
hands. Anyways, it must be added that, although the intentions continued therefore to be 
those of granting relief to needy people, already since XIV century it was developed the  
idea that an indiscriminate charity would have brought more problems than resolving the 
existing ones.   
 Complaints on this regard referred to the fact that there was a significant number of 
able-bodies who used to take advantage of charity notwithstanding their proper condition to 
work and, therefore, proper condition to look after themselves.  
 Now, apart from the discussion on the abuses of the beneficiaries,  the shift into 
secular hands did not resolve problems of agency whereas also lay executors used to not 
behave according to the wishes expressed either by the testator and by living donor.  In the 
sixteenth century, in fact, “a process of separation between donor and donee entered English 
dealings with the poor” [Fishman, 2005]. In other words, it has to be underscored that the 
majority of inter vivos charity was not longer characterized by a direct almsgiving (to the 
Church or the beneficiaries), but as well as in case of wills’ provisions, it began to be 
realized through executory donations. This of course implied that the interest of the donor 
had a stronger voice as he/she could actively complaint for questions concerning 
administrations of the funds while this could not happen in mortis causa charity.  
 Whether the trust – that as seen earlier was the legal scheme adopted for charity 
initiatives of more significant value – was established by an inter vivos or a mortis causa act, 
the Court of Chancery did not prove able to look after maladministration of charitable funds. 
It is true, its efficiency had lasted only for few years when it was distinguished by a speedy 
and simple procedure. After that, pleading progressively became more verbose and delaying 
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motions. The most complicated problem regarded the right to bring suit before the Court of 
Chancery. Differently from private trust, in fact, the charitable trust did (and does) not 
involve a definite class of beneficiaries. Representative actions were often challenged by 
defendants who objected that the representatives were not “apt parties”. 
 Exigency of certainty and justice 13  in relation to charity demanded a specific 
normative intervention that would have established an efficient procedure. Moreover, the 
urgency of a discipline was justified by the fact that England was experiencing very difficult 
economic situations and private charity was needed as the State was not able to provide and 
guarantee the basic social-public services. In fact, taxation for poor relief was vehemently 
resisted because it was taxation and, as seen above, only in 1563 charitable contributions 
were made compulsory.   
 Thus, in 1597, the 39 Elizabeth I c.6 was decided. This provision other than being 
considered as the first of the Acts that would have formed the Poor Law, solved problem 
related to the right to stand; indeed, the control over charity was referred to the Crown which 
became “enabled to initiate and sustain a thorough investigation of charitable uses” [Jones, 
1969]. 
 The procedure implied that the Court of Chancery would have issued a 
commission that would have carried out inquisitions with the support of a jury and of the 
parish officers .  
 This Act was soon repealed for it was too imprecise and, even more important, for  
it did not provide the right for the interested people (that is, the people interested in the fair 
administration of the charity) to challenge the members of the jury who might be personally 
interested in the funds. The right to challenge jurors was in fact guaranteed by article XXIX 
of the Great Charter14. The abrogation took place through the adoption in 1601 of the Statute 
of Charitable Uses.  
                                                 
13 That is the fundamental  functions of law.  
14 “No Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or 
be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by 
lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to 
any man either Justice or Right”. 
38 
 
 As regards the agency problems concerning the public side of charity it has firstly 
to be observed how before 1597-1601 only few parishes had adopted the scheme of poor 
relief envisaged by XVI century legislation15.  
 For being resources obtained from compulsory taxation – and not therefore 
voluntary contribution or voluntary investment as in the case of business corporations – the  
analysis of the relationship between property owners (tax payer, patrons, principals) and 
parishes  (public managers, agents) conducted through the agency theory assumptions, must 
be integrated by some observations.  
 In brief, to explain the differences between the agency problems occurring in private 
firms – whether non-profit or profit seeking – and public administration, one may set out 
from the opinion of Luby [2009] according to which:   
 elected officials (the agent), acting through their financial 
managers, make policy choices to divert the resources of the 
taxpayers (the principal) for personal gain. In this context, 
personal gain refers to the elected official increasing his/her 
reelection chances through the use of an upfront refinancing 
savings structure thus reducing the necessity of having to make 
potentially unpopular policy choices such as raising taxes or 
cutting government services. 
 
 Thus, the elected officials in the Tudor period were not really elected. The Justice of 
the Peace were appointed by the Crown and the Overseers of the Poor were nominated by 
the Justices of the Peaces themselves.  An administrative system like this implied that in the 
matter of facts it was hard to reason through agency theory findings so far as the supposed 
principals did not choose their agents.  
 So, the lack of the voluntary element and the statutory impositions of the agents 
represented basically other problems than those of agency, that is public law problems with 
particular reference to democratic aspects.  
Yet, frequent were the cases within which people donated property to parishes 
voluntarily. That is, they chose as their agent the public institution instead of a private 
individual or organization.  The interests of these donors in encouraging good behavior 
(from the public administrators) and personal industry among paupers (so in avoiding 
indiscriminate charity) was reflected by the conditions the donors themselves used to 
provide for in their deeds [Birtles, 1999].  
                                                 
15 See the description of Emmison [1931] above p. 29 
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 Accuracy requires to remind that obviously the money and benefits arising from 
private charity could not used to offset the rates. So, donors who chose to put into parish 
hands their personal properties still were obliged to pay the poor rates.   
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§1.4 THE WELFARE SYSTEM CHARITY 
  
 The legislative process – for  which Queen Elizabeth I [Reign 1558-1603] aimed 
firstly at establishing a private-public partnership for charity services and secondly at 
speeding up the efficiency of this system  – reached the final consecration in 1601, with the 
decision respectively of the Poor Law Act and the Statute of Charitable Uses.       
 As seen above, the former was at the same time an evolution of the 1597 Elizabeth 
39 c. 3 and a device for consolidating all the previous Acts containing practices related to 
the organizational aspects of poor relief; whereas the latter was an evolution of the 1597 
Elizabeth 39 c. 6, thus concerned with the control over the administration of charitable 
funds. In other words, the Statute of Charitable Uses was specifically concerned with agency 
problems.  
   The consolidation provided by the Poor Law Act 1601 can be outlined as follows:  
a)  the church-parish was the governmental unit responsible for poor relief and with 
imposing a tax (the poor rate) for levying public resources for charity.  
Therefore, the Elizabethan Poor Law was directed to restore somehow the theory of the 
British rule according to which “an established Church had the legal responsibility of 
providing nearly all religious, cultural, human service and educational activities” [Hammack, 
1998];  
 
b) the relief of the poor was placed in the hands of Churchwardens  and of two to four 
“Overseers of the Poor”, who were appointed annually by the justices of the peace, and 
drawn from the substantial householders of the parish. The Overseers of the Poor were in 
fact unpaid. Their duties were to levy and collect the poor rate and to see that it was actually 
expended for charitable purposes.  
 
The role conferred to these figures represented a major change with the past. 
Previously, the responsibility of initiating measures for relief rested on the head officials of 
the towns or the justices of the peace in the parishes. Instead, the justices of the peace 
assumed a supervisory role. For most of the sixteenth century voluntary assistance was the 
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source of fund and their locus was in the church16. Poor relief became now part of the civil 
power [Fishman, 2005]. 
    The poor relief system based on the parish unit has also been seen by economic 
scholars as a form of insurance. People were willing to pay a rate in the awareness they 
might need relief at some time in the future.  
The efficiency of this system could be explained by the fact that the classic problems 
of insurance, that is moral hazard and adverse selection,  were not really suffered: “there is 
moral hazard when as the result of being insured against a specific event, an individual 
changes his or her behavior in such a way as to make the event more likely. In the context of 
poor relief, this might involve feigning either illness or the inability to find work. But moral 
hazard was un likely to have been a severe problem in small communities where potential 
recipients were well known to relief authorities. Adverse selection occurs when providers of 
insurance cannot distinguish high from low risk individuals. Under the old poor law this was 
not a problem because all individuals were covered” [Solar, 1995].   
 The Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 aimed at providing a mechanism to make 
trustees more accountable for the appropriate administration of charitable assets deriving 
from donations.  
  To begin with, the Crown restored the role of the Church in charity matters.  
 This intention of the Queen can be detached at paragraph 4 of the Act where it was 
provided that the Bishop of the Church of England headed every investigation against 
charitable boards and directors.  
 The involvement of the Bishop was actually only an element of the articulated 
procedure prospected by the legislation.  
 In particular, the Bishop was one of the five commissioners that had already 
introduced by the 1597 Elizabeth 39 c. 6 Act.  
                                                 
16  According to MacKay [2009], “it is often plausibly but incorrectly asserted that the dissolution of 
monasteries rendered Poor Law necessary”. The confiscation of the religious houses, however, only affected a 
few localities. These establishments were, moreover, rather great inns than places  devoted to the relief of 
distress. The philanthropic legislation of Elizabeth, as evidenced by Acts for the encouragement of charitable 
endowments and compulsory assessment for the poor, seems to be part of a general policy, and though possibly 
it may be referred to the Legislature’s desire to show that the interests of the poor, as then understood, were not 
to be allowed to suffer by the ecclesiastical revolution, the dissolution of monasteries was not in itself a 
sufficient economic cause to warrant the universal compulsory assessment which then began.  
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 Once the commission had been issued by the Court of Chancery it would have 
discussed the allegations in a public hearing together  with jury and the parish officers.  
 The latter were represented by the Churchwardens and by the Overseers of the 
Poor and they played a very fundamental role in the decision making process of the 
commissioners. In fact, they were required to provide all the evidences of all the hypothesis 
of charity maladministration which they were aware of.    
 This meant that the control over charity was exerted at a local level where the 
parishes acted as government agencies. In other words, every county had its own Chancery 
Court that, when required by the Crown, issued the commission for the inquisitions over 
charitable funds. The commission was formed by local parishioners that had to know quite 
well the situations that occurred in the parish where they lived in. Similarly, a good 
knowledge of the parish life was expected to be held by the Churchwardens and the 
Overseers of the Poor.  
 The decree issued by the commissioners could be appealed by the interested people 
before the Court of Chancery.  
 Obviously, some peculiarities had to occur when the investigations carried out by 
the commissioners involved parish officers such as the Overseers of the Poor, 
Churchwardens, Vicar etc.  As seen earlier, in fact, it could happen that bequests or 
donations were accomplished on behalf of the parish which, therefore, was expected to act 
as trustee.  
 In fact, actually, one of the problems of the Poor Law, of which the charity 
commission procedure was a part, was local corruption at the parish level.  Theoretically, if 
a donor to a trust to assist the poor found that the churchwardens or overseers were 
misappropriating the funds, the donor could demand that a commission be set up, and such 
commission would if empanelled investigate17.   
  Other than the establishment of a new procedure – that as mentioned before had 
already been partially introduced by the 1597 Elizabeth 39 c. 6 Act –, the 1601 Statute 
helped to draw definitively the outlines of the “legal” definition of charity. In fact, the 
                                                 
17 That happens today in the United States all the time.  A local authority is accused of corruption and in 
defense, the mayor or some other official appoints a group to investigate the charges or the matter is turned 
over to a grand jury to investigate.   
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jurisdiction of the commissioners would have covered all the uses set out in the Preamble of 
the Act18. By the way, the catalogue was never regarded as exclusive.  
 According to Stalteri [2002] the Statute of Charitable Uses introduced a new 
methodological technique of selection that vested the judge with the power to recognize or 
not the charitable nature of a certain organization.  
  
                                                 
18  Whereas Landes Tenementes Rentes Annuities Profittes Hereditamentes, Goodes Chattels Money and 
Stockes of Money, have bene heretofore given limitted appointed and assigned, as well by the Queenes most 
excellent Majestie and her moste noble Progenitors, as by sondrie other well disposed persons, some for 
Releife of aged impotent and poore people, some for Maintenance of sicke and maymed Souldiers and 
Marriners, Schooles of Learninge, Free Schooles and Schollers in Universities, some for Repaire of Bridges 
Portes Havens Causwaies Churches Seabankes and Highwaies, some for Educacion and prefermente of 
Orphans, some for or towardes Reliefe Stocke or Maintenance of Howses of Correccion, some for Mariages of 
poore Maides, some for Supportacion Ayde and Helpe of younge tradesmen Handicraftesmen and persons 
decayed, and others for reliefe or redemption of Prisoners or Captives, and for aide or ease of any poore 
Inhabitantes concerninge paymente of Fifteenes, setting out of Souldiers and other Taxes; Whiche Landes 
Tenementes Rents Annuities Profitts Hereditaments Goodes Chattells Money and Stockes of Money 
nevertheles have not byn imployed accordinge to the charitable intente of the givers and founders thereof, by 
reason of Fraudes breaches of Truste and Negligence in those that shoulde pay delyver and imploy the same…: 
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§1.5 THE POLITICAL CHARITY  
 
The efficiency of the system of poor relief designed by the Elizabethan Acts did not 
survive to the Civil War (1642-1660) as during this period there were far more important 
issues in the country to be resolved than the proper use of charitable assets. Utilization of 
charity commissioners declined [Owen  1964, in Fishman 2008]. 
 In the words of Jones [1968], “the method of investigation established under the 
Charitable Uses Act 1601, could not efficiently function in a society whose gentry served 
with reluctance as commissioners, whose jurors resented their jury service, whose parish 
officers were lax and inefficient, whose central government was pathetic, and whose 
Chancellor would not oppress any man for the sake of a charity and bitterly regretted the 
privileges which his predecessors had afforded to charitable trust”.  
 This led to two consequences. The first was that the Justices of the Peace and the 
Overseers of the Poor in each locality were left to interpret the provisions of the 1601 Poor 
Law Act as they thought best [Rose, 1971].  The decline of the commission jeopardized in 
fact the Governmental attempt to centralize the control over the administration of charities, 
increasing  the degree of local discretion.   
The second implied that 
 instead of the charity commissions, which depended upon the 
energy and good will of neighbors, petitioners on behalf of 
charities used another procedure, the information, which was an 
appeal to the Attorney General. The attorney general as relator 
sought to enforce charitable trusts on behalf of an aggrieved 
individual or charity through an action in Chancery. By this time, 
many of the Commission proceedings wound up in Chancery on 
appeal, so one of the initial advantages of the commissions, an 
expeditious hearing, was lost. The information was felt to be a 
more efficient procedure, and the commission procedure fell into 
disuse. Thus, the Commission procedure was undermined by the 
legalization of the process, the use of traditional channels of 
litigation to prolong and to change the internal result [Fishman, 
2008].  
 Moreover, the Attorney General, representing the Crown in its character of parens 
patriae, was the protector of the charities (as the property of the public), and could sue ex 
officio by information for the reform of abuses to which charities might be subject. It can be 
said that the duty to protect the charity had to involve also the duty to control charities, in 
the sense that he had the duty not only reform the abuses but also to avoid them.   
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Anyway, since 1680 to 1760 England experienced the “dark age” of philanthropy. 
One reason could be that donations for social purposes began to be considered as violations 
of the heir’s at law rights so that judges demonstrated a stricter attitude in recognizing those 
privileges that had been happily recognized during the previous century. According to 
Goose [2006], an expanding tax base and increasing per capita poor relief payments swung 
the balance decisively towards formal relief.   
The distrust against charity was then expressed by legislation. The Mortmain Act of 
1736 avoided devises of land to charity and vested the property so devised in the testator’s 
heir at law or (exceptionally) his next of kin. 
During the “dark age of philanthropy” the income of charities still continued to 
increase, this not being due to donations but to the increased value of land, urban and 
agricultural. That is, the lands that had been devised to non-profit organizations in the 
previous century used to be given on rent on behalf of  third parties. The increased value of 
the land would have ensured a high fee.  
The decline of donations meant actually the decline of institutions of new charitable 
trusts. In the matter of fact donors still used to direct their flow of benevolence  those non-
profit organizations established (mostly) during Tudor or Stuart times or to the familiar 
charities for the poor.  
Yet, within in this period it became common that charities were developed through 
voluntary subscription forms.  These fundamentally consisted in a plan or in a project to be 
financed on voluntary basis, in a certain sense resembling the model of joint-stock company.  
For example, the The Lunatic Asylum, out of Bootham Bar, was built by general subscription, 
in 1774, from a plan prepared by Mr. Alderman Carr. The subscription list formed by about 
three hundred names included a number of amounts as high as 500 pounds and many of 100 
pounds [Owen, 1964].  
On one side, the (new) practice of launching voluntary subscriptions entailed the 
replacement of the individual doer of good works with philanthropic associations.  
On the other side, it implied  of course different legal aspects to be regarded. In fact, 
according to Owen [1964] “a children’s home maintained by voluntary subscriptions 
operates on an entirely different basis in law from an orphanage supported by income from 
funds in trust.  In the former the law is relatively uninterested, making few demands and 
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offering few concessions, but around the charitable trust, the charitable benefaction in 
perpetuity, has grown up one of the more demanding and complicated (as well as lucrative) 
branches of equity practice” .  
Owen’s observation recalled the different perspective of the agency problems. While 
in charitable trusts the donor would not have retained control over the organization, in 
voluntary organizations subscribers would have sit on the board of directors or, at least, 
would have had voice in administration matters, for instance by electing the directors 
themselves.  
By the end of 1700, the Industrial Revolution posed problems for philanthropists 
different in degree and kind from those they had faced in the past. In particular the great 
social and economic changes implied an unceasing growth of the population and a high 
percentage of unemployment or low wages. 
Charity therefore could no longer reflect that economic phenomenon – of the earlier 
century – for which  generous Englishmen by inter vivos or mortis causa acts decided to 
help local indigents whose poor conditions were well known. In other words, the danger of 
professional mendicant became significant so far as the beggar was more often a stranger 
than a known neighbour [Slack, 1990].   
 This led to two consequences. The first was that philanthropic donations were much 
more careful and, therefore, no longer open-hand as before, while the second was a greater 
involvement of public activities for what concerns the relief of the poor.  
 The carefulness of the donations might be demonstrated by the practice of 
constituting charity on the basis  of voluntary subscriptions. As this scheme would have 
ensured the contributors to control the entity, the help would have been guaranteed only to 
selected people.  
 The second consequence was realized through new structures and new approaches.  
As concerns the structures, the government established several charity commissions 
charged with investigating on the financial status of existing charitable trusts. The aim was 
to identify inefficient organizations so that the State could recover the relevant assets and 
provide public services reducing the need for public monies [Fishman, 2005]. 
The idea for which the government had to be the primary source of support for the 
indigent implied that these new structures – that is the charity commissions – would have 
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functioned through a more scientific approach. In fact, probably due to the influence of the 
Enlightenment,  “rational and purposive control based upon measuring, counting and 
observing” [Fishman, 2005] became the fundamental parameter to which commissioners had 
to refer for adopting procedures on behalf of the charitable trusts scrutinized.  
Of course, other than representing a parameter for the commissioners, such empirical 
techniques – which actually had already been introduced in 1760 since the accession of 
George III, who promoted the institution of a Royal Commission of Inquiry – represented 
also an important parameter for legislation.   
 The first inquiry on charitable trusts was promoted by Thomas Gilbert – a member 
of Parliament – in 1780. The inquiry did not actually establish a commission but it required 
ministers and church-workers to file data concerning the activity of charities. The returns 
would have been examined  by a committee of the House of Commons. 
Although these reports were incomplete and inadequate to have a clear idea about 
charitable abuses and although these were hardly settled within the Court of Chancery, 
Gilbert’s initiative was important as it recalled the attention on the accountability of non-
profit sector .  
The second inquiry was supported in 1816 by Peter Brougham, a very important 
lawyer and figure in the English public life.  He actually proposed a Select Committee to 
investigate on the London city charities. As well as concerns the Gilbert Act, no commission 
was actually established. 
 The Committee’s report found many abuses. When he talked about the report in the 
House of Commons, he pointed out the reasons for which charitable assets were lower than 
they should have been:  
1) Trustees had insufficient powers for the profitable management of the funds under their 
care. For example, they could not sell or exchange lands in the middle of towns. 
2) There was a diminution of revenue because of loss of property through defects in the 
original charitable instrument and a consequent extinction of the trustees without the 
possibility of supplying their replacements. 
3) Trustees exhibited negligence in all its branches, including carelessness, ignorance, 
indolence, and omission. 
4) Various kinds of willful abuses. 
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 In the light of his findings, Brougham proposed to extend the inquiry also to the 
territories outside the city of London assuming that the data in that way obtained would have 
not only underscored the necessity of a legislative intervention but also shaped the possible 
public policies to be taken.  
Thus, after several debates in the Parliament, the government adopted almost all of 
Brougham’s positions and in 1819 the Committee was expanded into a Select Commission 
on Public Charities. 
As mentioned above, the establishment of the commission depended on the suspects 
over the administration of charitable trusts and on the fact that the Crown wanted to take a 
dominant position in the provision of public services. In the matter of facts, the 
establishment of charity commissions depended also on the fact that there was not effective 
legal device to exert control on charitable trusts.  
The legal problems related to the prevention of maladministration of charitable funds 
in early nineteenth century reflected those that had brought to the adoption of the Statute of 
Charitable Uses in 1601. Even in that case, in fact, there was an establishment of 
commissioners and even in that case the establishment of commissioners were due to the 
inefficiency of the Court of Chancery and to the practice according to which the relator of 
the information brought in the person of the Attorney General would have had to pay all the 
costs if the suit was unsuccessful. The restoration of a charity commission would have 
facilitated the adoption of decrees aimed at correcting those charitable trusts that were found 
inefficient.  
To be more accurate, in 1812 the Parliament had decided the (Sir) Romilly Act. This 
legislation, other than being a further confirmation of the concern over charities’ 
administration,  had introduced a even simplified procedure for bringing suits against 
charitable trustees. In particular, the Act established that any two or more persons on 
obtaining fiat or certificate of the Attorney or Solicitor General were allowed to present a 
petition into the Court of Chancery.   
“Any two or more persons” had to mean that it was not necessary that parties needed 
to have an interest in the charity in order to initiate the procedure. But, much more 
importantly, parties would have not bore high costs of the proceeding as the Act established 
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that the Chancellor or the Master of Roll would have decided thorough a summary way, that 
is in a much less expensive way.  
The spirit of this legislation was well explained by Sir Romilly himself: “because 
relators need have no interest in the result of the decision, it could not be expected that such 
a person would be disposed to put himself to great expense which this would occasion, for 
the public benefit […] it would be difficult to find a man so public-spirited as to advance a 
great sum of money to carry on a cause in which he had no personal interest, imputing gross 
misconduct to a neighbor, with a chance of recovering a part of his expenses after so great a 
lapse of time ”.   
The Act would not have ensured impartial management, for any two or more persons 
being able to present petitions under it, whether they were in anyway interested in the 
charity or not, vexatious suits were continually brought by mere outsiders for the sake of the 
costs which they might get out of the funds of the charity [Edmund, 1887], for this reason 
the legislation was rarely applied19. 
 However it represents the occasion to understand firstly that already in the 
nineteenth century the idea for which charity was a “public thing” was very well established 
– only  the Attorney General could in fact bring suits into the Court of Chancery –  and, 
therefore, stronger than the Romilly legislation which to a certain extent conferred a private 
character to charities. Although it was true that he wanted to protect a public interest, he 
pursued this scope by conceding a purely private remedy whose misuses led legal 
professional to re-conceive charity only on a public dimension.  
Secondly,  the idea for which charity had to be public affair would have resisted 
during centuries and against the more and more pressures exerted by thinkers conceiving 
charities as a private affair. Indeed, in the United States the fear of a proliferation of suits 
had always been eschewed by conferring to the Attorney General the exclusive right to bring 
                                                 
19 Technically it was interpreted very restrictively by Lord Eldon, in Attorney General v. Green, 1820 .  In 
1868, in  Braund v. Earl of Devon, Mr. M. Ware   said: “the first objection to the bill is the want of interest in 
the Plaintiffs. They are not legatees, they are merely objects of the charity, and, except as such, have no interest 
in the testator's assets. The way of obtaining relief in such case is by information, not by bill. The Plaintiffs 
cannot properly represent all the objects of the charity, which is not confined to the special class to which they 
belong, but extends to children of officers in the navy, and to the public generally. No one but the Attorney-
General can represent such a body. The allowance of this bill would introduce a very inconvenient practice, 
because in every case where a testator gives a legacy to a charity, some of the objects of the charity might file a 
bill for administration of the estate without the leave of the Attorney-General: Magdalen College, Oxford, v. 
Sibthorp n(1) ; Nash v. Morley n(2)” . 
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suits against charitable directors. This approach, as it shall be seen in Chapter VI, would 
have suffered some exceptions, as for example the doctrine of the special interest.  
 Thus, for not being the Romilly Act really applied, the Parliament decided to take on 
the Lord Brougham Commission for the prevention and correction of charitable abuses. The 
concept of Commission is slightly different from the one of Committee. The Committees,  
as they were those instituted in 1780 (by Gilbert) and 1816 (by Brougham), are “one or more 
member of a legislative body to whom is specially referred some matter before that body, in 
order that they may investigate and examine into it and report to those who delegated this 
authority to them”.  The Commission is “an instrument issued by a Court of Justice, or other 
competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take depositions, or do any other act by 
authority of such court or tribunal” [Bouvier, 1843]. 
So, whereas the function is similar, that is to investigate, what actually changes is the 
degree of independence, higher of course as concerns the commission and the power to 
adopt decision in relation to the investigation. While the Committee could only write reports 
and present them to the Parliament, the Commission could even issue decrees, injunctions, 
etc.  
 Accordingly, the last instance of commission before 1819 was evidently the one 
established in 1601 by the Elizabethan legislation. Yet, several differences occurred between 
that and the 1819 one.  
To begin with, the Charity Commissions of 1601 were not permanent organizations, 
nor were they responsible for overseeing charities as they were instead the 1820 
Commissions.  They were organized by parish and only came into existence when 
somebody complained that a charitable trust was being misused.  In fact, while the 1601 
Commissions were issued by local Court of Chancery the 1820 Commissions were issued by 
the Parliament. After the 1601 Charity Commission had been empanelled, heard evidence, 
reached a decision it would dissolve.  Another such Commission would be created if there 
was another complaint. 
Secondly, the 1820 Commission operated through the scientific approach said above. 
This means that Commissioners had to “determine the amount, nature, and application of the 
earnings of estates or funds; and whether by change of circumstances or by other means, the 
trusts could not be beneficially applied for their original purposes. The Commissioners 
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prepared annual reports of their deliberations, which were published as Parliamentary 
Papers” [Fishman, 2005].  The approach adopted by the Commissioners established by the 
Elizabethan Statute was far less technical for not being provided in the Act itself any 
reference to obligations of detailed report.  
 The third difference regarded the power of the commissioners. For the Elizabethan 
legislation, they had to make orders for the due and faithful employment of the property 
given to the trusts. These orders had to be certificated into the Court of Chancery and the 
Lord Chancellor was the responsible to make provisions for the due execution of the orders. 
This implied that the commissioners were constantly subjected to the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the Chancellor.   
Any interested person who was aggrieved by the orders could challenge them  before 
the Court of Chancery. 
Differently from the 1601 provisions, the 1819 Commissioners were acknowledged 
with a direct power to correct the trusts. The CAP. XCI, Geo. III Act, 10 June 1818, in fact, 
established that  
“the said Commissioners or any Three of them 
shall, once in each Half Year during the Continuance of 
the said Commission, report and certify, in Writing 
under their Hands and Seals, to The King’s Most 
Excellent Majesty, and to both the Houses of Parliament, 
their Proceedings, touching the Amount, Nature, 
Management, Application and Appropriation of such of 
the aforesaid Estates and Funds as they shall have 
inquired and examined into, and also what is the Nature 
of such Estates, and Funds Respectively, and the actual 
annual Produce thereof, and what is the actual annual 
Value thereof, and in whose Possessions as Tenants 
thereof, any Part thereof conflicting of Lands, Tenements 
or Hereditaments shall be, adding at the same time such 
Observations as shall occur to them respecting such 
Mode as they shall deem most effectual for the 
recovering of such Part or Parts of such Estates or 
Funds as shall appear to them to have been applied in 
breach of the several Trusts created in respect of the 
same, or shall appear to have been omitted to be applied 
in pursuance of such Trusts, and subjoining such 
Suggestions as may seem to them expedient respecting 
the most effectual Mode of securing such Estates and 
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Funds, and their respective Produce, against any future 
Misapplication thereof”.  
 
The Statute moreover provided that the interested parties could act against the acts of 
the Commissioners within six months the “Fact committed”.  
The Commissioners had operated for two decades   and the first report was published 
in 1850.  
The charitable trusts who had a visitor did not fall into the inquisition of the Charity 
Commissioners. Yet, even those were found not in order. In fact, Fishman [2005] refers to 
two big scandals which occurred just during the time that the Charity Commissions 
operated. 
The XIX century charitable trusts involved in shameful situations were the Rochester 
Cathedral Grammar School and the St. Cross Hospital. Both were managed by the Church 
and expected to be supervised – and therefore visited – by the Bishop.  
The public as well as political attention focused on the former almost by chance. The 
headmaster of the school was indeed on of those conceive the legal litigation as “raison 
d’etre”.  His name was Robert Whiston and his complaint regarded the fact that the dean of 
the Cathedral – within which the grammar school was established – on one side  did not 
adjust the stipends of the undergraduate students according to the inflation while, on the 
other side, he increased his own emoluments.  
The argument of the Dean was that he was not obliged to change the amount due to 
student as it was originally established by the statutes of the Cathedral. 
After endless legal battles, letters to the press, Whiston firstly succeeded to convince 
the Dean to take some step towards the augmented scholarships and secondly to lead the 
Parliament to adopt the Endowed School Act according to which schools could no longer be 
controlled solely by the dean (and by the chapter) but by a diverse governing body.  
Also as concerns the St. Cross Hospital   a misappropriation of funds generated by 
the properties of the charitable trusts was found out. This time, the suspects on the charitable 
trust were steered by the press and brought behalf jurisdictional authorities by Henry 
Holloway, a churchwarden of the parish where the hospital was located.  In particular, the 
opportunistic behavior of the trustee consisted in taking advantages of the fines paid by 
tenants to lease lands belonging to the hospital itself. The fine system was a practice that 
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basically functioned as follows: the tenant paid a sum of money in order to get a low rental 
term; for example one paid £ 15,000 and he obtained the lease of £ 6 per annum. So the 
15,000 flowed in the trustee pocket and the rent was employed for the charitable trust 
purposes. 
The manager of the Hospital claimed that he was entitled by the by-laws to 
appropriate the revenues left after having satisfied the purposes of the charitable trust itself. 
This argument was discredited by the Court of Chancery which deemed the by-laws of the 
hospital as establishing exactly the opposite.  
What was important in these two cases was not really the procedure followed to 
render the trustees accountable. Both the cases relied on an information filed by the Attorney 
General on behalf of the interested persons (Whiston and Holloway) and this did not 
represent a novelty.  
On the contrary, it was interesting the relation between surplus and (the concept of) 
charitable activities. In not even one of the cases the Court gave an opinion concerning this. 
In the first case because Whiston succeeded to resolve the question out of the tribunals and 
in the second because the Court focused on the interpretation of the by-laws rather than 
deciding if it was legally possible to appropriate surplus resources in a charitable trust 
context.  The point was and is therefore to guess what the Court would have hold if the by-
laws of the St. Cross Hospital had clearly established that the trustees were entitled to gain 
the surplus.  
To be sure, from a legal point of view, charitable activities were identified on the 
basis of the object they pursued – that to some extent had to fall within the list of the Statute 
of Charitable Uses – rather than on the nondistribution constraint clause.  
 Still, as the law of trust applied, this envisaged that the trustees were forbidden to 
draw any economic personal advantage in the exertion of their function .  
In 1853 the Parliament decided the Charitable Trust Act. This legislation established 
a permanent Charity Commission which would have functioned and worked according to 
the recommendations that the Parliament Committee of 1835 and the Royal Commission of 
1849  made on the basis of the Brougham Commission Reports.  
As regards the power of the Commission it can be held that they were very broad. 
Basically they were as broad as the powers of 1601 and 1819 Commissions.  In particular:  
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a) no power of audit was given to the Commission, although it was authorized to 
require accounts yearly from the trustees of charities; 
b) the sanction of the commissioners  was made a necessary condition to judicial 
proceedings by any person other than the Attorney General in connection with 
any charity, except when the action was brought by the claiming adversely to the 
charity;   
c) the possibility for a limited category of persons – limited as to avoid proliferation 
of suits – to apply directly to the Court of Chancery or to the County or District 
Court for relief concerning charity matters. In other words, there was no need for 
information or petition.  
 
Yet, in 1860 the Parliament adopted an Act that would have entailed a significant 
change. The Commissioners, in fact, would have been granted with judicial powers.   
 Although further laws (Charities Act 1960, 1992, 1993 an 2006) were adopted by 
the legislative power, it can be held that  the very structure of the Charity Commission has 
been held intact since its initial inception by the Select Committee of the House of 
Commons in 1835 [Elson, 2010]. 
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§1.6     RESUME 
 
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated how since the era of persecution until the 
XX century, the non-profit sector has been represented by charity activities. This means that 
during all this period non-profit institutions aimed at “relieving the physical, mental, moral, 
or spiritual needs of one’s fellows”. Yet, the motivations and the purposes that led people to 
donate changed and, at the same time, also the problems of agency and their relevant 
discipline changed.  
In fact, in the very early stage of charity, for this was strictly religious, law did not 
intervene to regulate the administration of the given funds. The interest of the donors was 
supposed to be represented simply by the material transfer of the goods: I do give, and I do 
not expect anything in consideration. This situation had not to arise hard legal problems, as 
the majority of the donations were realized through direct almsgiving.  
When the practice of donations increased, above all through inter vivos and mortis 
causa acts, the Roman and the Canon law soon identified the problems of agency in 
relations to those donations where the donors specified which use had to be done and 
envisaged provisions aimed at ensuring a trustworthy administrator (the Church) and a 
conferring to whoever had an interest to sue the secular individual/entity charged of 
mismanagement of charitable funds.  
In this period charity was still religious based, however the fact that donors used to 
specify the employment of their funds suggested that they were interested also in 
contributing to a social cause. For this reason, in the previous paragraphs, the charity related 
to that period has been defined as extended religious charity.  
In the XIII century, a papal Decree promised salvation to all those who made bequest 
for charitable purposes. Also the position of Church in the administration of the funds was 
strengthened.  
The identification of many abuses from the Church led the English Government to 
secularize charities. This did anything else than moving the problems of agency from the 
donor/Church relationship to the donor/secular individual-entity relationship: “the creation of 
an independent English Church and the development of Protestant doctrines did not change the nature of man. 
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After the Reformation, petitioners still complained to the Chancellor about the misuse of charitable assets” 
[Fishman,  2008 ] 
In fact, as also the secular trustee proved not that fair in the administration of 
charitable funds, people that felt jeopardized by such misbehavior began to look for justice 
within the Court of Chancery whose competence in charity matters had been consecrated by 
the employment of the institute of trust to make charitable donations.  
The Lord Chancellor could offer a remedy that either the Common Law and the 
Roman Law did not offer: the specific performance.  
The power of the Equity to enforce charitable trusts anyways had to crash against 
several legal issues and against the excessive formalization of the procedure. One of the 
legal issues was represented by the acknowledgement of the right to sue as the class of 
beneficiaries was normally uncertain (the poor, the sick, etc. ).  
 This explains why Queen Elizabeth urged the adoption of the Statute of Charitable 
Uses that envisaged the establishment of a local commission every time there were suspects 
over the administration of charitable trusts.  The commission could solve problems of 
administration by issuing orders whose execution was guaranteed by the Court of Chancery.  
The Civil War (1642-1660) jeopardized the efficiency of the local commissions so 
that claims against the misappropriation of charitable funds were brought to the attention of 
the Attorney General through an information.  
The intervention of such office into charity matters demonstrated of these economic 
practices had a public relevance.  
During the XVIII century, England experienced the “dark age of philanthropy”. This 
was due to the belief that charitable donations/bequests would have jeopardized the rights of 
the heirs.    
One expression of such rationality and caution was represented by the practice of  
constituting charities through voluntary subscriptions which involved the direct participation 
of the contributors in the administration of the funds and, therefore, which implied a reduced 
exposition to agency problems. In particular, contributors would have been able to select the 
beneficiaries of the charitable activity.  
Another expression of this rationality was the establishment of governmental 
commissions charged with examining into and correcting the inefficient charitable trusts 
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established in the national territories. The rational aspect of such inquisition was represented 
by the provision of specific parameters which commission had to refer to assess the 
efficiency of the organizations.  
In 1853 the Charitable Trust Act was passed in the UK Parliament. This established a 
permanent Charity Commission whose very structure would have lasted to date.  
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§2. THE AMERICAN NON-PROFIT 
 
 The colonial experience with charity was generally favorable, but it was surely not  
uniform [Wyllie, 1959]. In particular, the reception of the English system as configured by 
the 1601 Poor Laws implied that some states such as Virginia and Maryland were more bent 
to conceive charity on a public dimension – therefore charitable activities had to be exerted 
by the state – while others such as like Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and other northern 
states went to some length to encourage (private) philanthropy.  
 Evidences of the first category of States were provided by Deutsch [1941] who 
maintained that  
“the settlers brought over with them poor relief principles and 
practices of the old country, which were applied in modified 
form to accord with the requirements and limitations of the new 
environment. The English settlements adopted the principle of 
local responsibility set down by the Elizabethan poor law of 
1601, whereby each parish or town was responsible for its own 
needy” . 
 
 In fact, the scholar focused the attention on the many instances of governmental 
intervention for health care, poor relief and education.  
 It is true, not only the local parish but also other public agencies such as the 
county, magistrates, selectmen, overseers of the poor and even the colonial government  
were involved in charitable programs20.  
 The public dimension of charity implied that the funding relied on taxation as 
demonstrated by the 1702  Act of New York City assembly through which city authorities 
were permitted to raise poor rates from the existing level of £ 150 to £ 300.   
 Deutsch, anyway, was well aware of the circumstance that his picture did not 
reflect the whole situation of charity in America. He indeed claimed that his article “dealt 
most exclusively with public provision for the sick of poor, omitting the private efforts of such socio-religious 
groups as the Quakers and the activities of the Scots Charitable Society, the Deutsche Gesellschaft of 
Philadelphia,  and other immigrant aid societies”.  
 In addition, in his discussion there was room for considering two important 
private-public partnerships for the provision of public services.  
                                                 
20 For a specific study on the operation of Poor Law in Virginia, see Mackey [1965].   
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 The first was represented by the 1695 South Carolina Act that created colony-wide 
commissioners of the poor, in whose hands were to be placed private donations for 
charitable purposes together with an annual grant from the public treasury not exceeding £ 
10. The office of commissioners was suppressed in 1712.  
 The second was the foundation of Pennsylvania Hospital in 1751. This was 
financed by both public and private contributions but the most relevant aspect is that it was 
run  by private officers, as it is still today.  
 Deutsch’s finding pointed out that the positive factor discernible in the colonial 
care of sick poor was the principle implicit in the Elizabethan poor law that society was 
responsible for providing for its helpless and disabled members. Yet, he went on with  “[…] 
towards the  end of colonial era the shift in emphasis from governmental responsibility to private enterprise in 
social welfare was already evident, and this shift continued steadily in later years until private philanthropy 
became for some time a dominant fact in provision for the sick poor”. 
 Deutsch opinion that the encouragement of private philanthropy was 
fundamentally a characterizing element of the end of the colonial period is confirmed by an 
observation of Hammack [2001] arguing that “their [nonprofit organizations] finance relied 
upon tax funds until the American revolution [1775-1783] disestablished the state 
connection and forced NPOs to seek for private donations”. 
 Yet, this must not lead to forget that in some states, the favor for private charities 
had existed since the beginning.  
 Evidences of American private charity were presented by Wyllie [1959]. The 
author identified in the state of Pennsylvania the strongest tendency – promoted by the 
Quakers –  in  financing charitable projects through private contributions.  
 Now, the private or public conception of charitable activities did not simply imply 
that some states provided social welfare through taxation and governmental agencies and 
others through private donations and private organizations.  
 The distinction involved important consequences related to the discipline of 
charitable uses (trusts). That is, in the States where a public conception of charity was 
dominating, the enforcement of charitable uses would have been more complicated. This 
was due to the fact that where the private conception of charity dominated, the courts would 
have given more importance to the intentions of the settlor, even if such intentions were not 
clearly expressed in the documents supporting the donation (will, deed, etc.).  
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 The original uncertainty of the US Supreme Court on this question was 
demonstrated by two decisions handed down in 1819.  
 In both the following cases, Dartmouth College v. Woodward and Philadelphia 
Baptist Association v. Hart’s Executors, the Supreme Court had to establish to what extent 
the state (New Hampshire and Virginia respectively) could interfere with the specifications 
indicated by the settlor.  
 While for the former judge John Marshall argued that “philanthropic giving would 
be discouraged if the state were allowed to alter Dartmouth’s charter”, for the latter he 
himself held that the endowment provided by the will could not be received by the 
Association for two reasons: the trustees were not identified in the will and constituted an 
ever-changing body of unnamed persons and no society could take personal property by 
devise without a charter of incorporation.  
 The opinions of the same judge reflected what it has been said above: Virginia was 
a state where public conception of charity used to dominate while New Hampshire was 
supporting a liberal-private dimension of it.   
 In particular, the restrictive attitude of the Supreme Court in the latter case was due 
to the fact that the state of Virginia had repealed the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses in 1792 
– (the above mentioned will had been drawn up in 1795.)  In fact, the legal reasoning 
followed by Judge Marshall set out from the assumption that in the absence of the Statute of 
Charitable Uses, it was necessary to look for judicial precedents in order to declare valid or 
void a charitable use.  
 Put it differently, since the Statute of Charitable Uses established which inter vivos 
or mortis causa acts had to be considered as charitable trusts (uses), its abrogation 
constringed the judge to address his attention on other sources of law. That is, the Supreme 
Court had to verify if the Court of Chancery had already recognized uses/trusts similar to 
those the Supreme Court had to decide on. Now,  according to the investigation conducted 
by Marshall himself, there were no records demonstrating that such indefinite bequests were 
allowed in English cases.    
 The opinion of Marshall was soon challenged by a more liberal judge whose name 
was Henry Baldwin.  
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 The occasion to set forth his ideas was represented by the Magill v. Brown case 
which involved a will dated in 1819. In such circumstance, the judge dealt with the two 
above mentioned legal questions: the possibility for unincorporated societies to take real or 
personal property by devise and the validity of donations for constituting charitable uses by 
deed or will.  
 As regards the latter,  judge Baldwin discredited the research accomplished by 
Marshall and, differently from him, he demonstrated that in English cases very often trusts 
were upheld in courts of chancery independent of the Statute of Charitable Uses. Yet, as he 
did not find a precedent concerned the bequests for the purchase of a fire engine and hose – 
that is one of wished expressed by the testator of the Magill v. Brown case – he took the 
position that the law should always be stretched to cover new uses that promised some 
public benefit.  
 As concerns the former, Baldwin opinion reminded that in Pennsylvania religious 
societies had always enjoyed the right to purchase and manage property, to develop their 
own systems of charity and their own forms of worship.  Therefore, the prohibition to devise 
funds to these organizations would have crashed against local customs and habits as well as 
against the First Amendment of the American Constitution that is interested with the free 
exercise of religion.  
 On the basis of these arguments, Baldwin approved the bequests envisaged by the 
will. 
 It is true, while these decisions were not directly concerned with the focus of this 
work, still they provided fundamental elements for framing the discipline of non-profit 
trustees.  
  In fact, rather than considering problems of agency, they aimed at clarifying the 
privileges of charity in the light of the application of the so called cy press doctrine. 
According to this doctrine, where a charitable trust failed because its objects were uncertain, 
impossible to achieve or illegal, the court would apply the property to similar charitable 
uses, provided that this was in accordance with the settlor’s intention.  
 The application of cy press doctrine and the successive confirmation  occurred in  
Vidal v. Girard’s Executor 1844, demonstrated how the US Supreme Court supported a 
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private liberal approach to charity and overcame the idea that it was the policy of the law to 
prevent indefinite accumulations of property for the benefit of individuals.  
 If compared with English policy, the American one21 had to be far more liberal as 
the Statute of Charitable Uses was considered only a “piece of remedial legislation, intended 
to remove some of the burden of legal restraint under which managers of charities had been 
forced to operate, and to improve England creaky philanthropic system”. [Wyllie, 1959] 
 The independence of charity from whatever public force and, therefore, its private 
dimension represented the framework within which agency problems of that period had to 
be studied.  
 To make it clearer, in England under the Statute of Charitable Uses the protection 
of all the interested people  against managers misuse of assets was guaranteed initially by a 
royal-ecclesiastic inquisition,  and successively by an information brought by the Attorney 
General. Both the solutions reflected the public component of the private charity system 
promoted by the said Statute.  
 The question therefore was to find out if the more liberal and private policy 
adopted by America maintained a public-based protection or instead proposed a legal 
solution more shaped upon the new ideas of charity, like for example conferring the right to 
sue trustee to the people interested in the administration of the charity itself, this device 
representing a typical private remedy.  
 Similarly to the discussion concerning the English system, the answer requires to 
understand firstly what was the role exerted by non-profit sector in the Colonial and Post-
Colonial period. 
 Literature [Tamburrini, 2010 and Hammack, 1989] agrees to distinguish two 
stages: the first covers the years until 1873 and the second those until the years of 1960.  
 As regards the first stage, on one side US charities strongly resembled those of the 
Old-country. In particular, these were charities “founded by the piety of our ancestors to 
alleviate human misery and scatter blessings along the pathway of life” [Hammack, 2001] 
and/or charities established in accordance with the welfare system prospected by the State of 
Charitable Uses.  On the other side, around the end of the XVIII, in the US organizations 
                                                 
21 As seen earlier, the American policy on charity reached that liberal dimension around the end of the colonial 
period. 
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without profit purposes were likely constituted by elitist people that, “fearing the political 
power of the general populace, endowed universities, hospitals and other charities in order to 
build up the learned professions (such as law, medicine, science and business) for their sons” 
[Brody, 1996]. 
 Moreover, another kind of non-profit organizations was very popular in US. These 
were the “grassroots organizations to be considered as the mutual-benefit, single/issue 
interest, based in the goals of ethnic, neighborhood, denominational, political, aesthetic (and 
some times athletic) interests” [Hall, 2002].  
 As one can easily note, the existence of these two kinds of non-profit organizations 
demonstrated that, differently from England, the American territory of the first stage was 
characterized by a heterogeneousness of non-profit organizations whose functions depended 
on the particular local culture. 
  Therefore, every specific kind of charity presented a different degree of exposition 
to agency problems.  
For sure, the more exposed were the sociological charities because of one fundamental 
reason: they were normally established by will so that their administration was mandated to 
a third party. Of course, the more the charity was old, the more their controllers were in a 
fittest position to pursue personal interests rather than those of the organization.  
 The grassroots and the elitarian non-profit organizations were less exposed to the 
extent to which they were controlled by the founders themselves. It is worth, anyway, that 
the role of these organization did not longer actually reflect the Ryan [1908] definition of 
charity, so that instead of charities, these organization might well be defined as non-profit 
organizations.  
  Anyways, in those cases where misuses of non-profit assets were suspected, the 
right to bring suit before the court rested with the Attorney General.  
 The very first observation at this regard would question the relationship between 
the private liberal conception of charity expressed by the application of cy press doctrine and 
the public conception of charity expressed by the just mentioned control exerted by the 
Attorney General.  
 In fact, non-profit organizations have always presented a hybrid aspect between 
private and public dimension.  It is not a chance that the non-profit sector is also known as 
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third sector and that, whatever the qualification, the entities involved in this sector are 
thought to pursue public interests – although they are not public institutions – and to be 
formed and disciplined by private law – although they are not profit seeking [Coelho De 
Castro, 2000].  
 In a certain sense, it can be argued that the two-fold dimension of non-profit 
organizations before the law depended on the two separate moments within which private 
and public interests deserved protection.  
  The first moment was represented by private interest of the testator/donor in 
setting in force the trust. Through the application of the cy pres doctrine, the law charged 
itself with ensuring that the devised funds are effectively placed for charitable purposes.  
 Once the funds were placed, the private interest of the donor/testator  became 
accomplished and left room to the second moment. From a legal point of view, in fact, the 
correct and fair administration of the funds reflected no longer the interest of the 
donor/testator, but the interests of the of the whole society.  
  For public interests22  referring to interests for which states bear responsibility 
[Vonk and Tollenar, 2008], the Crown was expected to protect charities.  
 As seen earlier, this duty commenced to be executed by the Attorney General  on 
behalf of the Crown around the second half of the seventeenth century [Cullity,  1981]. 
This approach was confirmed and therefore continued by American judges through 
decisions  that took on the principles stated by several UK decisions among which can be 
reminded the  one held by  Lord Macclesfield LC,  occurred in 1724, that stated:   
 “In like manner, in the case of charity, the King pro bono publico, has an original 
right to superintend the care thereof, so that, abstracted from the statute of Elizabeth relating 
to charitable uses [Charitable Uses Act, 1601] and antecedent to it as well as since, it has 
been every day's practice to file information  in Chancery in the Attorney-General's name for 
the establishment of charities. Also in Viscount Falkland v Bertie (6) LORD SOMERS, in 
delivering his opinion, takes notice that several things are under the care and 
superintendency of the King as he is pater patriae, and instances charities, idiots, lunatics, 
and infants”. 
                                                 
22 See Vera Langer 1988 American Journal Comparative Law  
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 The hypothesis for which until 1873, that is the first stage, only those (old) US 
charities established by will were exposed to agency problems and, therefore, only those 
required the intervention of the Public Attorney has been tested by a research conducted by a 
digital legal browser: Lexis Nexis.  
 Indicating in the research parameters all the cases between 1600 and 1873 that 
involve Attorney-General and Trust, the result has been a list of 991 decisions. By having 
taken into consideration a sample of 20 random decisions23, it has come out that all of them 
involved a will or a bequest, or even a inter vivos donation where the donator had died.  
 The hypothesis for which only charitable trusts established by will were those more 
exposed to agency problems had to confirmed also in the second stage of the US non-profit 
history, that is after 1873.   
In fact, other than the charities/non-profit organizations that have been quoted earlier, 
also other kind of non-profits showed up. These new non-profits, similarly to the grass-roots 
and elitarian organizations and, therefore, differently from the old-fashioned charities, were 
controlled by their founders.  
  Their story is strongly connected with the liberal capitalist-based American state 
which was threatened by worker riots against the industrial class. Indeed, the most 
thoughtful men of affairs understood that their economic system would have resisted only in 
the case institutions would have guaranteed equal opportunities for every citizen. Such 
condition would have allowed the “Social Darwinism” to select the most skilled people for 
high locations in the business hierarchy. The latter, therefore, was not conceived by these 
leaders as a birthright [Hammack, 1989].  
 Such “scientific philanthropism” became importantly widespread in the US so that it 
succeeded to assign a new role to non-profit organizations, that is a political role. Such 
political role could actually resemble the role that XIX century English Government wanted 
to confer to charities through a strong control into their administration or through public-
private partnerships. In particular, these organizations were expected to provide those 
services theoretically of public competence, but which the state was not in the condition to 
perform.   
                                                 
23 See http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/casessubmitForm.do  
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 The study of the agency problems exclusively based on the relationship between 
donors/funders and administrators of the non-profit organizations would have had to take 
into consideration another fundamental change occurred in the XIX century. 
In particular, the approach aimed at studying the relationship between patrons and 
administrators had uncovered agency problems only in relation to self-dealing behaviors or 
misappropriations accomplished by the agents. It is true, in the late XIX century the 
complexity of the non-profit activities and the establishment of the freedom to incorporate, 
led many funders transform their charitable trusts – or directly establish – into non-profit 
corporations. This change implied the ingress of other principals that would have added to 
the patrons. The most important of them was represented by the corporation itself in light of 
its legal personality.  
Thus, the corporate structure rendered the trustee accountable not only to the donors 
but also the entity. In other words, trustees not only had to employ the funds in accordance 
with the purposes established by the by-laws – which indeed contained the intentions of the 
donors – but they also had to ensure economic efficiency to the organization.  
As regards the first duty,  agency problems were not expected to arise so long as the 
trustees remained those that had incorporated and financed the organization.  
As regards the second duty, trustees might not have the technical knowledge to 
manage the structure. 
For example, in 1809 – that is when it still was necessary an Act of Parliament to 
incorporate – the State of Florida had conceded its permission in favor of private funders to 
incorporate the Miami University. In consideration of that it required that the directors had 
to be appointed by the superior court. In 1873 the University was shut down for it was 
unable to face the enormous debts that it incurred [the university reopened its doors ten 
years later]. The problems of agency characterizing this structure were wonderfully 
described by a contemporary scholar:  
“There are advantages and disadvantages in this method. It ensures a conservative 
management and expenditure of funds. This is important to state institutions of all 
kinds. Inasmuch as all appropriation must be provided by the legislature the 
university is held to a careful regard for the intelligent public opinion of the state. 
There being no corporate rights to be forfeited the legislature might, at any time, 
change the character, alter the methods, or entirely abolish the institution. On the 
other hand, the limitations of the State University are such as to hinder it from 
meeting emergencies as they arise, or devising plans looking into the future. 
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There is a limit to the resources available from the state, and this limits as well 
what may be undertaken” [Burns, 1982 in Hall, 2002].  
 
As it has been demonstrated, the agency problem that characterized those non-profit 
organizations run by a combination of public and private, did not imply any financial 
scandal. The inefficiency of the firm was not due to self-dealing behaviors or whatever 
shameful managerial operation. The reasons were rather rooted in the incompetence of 
public directors to raise funds or to manage them in order to lead to a financial increase.  
However, it must observed that the incompetence of the directors to manage a non-
profit corporation was not due to their public or private status, rather it was due to their 
background. In fact, even if the directors of the Miami University were the funders of the 
organization, problems of efficiency would have likely arisen for those directors were not 
business professionals.   
It is true, the private/public partnership for the management of Universities did not 
concern all the states of the Federation since they historically had been autonomous in 
relation to corporation law. This means that some of them, acknowledging the private nature 
of non-profit organizations, did not require to seat directors as consideration of the 
permission to incorporate.   
An example might be represented by Harvard University [State of Massachusetts] 
whose board was composed by members of the state senate only until 1865 when, indeed, 
the corporation began to be regarded as a private non-profit organization in the modern 
sense [Hall, 2002]. Moreover, in 1865 the freedom of incorporation had already been well 
established.  
 The private or public management of non-profit corporation did not therefore 
concern problems of agency related to opportunistic behaviors. In case the management was 
private, the boards were the organizations so that it was improbable a misappropriation of 
funds [Wood, 1992].  Where the management was public, theoretically the control of the 
court had to ensure a minimum of loyal behavior.  
  In order to face the agency problems related to inefficiency, in the beginning of the 
XIX century, some non-profit directors, above all those seating in hospitals and health 
services institutions, decided to hire physicians [DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990].  
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On one side, this corporate governance change assumed that physicians would have 
conferred prestige to the structure and, therefore, would have brought money. In other words, 
it would have resolved the problems of agency – between the corporation and directors – 
related  to the inefficiency.  
 On the other side, the ingress of these professionals commenced a process that  Berle 
and Means [1991], analyzing business corporations, had defined as “separation of ownership 
and control ”. Given the absence of owners,  that expression would have sounded better as  
“separation of supply and control”.  The funders, in fact, were no longer in the control of the 
non-profit organization and this could restore problems of opportunism as those studied in 
occasion of traditional charitable institutions.  However, physicians were not feared to 
behave immorally as a hospital had to be considered the last place for someone with such 
professional ideologies to work in. 
The solution represented by the hiring of physicians anyway did not resist for long 
time. In fact, during the ’69s, President Reagan’s policy envisaged federal cutbacks 
concerning non-profit organizations’ funds. Such provisions forced directors to hire business 
professionals to intensify their efforts to seek for private donations or any profiting activity . 
This was true for hospitals and health care institutions that had hired physicians, but also 
other non-profit organizations that had continued to be managed by their funders or 
successors.  
In particular, the lack of economic expertise did not allow the old patrons to raise 
sufficient resources to guarantee the survival of the organizations they operated. Rather than 
dissolving their non-profit organizations, they opted to strengthen their links with business 
corporation management reflecting the assumptions of resource-dependency theory, 
according to which “organizations require resources to survive, and so must interact with 
others who control these resources” [Eikenberry, 2004].  
For-profit directors saw in the non-profit sector a formidable key to extend and 
increase their businesses. They felt very happy to join and finance non-profit organizations, 
frequently requesting the chair of the boards and the engagement of a certain number of 
executives with whom they had strict ties in return. 
Therefore, corporate financial intervention into non-profit organizations was 
basically executed for restructuring purposes. Once the firm had restored its financial assets 
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it would have been far more trustworthy for attracting private donations. Furthermore, 
business executives, unlike their non-profit colleagues, were able to raise funds through 
“commercial income such as fees for services, product sales, and other profit-making 
ventures” [Eikenberry, 2004].  
Thank to the business professionals the US non-profit sector grew until counting 1.4 
million non-profit organizations at present, holding $ 2 trillion in assets and accepting 
annual donations totaling $ 241 billion [Fremont-Smith, 2004].  
The described situation represents the framework within which the agency problems 
of non-profit corporations have to be studied.  
To begin with, the problems related to opportunistic behaviors present a new 
dimension. The sharp increase of assets necessarily has created more possibilities for 
accomplishing self-dealing transactions or abuses.  Similarly, more possibilities for such 
behaviors have been brought by the circumstance for which the day-to-day agents of the 
corporation are no longer those who have founded it.   
Among incidents of opportunism, which certainly mirror the ones having occurred in 
Enron and Worldcom in the business sector, notable are the misuse of non-profit funds 
committed by William Aramony as president of United Way [Salmon & Whoriskey, 2003], 
and the embezzlement done by Jacques Crozemarie, president and leading fund-raiser of the 
Association for Cancer Research [Gibelman & Gelman, 2000]. 
Anyway, not necessarily all business professional directors are greedy agents. In fact, 
literature underlines that some of them, the most thoughtful, aimed at a ROI (return on 
investment), a SROI (Social Return on Investment), a FROI ( Financial Return on 
Investment) or a EROI (Emotional Return on Investment) [Gingold, 2000].  
As regards the problems related to the economic choices of the management, the 
hiring of business professionals has brought positive externalities only in part. 
On one side, as it has been seen, these executive directors have solved the problem of the 
organizational efficiency. It is true, such target might not well represent the sole interest of 
the non-profit corporation or of who founded it.   
 To ensure efficiency, indeed, directors may be obliged to make economic choices 
which do not comply with the social, altruistic and ethical values promoted by the 
corporation and by who finances it.  
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For sure, both the problems related to opportunistic behaviors and to the economic 
choices made by managerial directors affect the current US non-profit sector. Yet, as some 
institutions might be more exposed than others and as some institutions might present those 
problems in a very peculiar way, it is necessary to make a choice that limits the analysis of 
these problems only to  a certain category of non-profit corporation.   
 Thus, the attention shall be focused on those non-profit organizations which are 
unowned and that are supposed to exert an economic role. 
In particular, the discussion shall take into account the sector of the health, of the 
education and of the social services.  
The reasons that are behind this choice are three. 
The first concerns the fact that unowned organizations are more exposed to agency 
problems, either opportunism and economic oriented managerial choices. In fact, in non-
profit organizations characterized by memberships, the associates may exert a certain control 
over the administration.  
The second concerns the fact that although health, education and social services non-
profit organizations exert a market role, still they present a charitable dimension.  This of 
course implies an internal conflict of cultures that increases the chances of  agency problems.  
The last one is represented by the fact these institutions are the more representative 
from an income point of view, that is those that in the non-profit sector produce the most 
quantity of richness.  
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
§. 1 TERMINOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS 
  
Law  is a science made up of words, so words are very important for definitions and 
for  normative prescriptions. 
In the previous chapters, several expressions have been used to refer to the non-profit 
sector: charitable corporations, charitable trusts, non-profit corporations, not-for-profit 
corporations, charities, foundations, associations etc. Although, their aspects have already 
been pointed out, a more detailed analysis is necessary to avoid confusions and inaccuracies.  
To begin with, the expression non-profit organization represents the general concept 
which embraces all the mentioned legal-economic schemes.   
A non-profit organization is any structure where “no part of the income or profit of 
which is distributed to its members, directors or officers” [Oleck, 1979].   
This definition represents actually a very liberal approach that is not only “new” but 
also peculiar to the US legal literature, doctrine and legislation.  
In fact, the liberal conception for determining a non-profit organization has been 
introduced by three decisions of the US Supreme Courts between 1930 and 1960 [Zoppini,   
1997], then translated into legislation through either the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act 
elaborated by the American Bar Association  and  through Corporate Statutes adopted by the 
states of the federation24.  Finally it was also recognized by legal literature [Hansmann, 
1981]. 
                                                 
24 “The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act was originally drafted in 1952 by the Committee on Corporate Laws 
of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the Maerican Bar Association, and was 
consquently revised in 1957 and 1964. It has had considerable influence, having been adopted in whole or in 
part in substantial number states” [Hansmann, 1981].  
The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act received a further revision in 1987.  
“The Revised Model Act has been adopted, in whole or in part, in Arkansas, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington and Wyoming. Georgia and Ohio have explicitly 
rejected the Revised Model Act. Nearly half the states, while not formally adopting the Act, follows the Act's 
application of the traditional duty of care on nonprofit directors, and possibly other aspects”. [Brody, 1996] 
It is important to underscore how even through the revisions of the Model Act, the concept of NDC has been 
playing a more and more significant role.  
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Before the above mentioned US Supreme Court decisions, the criteria adopted to 
identify the non-profit dimension was represented by the evaluation of the purposes pursued 
by the entity.   
This approach, known as “traditional” was the one established by the Statute of 
Charitable Uses in 1601 which, as seen in chapter II, envisaged an enumeration of charitable 
purposes. Thus, differently from the (majority of the states of) US, UK would have 
maintained the idea that only organizations pursuing charitable purposes, generally speaking, 
could benefit of the advantages reserved for the non-profit sector.  
While a corporation is undoubtedly an organization, a corporation characterized by a 
NDC clause is hence a non-profit organization.  If such non-profit corporation/organization 
pursues charitable intentions, then it also can be classified as a charitable 
                                                                                                                                                      
For example, in section 4 of the 1964 version, it was provided: 
“Corporations may be organized under this Act for any lawful purposes, including, without being limited to, 
any or more of the following purposes: charitable; benevolent; eleemosynary; educational;...; athletic;...; 
animal husbandry; ...; but labor unions, cooperative organizations , and organizations subject to any of the 
provisions of the insurance laws of this State may not be organized under this Act”.     
There was an alternative Section 4 that simply stated that: “corporation may be organized under this Act for 
any lawful purpose execpt ...[list, if any].  
Hansmann [1981] provides a useful and brief discussion on the meaning of the two alternative provisions.  
Anyways, what wanted to be remarked was the fact that in the 1987 Version, section 3.01 no longer deals with 
enumeration or esclusion of purposes, rather it introduces the concept of activity and a even more liberal 
provision: 
“Every corporation incorporated under this Act has the purpose of engaging in any lawful activity unless a 
more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation”. 
As concerns non-profit statutes enacted by the states of the federation, two are worth to consider: New York 
Not-for-Profit Corporation Law (N-PCL) and Calfornia Nonprofit Coporation Law.  
The first is well-known for identifying the non-profit dimension in four categories [Type-A,B,C,D].  In a few 
words, the N-PCL accepts the NDC principle for the application of the Statute, yet it reserves different degrees 
of regulation for the different types which are distinguished by the purpose. This can be: lawful non-business, 
charitable, lawful public or quasi-public, business.  
The N-PCL enacted in 1970 was edited in 2009. The amendments anyways concerned: 
a) membership quorum requirements;   
b) the dissolution of not-for-profit corporations.  
The California Nonprofit Corporation Act also identifies the non-profit dimension in categories. Instead of 4, 
there are 3 types which are – like in New York – distingushed according to the purpose and treated with 
different degrees of standards.  
The Calfifornia Statute, therefore, shares the NDC principle within the limits of the definitions regarding the 
type of nonprofit corporation.  
“Some persons see a subtle distinction between not-for-profit and nonprofit in that the first term is more 
precise since nonprofits may seek profit, as long as that profit is employed only to fulfill the organzations 
major, i.e., nonprofit purpose” [Oleck, 1979]. 
Such distinction is not welcome by this work as in the California legislation, that is where the expression 
nonprofit is adopted, a nonprofit corporation may – as well as a not-for-profit New York corporation – seek 
profit to be spent for pursuing by-laws [lawful] purposes – third type.  
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corporation/organization. Whether the non-profit corporation/organization is charitable or 
not is established by the applicable law. In fact, although the majority of the states of the 
Federation have adopted the NDC approach, they distinguish non-profit corporations which 
pursue charitable purposes from non-profit corporation which pursue any lawful purpose25.  
The distinction between a not-for-profit and nonprofit organization/corporation is 
only terminological26.  
A charitable trust also can be categorized as a non-profit organization as long as it 
presents an organizational structure.  Charitable trusts, in fact, may well be set in a simple 
structure which envisages a single or few trustees charged with the administration of a 
certain fund – or certain funds – on behalf of the categories indicated by donor’s deed.  
While the legal scheme of charitable trust was commonly adopted in the period of 
State’s grant for obtaining legal personality, nowadays the majority of charitable trusts apply 
for incorporation [Stalteri, 2002;  Zoppini, 1997]. 
 The transformation of charitable trusts into charitable corporations have always 
entailed confusion about the  extent to which the general law which relates to charitable 
trusts is applicable to charitable corporations. 
 On this regard, Professor Scott has described the position with his usual clarity: “The 
truth is that it cannot be stated dogmatically either that a charitable corporation is or that it is 
not a trustee. The question is in each case whether a rule which is applicable to trustees is 
applicable to charitable corporations, with respect to unrestricted or restricted property. 
Ordinarily the rules which are applicable to charitable trusts are applicable to charitable 
corporations, as we have seen, although some are not. It is probably more misleading to say 
that a charitable corporation is not a trustee than to say that it is, but the statement that it is a 
trustee must be taken with some qualifications.” [Cullity, 1981] 
  The circumstances for which the expression “non-profit organization” is often 
adopted in a general sense, compel the studious to always ascertain the exact legal nature of 
the entity concerned.  
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
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 In fact, other than confusion concerning the expressions charitable trust/charitable 
corporation, the expression charitable trust is often employed to indicate another non-profit 
sector’structure: the foundation.  
A foundation is for sure the most studied non-profit organization structure by north-
American literature [Ponzanelli, 1999]. 
As well as a non-profit corporation, a foundation is a kind of – is a manifestation of –  
non-profit organization.  
Hence, other than the general NDC clause, a foundation is distinguished by its  
purpose which is generally recognized as “public utility” purpose.  
Still a foundation can be structured as a corporation – of course non-profit 
corporation –  or as a trust [Hondius and Van de Ploeg, 2000].   
Actually,  in US it is not possible to track down an explicit legislative definition of 
foundation. In order to find out what a foundation is from a legislative point of view, it is 
necessary to refer to the International Revenue Code (IRC) and  to accomplish an ex adverso 
reasoning.  
To begin with, the term foundation appears in section 501 (c) (3) among the tax 
exempt organizations: 
  Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational 
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities 
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, 
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial 
part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation 
(except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including 
the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any 
candidate for public office. 
Foundation appears again in section 509 (a). The content provided by this article 
concerns the private foundation  “which means a domestic or foreign organization described 
in section 501 (c)(3) other than [...]” the organizations described by section 509 (a) (1), (2), 
(3), or (4).  
In other words, all the organizations described by 501 (c) (3) are private foundations 
unless they present the characteristics prescribed by section 509 (a) (1), (2), (3) and (4) for 
which they are recognized as public charity. Those characteristics regard mainly the kind of 
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support received by the organization and its administration,  not  being therefore the 
distinction based on aspects related to the purposes contained by the by-laws: public charity 
and private foundations follow the same purposes. Hence, a non-profit corporation which 
does not pursue charitable purposes can not be considered as a foundation – whether private 
or in public charity version.   
 The qualification of private foundation or public charity involves different tax 
treatment. In fact,  with the Tax Reform Act of 1969 it was introduced “the distinction 
between private foundations and public charities27. Private foundations are subject to the 
excise taxes imposed by IRC chapter 42, while public charities are not. It is, therefore, most 
advantageous for an IRC 501(c)(3) organization to be classified as a public charity rather 
than as a private foundation” [Richardson and Reilly, 2003].  
  Finally, association  “is a vague term for a group of people who have joined in a 
common purpose. Sometimes the word society is used in the same sense, but this word is 
confusing because of its frequent use in other contexts. Many other terms are also used to 
convey the idea of a group or association (e.g. fraternal order, club, brotherhood, union etc.). 
Ordinarily, an association is not incorporated. If it is, it is more accurately called a 
corporation, whether its purposes be profit or non-profit”  [Oleck,  1979].  
 Association anyways implies that the organization is composed of members who 
exert control over it, implying that the agency costs are theoretically lower.   As seen earlier, 
these structures are defined as mutual non-profit organizations and they actually fall out the 
attention of this discussion.  
                                                 
27 From a legal point of view, the word charity has actually never brought in itself a clear definition. Even 
today, the English Charity Act 1993 provides that “charity” means any institution, corporate or not, which is 
established for charitable purposes and is subject to the control of the High Court in the exercise of the court’s 
jurisdiction with respect to charities.  Differently from the US law which – as it shall be seen – has ended up to 
identify the non-profit dimension in any lawful activity under the condition of a nondistribution constraint to 
be contained in the by-laws of the organization , in England the legislator has continued the tradition for which 
the non-profit must pursue charitable purposes to be regarded as non-profit before the law.  
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§ 2. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
  
The exposition to agency problems and the ways by which these affect  corporations 
– whether business or non-profit – are strongly connected with the economic structure of the 
corporations themselves.  
Shaped in terms of finance and control, the most popular categorization of the non-
profit structures is suggested by professor Hansmann [1980] including: (1) donative mutual, 
(2) donative entrepreneurial, (3) commercial mutual, (4) commercial entrepreneurial.   
The donative and commercial mutual are non-profit organizations controlled by their 
patrons such as Social Clubs – controlled by their customers – and Common Cause, the 
citizens’ lobby controlled by its contributors.   
Patrons of these organizations are therefore members or associates and as such they 
have the right to elect the board of directors. Because of that, theoretically agency costs are 
expected to be low.  
The donative and commercial entrepreneurial are non-profit organizations controlled 
by self-perpetuating boards such as Hospitals and Universities.  
Patrons of these organizations end their commercial relationship with the entity once 
they have accomplished the donation or paid the service/product.  As patrons do not take 
part in the economic and organizational structure, these kinds of non-profit organizations are 
defined as unowned [Hansmann, 1981] and, consequently,  the problems of agency might be 
more pronounced.  
Strictly connected with the economic structure of the organization is the market for 
corporate control, recognized in literature [Fama Jensen, 1983 and Manne, 1965] as one of 
the devices available for the reduction of agency costs.  
For mutual non-profit organizations a market for corporate control is possible and it 
works through operations aimed at extending the number of  members prepared to vote for 
the “bidder”. As obvious, this market for corporate control is pretty different from the 
market for corporate control characterizing business corporations28.  Anyway, it represents 
only extraordinary cases and not the normality.  
                                                 
28 For a more detailed discussion on the market for corporate control regarding non-profit organization see 
Brakman [2006]. 
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For being unowned, entrepeneurial non-profit not only are more exposed to agency 
problems but they also can not take advantage of the market for corporate control to keep 
directors’ interests aligned with patrons’ one.  
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§ 3. THE LEGAL NATURE OF  BUSINESS CORPORATION 
  
Every economic phenomenon is potentially apt to arise problems, that is situations 
within which the interests of one or more parties – that are not necessarily part of the 
transaction – are or risk to be jeopardized. The function of the law is just to 
recognize/identify and to protect these interests. The identification and the protection of the 
interests take place in two ways:  
a) drafting -new- provisions; 
b) interpreting the -existing- provisions.  
The way a) is expected to be accomplished by the legislative power while the way b) by the 
judicial power. Both the ways are supported by legal-economic literature whose function is 
to shed light on which are the interests supposed to be identified and to have protection.  
 For sure, the corporation represents an economic phenomenon and as such it is 
capable to arise problems. Corporate governance scholars are therefore expected to uncover 
the interests which risk to be jeopardized in the exertion of the corporate activities.  
This kind of analysis requires first of all the definition of the concept of interest.  
  In the opinion of Jaeger [1963] and Freund [1897], and in general of the theory of 
elementary law – the interest can be conceived as the “relationship acknowledged by the law, 
between an individual who has to satisfy a need and the good that is suitable to satisfy that 
need”. 
 Such definition implies that the second step of the analysis is represented by the 
investigation on the legal nature of corporation. In fact, according to the legal nature of the 
corporation, one shall know which are “the relationships acknowledged by the law”.  
To begin with, in order to clarify and to reason on the notion of interest provided by 
Jaeger [1963] one can imagine the following example:  a girl has to satisfy the need to arrive 
to her job place sooner and for this reasons she decides to buy a mopped instead of using 
public transports.  
Taking on the mentioned Jaeger definition of interest, if the law recognizes a 
relationship between the girl and the mopped that she is meant to buy, then this relationship 
involves an interest.  
80 
 
It is clear that the law shall not recognize the relationship between the girl and the 
mopped only because the former has seen it in a retailer shop and she has decided to buy it. 
Rather, the relationship between the girl and the mopped shall be recognized by the law only 
when the girl signs a contract with the seller.  
Then, once the contract has been signed, the law acknowledges the interest of the girl 
in receiving the mopped.  
In particular, the law shall protect the interest of the girl – that is, shall protect the 
relationship between the girl and the mopped – by obliging the seller to respect the 
purchasing contract. For instance, the law establishes that if the mopped is not delivered, or 
is delivered with late, the girl shall be entitled to recover damages she has suffered.  The law 
protects the interest of the girl in receiving the mopped by obliging the seller to pay damages 
in case of non-performance or partial performance29.  
In some cases, the law could even oblige the seller to execute a specific performance 
instead of paying damages so that the girl is entitled to receive the mopped that has been 
indicated in the contract30.  
However, the interest of the girl in the mopped, either protected with recovering 
damages or by specific performance, is not relevant for the law until the girl adopts a legal 
device (which in that example has been the contract): the legal device is necessary for the 
production of –legal– effects31.   
Once the legal device is adopted, the rules governing this legal device itself shall 
protect the relationship between the individual and the good meant to satisfy her need.  
As to the satisfaction of the need of the girl to receive the mopped corresponds the 
need of the seller to receive the money, the legal device employed  - that is the contract – 
involves two interests – and hence two relationships acknowledged by the law: 
a) the interest of the girl in receiving the mopped and hence the relationship 
between the girl and the mopped; 
                                                 
29 This is actually a common law  rule. In civil law legal systems, the agreement of the party is sufficient to 
transfer the right of property so that the seller is first of all obliged to execute a specific performance.   
30 This is a remedy elaborated by the Courts of Equity.  
31 At the same time the law protects the interest of the seller in receiving money. For example, if the contract 
establishes that the delivery of the mopped precedes the payment, then if the girl does not pay until the date 
agreed or pay only part of the sum, then the seller also is entitled to act for the damages.  
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b) the interest of the seller in receiving the money and hence the relationship 
between the seller and the money. 
In addition, when two or more interests are involved in a certain transaction, the risk 
is that the accomplishment of one of them jeopardizes the accomplishment of the other.  
Thus, one can assume that the girl signs the contract on May the 5th 2010 and that the 
agreement provides that she shall receive the mopped the day after and that she shall have to 
pay the full amount by the 10 of August 2010. The price agreed for the purchase of the 
mopped is 2,500 dollars.  
If by the 10th of August 2010 the dollar has dropped so dramatically that 2,500 are 
worth nothing, then by paying the agreed price the buyer shall have satisfied her need while 
the seller not.  
Law therefore is expected to focus on the contractual relationship and to make the 
best to combine all the interests involved. A problem of currency such like the just 
mentioned one, could be resolved by envisaging a statutory provision that compel parties to 
behave with good faith when performing their pecuniary obligations.  
It is true, while one can discuss how and to what extent law should protect the 
interests involved in the transactions, there is no room for discussing to whom the interests 
belong. To put it differently, while one can argue that law should limit its intervention and 
hence leave parties with the widest freedom to choose the rules that govern their relationship 
(their interest) or while one can argue that law should affirmatively intervene into private 
affairs with the intent to prevent market failures – for example by providing the good faith 
clause to eschew the risks connected with a drop of currency –, one can not argue that the 
legal device contract, so far as it is considered by the definition as the king of private tools 
for operating within the market, involves only the interests of the parties involved in the 
transactions: the buyer and the seller in the example offered in this discussion. 
 Now, if the need of the individuals is simply to earn money, there are many ways for 
them for satisfying this need. For example they can sell mopeds, they can open restaurants, 
they can be doctors etc.  
In all these cases, the individuals shall likely earn money through contracts with the 
buyers of the mopeds,  with the clients of the restaurants, with the patients. Contract law, 
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other than defining to whom the interests belong, shall also define what kind of interests are 
to be protected.   
By the way, individuals may satisfy their need of earning money through holding 
shares in a corporation. As in this case the legal device chosen by the parties is called 
“corporation” and not “contract”, it might mean that the relationships involved are not 
represented only by the parties and the profit.  In other words, while the legal device contract 
left no room for discussing that the interests to be protected were only those belonging to the 
parties involved in the transaction, the legal device corporation not only does not reveal to 
whom the interests belong, but also which are the interests involved so clearly as the 
contract legal device.  
This aspect of unclearness is due to two reasons: 
a) not all the scholars and professionals agree on the function of the corporation. 
Differently from the contract, where everybody agrees that is a private tool, 
corporations are considered either private or public tools; 
b) not all the scholars and professionals interpret the law in the same way so that for 
some of them the corporation looks more like a contract while for others like an 
institution.  
The stream of thought that conceives the corporation as a private tool and hence as a 
contract is known as contractiarian while the school supporting the idea that the corporation 
is a public tool and hence an institution is known as institutionalism. Therefore,  point a) and 
b) represent actually two approaches concerned with the analysis of the nature of the 
corporation: functional and structural approach.  
 The next sections shall discuss these approaches in order to identify those findings 
that shall be useful for understanding the nature of non-profit corporation.  
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§3.1 FUNCTIONAL APPROACH  
   
 Some scholars think that the corporation does not simply represent a private legal 
device which is employed by individuals to earn money. Rather, in their opinion the 
corporation presents certain features related to its function that bring such economic 
structure beyond the private dimension.  
 It is true, while all these scholars agree that corporation involves a public and 
institutional dimension other than a contractual and a private one, they reach this conclusion 
through different ways of reasoning.  
 One of these theories  refers to Walther Rathenau [Jaeger, 1963] and is known as 
Unternehmen an sich.  This scholar assumes that the function of the corporation is to offer 
security for the community, to provide job and to improve the techniques for the scientific 
progress.   
  Rathenau therefore seems to not consider or to give little importance to the fact that 
the corporation has actually been the product of the efforts of private individuals. The 
scholar focuses his attention directly on the organizational dimension of the corporate 
phenomenon and underscores which are the needs that this organization is expected to 
satisfy.  
 As the needs are represented by benefiting the national economy, the corporation 
may satisfy these needs by accomplishing the three objectives inherent to its function.  The 
corporation, therefore, from a legal device of the private individual, becomes a person that 
boasts its own interests, that is the corporation establishes a relationship between itself and 
the goods; the goods are indeed represented by the security of the community, the provision 
of job and the improvement of the techniques for scientific progress.  
The public nature of the corporation itself implies that its relationship with the 
mentioned goods is acknowledged by the law.  
As long as the interests of the shareholders and of the corporation may not coincide, 
then the accomplishment of one interest may jeopardize the accomplishment of the other 
interest.  So, the interests of the shareholders and the interests of the corporation may stay in 
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conflict and according to Rathenau, in such circumstances, law is expected to protect those 
of the corporation.  
 However, as well as law cannot protect the interest of the girl in receiving  the moped 
unless she adopts a legal device – as for the example the contract – to advance her interest, 
so the law cannot protect the interests of the corporation if there is not a legal device that 
supports the relationship between the corporation and the goods. This legal device is 
represented by the management body of the corporation itself. 
 Thus, as well as the law of contract is expected to protect the interests of the seller 
and of the buyer by providing a mandatory good faith clause, so the corporate law conceived 
by Rathenau shall advance the interests of the corporation by providing mandatory rules of 
governance that shall drive directors to prefer corporation interests in detriment of 
shareholders one.  
 It is true, according to Rathenau, the public dimension of the legal device corporation 
implies that this organization is accountable before the community as well.  
 The community, as the public, implicitly adopts the legal device corporation to 
satisfy the need of producing resources to be distributed among the people. Therefore, 
through the corporation the community establishes a legal relationship with the three 
mentioned goods inherent to the function of the corporation itself. 
 Community and corporation, other than shareholders, are all parties whose interests 
deserve to be protected by corporate law.  
 Another institutional theory refers to Haussmann [Jaeger, 1963].  The scholar 
actually maintains that the firm is a “living body” participated by several subjects that are, 
other than the shareholders, the members of the management and of the supervisory board, 
the creditors and the employees.  
As the life of the corporation depends on these subjects, the function of the 
corporation is to promote their interests. Differently from Rathenau, Haussmann indeed 
believes that only physic persons may have an interest so that the sum of the interests of the 
mentioned subjects represents the interest to be pursued by the corporation. Another 
important divergence between Rathenau and Haussmann idea is that the latter denies that 
there is a public interest in corporation law. This means that for Haussmann corporation law 
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should only aim at maximizing the wealth of whoever participates in the firm. For 
Haussmann the wealth maximization of all the constituencies reflects the corporate interest.    
 In other words, because of the convincement of the public interest inherent to the 
concept of the corporation, Rathenau argued that law had to resolve the conflict of interests 
between shareholders and corporation in favor of the latter, while according to Haussmann, 
in a situation of conflict of interests between the constituencies, law had not to prefer one 
interest  in detriment of the interests of the others, rather law had simply to consider the 
interests of all the constituencies on the same level.  
 According to Haussmann therefore, the corporation remained a legal device through 
which the constituencies attempted to satisfy their needs and through which the 
constituencies rendered legally relevant their relationship with the good that would have 
satisfied their need. For example, an individual needs money for living. Law cannot ensure 
him the good for the mere circumstance she needs it. So the individual enter into a 
contractual relationship with the corporation and becomes an employee. The legal device 
contract between him and the corporation and the statutes dealing with labor law ensure that 
her interest in receiving the wage shall be protected by law. However, when she enters into a 
contractual relationship with the corporation, according to Haussmann she becomes part of 
the corporation. Her need of money for living is satisfied within the corporate context by not 
losing the job. The law therefore is expected to protect the relationship between the 
individual-employee and the good-maintaining her job position.  In Germany, for example, 
where the institutional theory is predominant, workers’ representation is part of the 
supervisory board. Their interests in the decision making process of the corporation is a right 
acknowledged by corporation law (Aktiengesechzt  1966). 
 The conflict of interests that could arise between shareholders and employees is 
evident so long as one considers that directors may jeopardize the interests of the former 
each time they take a long term decision and the interest of the latter each time they take a 
short term decision.  
 For example, by selling an asset of the corporation directors would increase the cash-
flow and this itself could be distributed as dividend. This decision would make the 
shareholders happy but not the employees that shall see the danger that the corporation –
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where and through which they satisfy their needs – loses its stability. And of course, the 
instability of the corporation threats their jobs.  
 According to Haussmann, the directors, that in this case represent the legal device 
corporation, faced with such kind of choice, should consider both the interests of 
shareholders and employees without the law imposing any indication about the decision to 
be taken. 
 Thus, Rathenau and Haussmann “only” shared the idea that corporation was not 
simply a private device aimed at maximizing the interests of the shareholders, but a legal 
device that, because of its function, takes necessarily in consideration the interests of other 
parties.  
Jaeger [1963] was actually right in holding that Haussmann theory is more complete 
than Rathenau’s one from a dogmatic point of view, for it is more logic to think that legal 
interests can belong only to physic persons and that the corporation is just the frame where 
these interests must be gratified. If Haussmann had taken in consideration even the interests 
of the community, then his theory and Rathenau’s one, although setting out from different 
perspectives, would have reached  the same conclusion: before corporate law, the interests 
of who participate with the firm and of who deals with it deserve at least the same protection 
of the interests of the community. 
A more recent institutional approach to the role and nature of corporation has been 
divulgated by the French scholar Bissara [1999] according to which the corporate activity  is 
expressed by “l’intérét supérior de la personne morale elle-meme, c’est-à-dire de 
l’enterprise considerée comme un agent économique autonome, porsuivant ses fins propres, 
distinctes notament notamment de celles de ses actionanaires, de ses salariés, de ses 
créanciers dont le fisc, de ses fournisseurs et de ses clients, mais qui correspondent à leur 
intérét general commun, qui est d’assurer la prospérité et la continuité de l’entreprise”.   
It is clear how this theory sets the interest of corporation as the main interest to be 
pursued by the management.   
Institutional theories based on functional approach were actually advanced also in the 
United States. Scholars like Berle and Druker  [in Jaeger, 1963] reasoned on the wide 
dimension reached by the American corporations.  
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They noted that earlier in the XIX century, the shareholders had an active role in the 
control of the corporations.  In fact, the small economic structure of these involved the 
presence of a major shareholder, traditionally represented by a family.  The family therefore 
managed and controlled the corporation actively. 
When the need of resources for investments showed up, then corporations were 
compelled to issue new shares. The result was that the economic structure no longer 
involved a major-family shareholders, but many minority shareholders.  
The scholars remarked how these exerted a very passive role in the control and 
management of the corporations, for this was put in the hands of specialized professionals.  
The fact itself that shareholders were anything but passive investors led Berle and 
Means to form the idea that the corporation could not represent actually a private affair as 
this  indeed involves the management or at least the control of the transaction.  The big 
corporation becomes therefore independent from the private wills of shareholders and 
absolutely sovereign of its own choices.  
Another important evidence of the not very private character of the corporation was 
represented by the large donations that corporations used to accomplish on behalf of 
universities and other charitable institutes.  
Basing their idea on these considerations, the US scholars conceived the corporation 
as a device operating on a public dimension and as a trustee of the community.  
As such, this implied that in the corporate phenomena not only the interests of the 
shareholders but also those of other stakeholders had to be considered.  
Either Drucker and Berle are close to the idea of Rathenau to the extent to which 
both the American and German side acknowledge the personality of the corporation (organ 
and tool of the society) and the consequence for which the corporation has its own interests.  
Similarly to the position of Drucker, Berle and Rathenau, the English scholar Goyder 
[Jaeger, 1963] acknowledges the corporation as a separate entity with its own interests. Yet, 
he underscores the need for the law to pay more attention to the devices available for the 
corporation itself, shareholders, workers and consumers to render the corporation more 
accountable before the community in general. According to Goyder, one of these devices is 
the by-laws, where the interests of those four classes are to be expressly considered.  
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Now, differently from the institutionalism scholars, there are scholars that think that 
the corporation is a legal device invented by the economic actors to increase their wealth and, 
as such, it should be left to the full autonomy of them.  
To introduce this approach, it would be useful to observe that ironically one of the 
institutionalism scholar, Berle, two decades earlier was one of the most confident authors in 
the contractarian theory. In 1932 he held:  “all the powers granted to a corporation or to the 
management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether derived from 
statute or charter or both, are necessarily and all times exercisable only for the ratable 
benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears”.  The 1932 version of Berle 
conceived that the function of the corporation was to maximize shareholders’ wealth as 
these were those who risked  money and as residual claimants their interests had to be 
protected before any other one.  
 The fundamental element of Berle theory was represented by his accent on the final 
interest of the shareholder, that is in the need to profit of the shareholder.  He said that 
corporate directors must make the best to ensure “the maximum profit compatible with a 
reasonable degree of risk” [1932]. 
 Shareholders organize themselves as corporation so that law shall recognize their 
interest in  the profits which represent their good. 
Differently from the contract between the girl and the moped seller where law, in a 
way or another, would have succeeded to satisfy the need of the parties – by recovering 
damages, specific performance etc. – in a corporate context law cannot actually ensure 
shareholders that they shall obtain the dividend.  
This limit of the law is acknowledged  by contracarians..  The limit is explained on 
the basis that the corporation before being a legal device is an economic tool. Such 
economic tool presents in its own nature a strong risk dimension for which the shareholder 
very well knows that her investment may not succeed to satisfy her need.  In fact,  in a 
simple contract like the one related to the purchase of the moped it is very easy for the 
parties to reach an agreement which specifies in details the exchange of the goods; one party 
has a certain degree of certainty that the counterpart has or shall have the good to be 
exchanged. If the party had not had this degree of certainty, she would have not reached an 
agreement at all.  
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In the corporate context, for sure the good is not immediately available. To this 
extent, the situation may resemble the one of the contract of moped purchasing to the extent 
to which in the latter case the retailer is waiting for the delivery from the supplier: that is, the 
buyer has possibly paid a good which still does not exist, but that she believes it shall exist 
with a certain degree of certainty, so does the retailer.  The situation indeed does not longer 
resemble the one of the contract of moped purchasing whereas either the shareholders and 
their counterpart –  corporation in the person of the directors – do  not have a certain degree 
of certainty that the good shall exist and, if it shall exist, they have no idea of its consistency.  
This explains why it is impossible for shareholders to specify details related to the good in 
the by-laws of the corporation and consequently explains how the lack of the specification of 
the good renders the transaction more risky. Rather, by-laws provides that shareholders shall 
receive the dividends (good) so long as there are residual returns.  
 In other words, in a hypothetical fact situation where the by-laws of the corporation 
provides a relationship for which shareholders shall be entitled to receive a minimum 
dividend of 1,000 dollar for each share hold at the time of the approval of the financial year, 
and where shareholders receive 900 dollars instead of the 1,000 envisaged by the by-laws, 
shareholders shall be entitled to claim against the partial performance of the corporation. 
Yet, this scheme does not reflect the economic nature of the corporation to the extent 
to which it shall never happen that shareholders are able to find directors available to sign a 
by-laws containing a clause establishing the minimum of the profit.  
A corporation functions just the other way round. That is, directors shall accept to be 
directors only if through the by-laws shareholders entrust them with the best discretion in 
the decision making process, recognizing  the risk of not receiving any good in exchange of 
their investment.  
In the light of this picture, Berle believed that notwithstanding the impossibility for 
the law to ensure the profits, law had somehow to recognize the interest of shareholders in 
obtaining the maximum dividend. 
In order to achieve this goal law had therefore to set the profit maximization of the 
shareholders as guiding principle for directors [Clarke, 2004].    
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§3.2 STRUCTURAL APPROACH 
 
The “structural” or positive approach  consists in the analysis of the black letters 
governing corporation.   Accordingly, the solution to the question “what is the corporate 
legal nature or the corporate interest?” has to be detached through the interpretation of the 
applicable law of a certain jurisdiction. If the jurisdiction is a common law jurisdiction, then 
for applicable law one has to give special attention  also to judicial precedents. .  
  Because of that, the concept of corporation shall vary according to the legal order the 
scholar is referring to. In particular, if one wants to measure the contractual/institutional 
dimension of US non-profit corporations, one has to look at the US legal system and must 
not forget the common law principles that have been developing in UK.  
The most authoritative institutional theory based on the structural approach develops 
its reasoning from the legislative provision that acknowledges legal personality to 
corporations.  
It is well known that legal personality is a necessary element of business corporations  
so that all the jurisdictions contain this norm, yet, in the US, the legal literature has not 
always interpreted this norm  in an institutional sense, as it has happened in Germany.  
  In fact, while the German Professor Gierke [Freund, 1897], maintained that 
corporations are something real and as such law acknowledged their legal personality, US 
scholars have been more bent to think that corporations were just an aggregate of investors 
so that their legal personality was simply a fictio juris.  
  The legal personality implies the existence of corporate own interest, which does not 
reflect the one of shareholders. This means that the conclusions reached by Gierke and 
Rathenau are basically identical; what differs between these scholars is the approach through 
which their findings are reached: structural and functional respectively.  
 As said earlier, the interpretation of English and American jurists of the provision 
concerning the legal personality tended to conceive this as a grant of the law, and not as an 
acknowledgment, as Gierke thought.  
The Anglo-American legal tradition, in fact, suggests how for common lawyers the 
legal personality was a grant of the law, for corporations were not considered as distinct 
persons that could claim an own interest. The legal personality was only a fictio juris created 
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by the law for practical purposes.  Because of that, the real interests of the corporation were 
to be considered only those advanced by the individuals.  
 Anyway, the legal personality represents only one of the structural criteria that the 
studious can refer to for assessing the nature of the corporation. Another very important 
legal parameter to measure the institutional and contract dimension of the corporate structure 
is represented by the notion of contract.  
Similarly to the legal personality, also the notion of contract varies according to the 
jurisdiction, above all if one considers the civil and common law point of view.  
Thus, if one wants to find out the contractual dimension of the US corporation, it can 
not skip the analysis of the common law idea of contract.  
 In law and economic terms, this is an obvious case of path-dependency.  In fact, this 
is actually the main reason why professor Gallor, a prominent English scholar of company 
law, believed that comparative study of company law was better pursued in comparing only 
common law jurisdictions: American corporations and British companies, this was for him a 
field in which comparison could have brought fruitful results. 
 In common law, a contract involves a bargaining between two or more parties. The 
bargaining is based on an agreement and it is defined as an exchange of promises. With a 
contract one promises to perform and therefore one undertakes an obligation.  A contract is 
able to bind. One is obliged to do something or to exchange something. 
 It is true,  the voluntary arrangement on which the formation of a corporation is 
based could never be considered in common law as a contract in the legal sense. In fact, in 
business corporations, shareholders actually do not exchange any promise among them to do 
or to perform something. They only agree to take part of an entity which is governed by the 
rules contained in the by-laws and in statutory provisions.   
If from a legal and technical point of view the corporation can not be a contract, then 
it is  an institution and as such the interests that it pursues are expected to be suggested by 
the legislator.  
Before advancing this conclusion, it is however necessary to interpret the common 
law notion of contract in the light of the corporate law. Instead of proceeding to accomplish 
this step by considering the US corporate law, it is useful to first check how the common 
law notion of contract fits into the UK company law.  In fact, as it shall be soon noted, such 
93 
 
analysis shall lead to different findings that would reveal the coexistence of both the 
institutional and contractual dimensions within the corporate structure.   
On one side, the English Company Act 2006 perfectly reflects this latter idea 
providing that the directors have to promote the success of the company and at the same 
time to consider: 
a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, so not only to short term 
profit, but look what happens to the company if they do something; 
b) the interests of the company employees;  
c) the need to foster company business relationships with suppliers, customers and 
others, employees, suppliers and customers and others are typical stakeholders; 
d) the impact of company operations on the community and the environment, again the 
public at large, not only public interest but also what a civil lawyer calls “interessi 
diffusi”; 
e) desirability of the company maintaining reputation for high standards of business 
conduct, so way of doing fair deals, fair business etc.  
f) finally also the need to act fairly as between members of the company, so defines 
also the quality of treatment of different duties.  
 
       Another clue that leads to think the company as an institution can be detached at Part 
10 of the Act. Section 170 (scope and nature of general duties) where it is provided that 
directors' general duties are owed to the company rather than to individual members. Hence, 
it is clear the connection with the ideas of legal personality.  
 One more track of institutional dimension of the company is detachable into the 
introduction of a new discipline of the derivative claim, provided by Companies Act 2006 at 
Part 1. 
The derivative action represents the possibility for shareholders to enforce 
management fiduciary duties in the name of the corporation for  officers and directors, who 
are in control of the corporation, are unlikely to authorize the corporation to bring suit 
against themselves. 
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To understand better the derivative claim one has to get back to Foss v Harbottle 32 
where the House of Lords basically established that an action against corporate directors 
could be brought only in the name of the company, that is on the basis of a valid deliberation 
of the general meeting.  This principle has always been in force in England and this is 
demonstrated by the provisions contained in Section 170 Part 10 of the 2006 Act.  
The Foss v Harbottle rule was actually grounded on the idea that corporations were 
democratic institutions and therefore a single shareholders had not to be allowed to interfere 
with managerial choices.  
However, with the growing of the idea that the balance between managerial and 
shareholders protection was too much bent towards the former, English judges began to 
develop doctrines for which shareholders themselves deserved the right to bring suits in the 
name of the corporation without the need to obtain a general meeting deliberation.  
Of course in the beginning such right was very limited.  The exceptions to the Foss 
rule were confined to cases of self-serving negligence or worse (i.e. fraud) from directors. 
With the decision of the Company Act 2006, from the first time the derivative claim was 
established on a legislative basis and was extended to breaches of duties including duty of 
care and skill.  
On the other side,  the Companies  Act contains provisions which instead would 
suggest also a contractual dimension of the company. In fact, at Section 33 Chapter 4, the 
Act envisages that the provisions of a company’s constitution, when registered, bind the 
company and its members to the same extent as if they: 
a) had been signed and sealed by each member ; 
b) contain covenants on the part of each member to observe the provisions. 
It has to be firstly observed that the black letter of the provision speaks about covenants and 
not contract. The legislator could not use the term contract as the provisions – that is the by 
law – are not a contract in the legal sense described above. Still the legislator wanted to 
ensure the same consequences as the shareholders relationships within corporation were 
contractual, that is to allow the shareholders to enforce their rights through contractual 
action.   
                                                 
32 (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189. 
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Already in Bratton Seymour Service Co Ltd v. Oxborough [1992], Judge Stein held:  
“It is, however, a statutory contract of a special nature with its own distinctive features. It 
derives its binding force not from a bargain struck between parties but from the terms of the 
statute. It is binding only insofar as it affects the rights and obligations between the company 
and the members acting in their capacity as members”. 
 The contractual dimension of the company implies that shareholders have contractual 
rights and therefore that these can be enforced through a direct lawsuit by the shareholders 
in their own name.  
 Obviously, the particular nature of the “company contract”  implies some limitation 
regarding the enforcement of its terms “as the rights given to a member are not necessarily 
absolute ones. They cannot be seen in isolation but only in relation to the rights enjoyed by 
the other members [Drury, 1986]”. 
 This explains why there is not a universal doctrinal approach which discloses when a 
member has the right to bring a contractual action. Judges have indeed often adopted 
different ratio decidendi33.  
 However, one of these limitations envisages that the rights given by the company 
contract to third parties cannot be enforced by these. Third parties are considered as outsider 
while articles of associations binds only the members and the company34.  
 The understanding of the difference between derivative claim and contractual action 
would be crucial to identify both the institutional and contractual dimensions of the English 
company or what is defined as “enlightened shareholders approach”. 
The former has to be brought for breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the company. 
If a manager goes to a business meeting and he behaves like spending extra corporate money 
for hotel, rent car, business class in the flight, he might be breaching his fiduciary duty to 
promote the success of the company.  The shareholder can not sue him/her for breaching a 
contractual obligation as there is no contract between him and the board of directors where it 
is specified that the director has an obligation to not behave selfishly. Yet, the shareholder 
                                                 
33 For a detailed discussion on the cases involving contractual actions brought by shareholders see Drury 
[1986]. 
34 Judge Stein [1992] continues: “It is binding only insofar as it affects the rights and obligations between the 
company and the members acting in their capacity as members. If it contains provisions conferring rights and 
obligations on outsiders, then those provisions do not bite as part of the contract between the company and the 
members, even if the outsider is coincidentally a member”. 
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has instead the institutional right to enforce that obligation and through the derivative claim 
he can protect his/her and corporation interest (the success of the company).  
 As regards the latter, a contractual action can be filed for breach of common law 
duties owed to the shareholders and detachable in the bylaws. The rights actionable directly 
by shareholders then affect their property, that is their shares, as for example the distribution 
of dividends, the right to vote etc35.  Shareholders have no power over corporation property.  
The structural approach to the English law reveals therefore that the interests 
protected by company law are those of shareholders as well are those of the other 
stakeholders.  This interpretation could lead to consider the corporation as an institution, yet 
it is crucial to underscore that only the shareholders may enforce the corporate interests, 
through a contractual action or derivative claim.  
In fact, the duties enlisted at Part 10 do not give rise to a direct right of action by 
employees or any third party outside the company (for example, environmental 
activists).  The directors still only owe these duties to the company, and a breach of such 
duties can only be enforced by the company or its shareholders.  
This is can be drawn from the section 170 (1) itself where the legislator provides that 
the duties are owed to the company and not to the persons specified in the subsection.  
 One could then wonder what is the point to envisage normative provisions 
protecting stakeholder interests if the former can not be enforced by the latter. One 
interpretation can be that the list of the interests represents a sort of defense for directors. Put 
it differently, whereas a shareholder brings suits against a director for having pursued a 
public interest in detriment of the shareholder interest itself, then the director can argue that 
he/she had complied with positive rules of law.  
Now, as regards US law, it has first to be remembered that each State of the 
Federation has its own corporate law so that for the purposes of this dissertation it is 
necessary to focus only on the most significant ones.  
To begin with, it can be considered the Delaware  General Corporation Law, for it is 
commonly recognized as the most liberal.  
Indeed the contractual dimension of a corporation organized under the Delaware Act 
is very easy understandable from the lack statutorization of the general duties as the one 
                                                 
35 See for example Wood v. Odessa Waterworks Company  [1889].  
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introduced by the Companies Act 2006 and, above all, by the accent posed by the legislator 
on the bylaw, for the duties of directors  “shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of 
the board of directors which is not inconsistent with the bylaws”36.    
The absence of a statutory consecration of the corporation interests’ might be the 
cause for which  “the distinction between direct and derivative claims has been the source of 
considerable litigation in the Delaware courts through the years.   Whether a claimant has 
standing to sue directly or derivatively is not always clear” [Olson, 2008]. 
Thus, the trend followed by the Supreme Court of Delaware has been the one 
established in 2004 case of Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc. 
 The Tooley test provides that the determination of whether a claim is direct or 
derivative "must turn solely on the following questions: (1) who suffered the alleged harm 
(the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive the 
benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?" 
 Moreover, in Delaware as well as in most of the States of the Federation, the 
derivative action is seen as a regulator of corporate management and one of the most 
effective means of enforcing the management’s duties and obligations under the law37. 
For the purposes of this work, the state corporate law to be analyzed is the one of 
New York. As seen earlier, in fact, New York adopted an important non-profit corporation 
law so that it would be interesting to compare it with the business corporation act. Note that 
the State of Delaware has not adopted a non-profit corporation law and, as a consequence, 
non-profit corporations are organized under the General Corporation Law.  
 At section 601 the NYBCA provides that “the by-laws may contain any provision 
relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, its rights or powers or 
the rights or  powers  of  its  shareholders,  directors  or  officers,  not inconsistent with this 
chapter or any other statute of this state or the certificate of incorporation”. 
 The norm undoubtedly confirms the contractual dimension of the document.  
Other than being contained in the by-laws, the duties of directors are envisaged also by the 
Act which specifies that these have to pay regard at:  
                                                 
36 See § 142.  
37  Accuracy requires to quote Ramsay [1994] according to which the “United States experience is that 
shareholder derivative actions are a rare occurrence despite the existence of contingency fees. One study of 179 
public companies in the United States found that, on average, a company is involved in a shareholder 
derivative action or shareholder class action only every 17.5 years”. 
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 (1)  both the long-term and the short-term interests of the corporation  and  its  
shareholders  and  (2)  the  effects   that   the  corporation's  actions  may  have  in the short-
term or in the long-term upon any of the following: 
    (i) the prospects for potential growth, development, productivity  and profitability of the 
corporation; 
    (ii) the corporation's current employees; 
    (iii)  the  corporation's  retired  employees  and other beneficiaries  receiving or entitled to 
receive retirement, welfare or similar benefits  from or pursuant to any plan sponsored, or 
agreement  entered  into,  by the corporation; 
    (iv) the corporation's customers and creditors; and 
    (v)  the  ability  of  the corporation to provide, as a going concern, goods, services, 
employment opportunities and  employment  benefits  and otherwise to contribute to the 
communities in which it does business. 
 Section 601 resembles section 171 of the 2006  Companies Act in so far it confers 
an institutional dimension to the corporation and at the same time recognizes the protection 
of the interests of the shareholders.  In this, they differ from Delaware General Corporation 
law where it is simply envisaged that directors duties are o be exerted according to the 
articles of association (Section 141).  
 Moreover, the existence of the derivative claim, which is disciplined by Section 
626 confirms the common law rules for which directors owe their duties to the corporation.  
The conclusion for which corporations, either under the UK Companies Act and the 
US corporate laws, present both a contractual and institutional dimension suggests that there 
are different devices to protect the interests of the shareholders and those of the corporation. 
Yet, it does not disclose the degree of responsibility that directors have before such interests.  
In order to uncover this question, one has to go back into  the eighteen century, when 
the Government hardly granted the right to incorporate and therefore business activities were 
carried out through the form of trust.  The shareholders simply and directly put in the hand 
of the trustees the money and the law of trust would have applied to this relationship. 
With the act of incorporation, a “thing” – that is the corporation – would have stood 
between shareholders and directors (trustees). For the law, this thing would have had legal 
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personality and would have gathered all the interests belonging to shareholders, directors 
and all the other stakeholders.  
 As quote above, for many years, the personality of the corporation has been thought 
a fictio juris, something created by the law for convenience. The truth that this fictio would 
have hided was that directors and shareholders were still tied by a trust relationship so that 
the law of trust would have applied to possible conflict of interests. The law of trust would 
have shaped the fiduciary duties of corporate directors even if the legal phenomenon of 
corporation did not involve actually a trust.  
In fact, Duggin and Goldman [2007] stated that 
 “The original model for defining the director-shareholder 
relationship emerged from the law of trusts. This is not surprising, 
for the duty of a trustee is a paradigm for allocation of fiduciary 
responsibilities in cases where one person holds money or property 
on behalf of another. In addition, the rules governing financial trusts 
were already well established by the time courts began to define the 
core relationships of corporate governance. Consequently, the 
potential fit appealed to courts and commentators. There was 
significant support for the idea that a corporate manager should be 
“a trustee—a guardian,” with “every shareholder . . . [as] his ward” 
and, at least in cases of large public enterprises, “the community [as] 
his cestui qui trust.” A number of nineteenth-century judicial 
decisions reflect a similar propensity to invoke the law of trusts in 
the corporate arena. The conservative rules of the trust approach, 
however, did not fit the entrepreneurial mold of corporate capitalism 
and its captains. As the twentieth century dawned and the corporate 
form became increasingly popular, corporations began to grow and 
diversify. It was evident that the skills that made individuals 
successful business directors were not necessarily the same qualities 
that made good trustees. It soon became clear that saddling 
corporate directors with the kinds of standards applicable to the 
guardians of trusts and eleemosynary institutions was 
counterproductive. This approach suited neither the needs of 
evolving business corporations nor the objectives of their investors. 
Consequently, the courts began to develop a separate set of 
principles for corporate management. As the law of corporate 
governance evolved, what remained of the trustee model was the 
idea that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation, and, 
indirectly, to its shareholders”. 
 
This understanding for which corporations were and are a mix of institutional and 
contractual dimensions is not shared by a new stream of thinkers, the contractarians, who 
identify exclusively the latter dimension.  
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To begin with, contractarian are actually not legal scholars but economists. 
Although this would imply incorrect findings on the legal nature of corporation, it must be 
reminded that Courts have several times applied their positions38. 
Thus, according to these economist thinkers the relationships which characterize 
business corporations can be actually considered contractual in the traditional common law 
sense.   
This idea, known for defining corporations as nexus of contracts, sets forth the firm 
not as an entity but as an aggregate of various inputs acting together to produce goods or 
services. Employers provide labour, so there is an exchange represented by labour against 
wage, creditors provide debt capital, which is in exchange of interests, shareholders provide 
equity capital in exchange to get dividends.  
The presence of a bargain and therefore of a valid consideration represents the 
sufficient legal element to consider these relationships as contractual before the common law 
notion of contract.  
The twofold idea arguing that the corporation is not an entity and it is rather a nexus 
of contractual relationships, is employed by contractarians to identify which are the 
interests protected by statutory corporation law.  
Although legislation is very clear in establishing that directors duties are owed to the 
corporation  and to the shareholders – as provided by section 717(b) of NYBCA –, for  
contractarians the interests of the latter should prevail in management decisions.  
The scholars argue that corporation is not an entity but just a legal fictio that hide the 
real interests of the shareholders. These, as real individuals may boast rights and these rights 
are identified in the company contract, that is in the contractual terms which bind them to 
the directors.  
 Still, contractarians go further and conceive the contract between shareholders and 
directors as an agency relationship, offering therefore a more extreme version of the contract  
“special in nature” one suggested by Judge Stein [1992]. 
For the employment of agency law terminology is employed to refer to the 
relationship between shareholders and directors, the interests of the former come up to a 
position of unchallenged  pre-eminence which implies two consequences. 
                                                 
38 The most important of these is Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp. [1988]. 
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The first is that shareholders should have the power to control the board in order to 
minimize the agency costs either in a de jure condendo perspective and in relation to the 
interpretation of law in judicial cases.    The easier way to enforce their (contractual) rights 
for shareholders sets forth the contrast with the old eighteenth century conception that saw 
the directors/ shareholders relationship  governed by the law of trust.   According to this 
discipline, the directors had to face a lot of limitations during the exertion of her power so 
that, as seen earlier, legislation and Courts began to confer more discretion to managerial 
decisions. Yet,  this acknowledgement was not counterbalanced by a power of control from 
the beneficiaries (corporation and shareholders),  for the law of trust provides that 
beneficiaries remedies are limited to specific enforcement of the trust, claim for breach of 
trust, appointment of a receiver, or removal of the trustee.  Put it differently, if the 
beneficiary requires the trustee to accomplish some act, transaction and she refuses to do so, 
the beneficiary can do nothing. The gap between managerial discretion and beneficiary 
control therefore would have been filled by conceiving the application of agency law 
[Dalley, 2006] .   
The second consequence, other than confirming that the firm is seen simply as  a 
legal fiction which represents the complex set of contractual relationships between these 
inputs,   means that, from a strict legal point of view, corporate law should be made only, or 
at least mostly, of rules freely adopted by the parties.  The law that govern these bilateral 
contracts or bilateral relationships should limit as much as possible the envisagement of 
mandatory rules, since it is believed that only default rules may have a positive impact on 
such relationships.  
 It is  true, default rules help contractual parties to reduce transaction costs: instead of 
spending time and money in the efforts of framing or writing or even discussing all the 
clauses, these are already provided by law.  
 The function of law acknowledged by the more extreme theories of this 
contractarian view in only to express the most efficient solution through written rules which 
can be opted out by the parties.  
 Therefore,  parties are free to accept  the solutions proposed by the legislator or 
instead to choose different ones which can be more tailored for their exigencies and 
preferences.  
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  The principal-agent conception of the shareholders-directors relationship has been 
rightly criticized by Dalley [2006], at least from a (strict) legal (structural) point of view.  
The professor explains that 
 “an agent is a person who has agreed to act on behalf of another 
person (the principal) and is subject to that person’s control. The 
principal has a complete right of control over the agent, which 
serves to offset the fact that the principal is vicariously liable for 
all the acts of the agent. The agent owes fiduciary duties to the 
principal, including the duty to turn over to the principal all 
profits or other benefits arising from the relationship. The 
relationship between shareholders and directors has none of these 
features, and it should therefore be apparent that a board is not an 
agent of the shareholders”. 
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§3.3 NEW INSTITUTIONALISM  
 
The employment of the functional and structural approach to explain the nature of 
corporation has involved also another stream of thinkers, known as new-institutionalist.  
To begin with, these authors criticize the nexus of contract theory   because they do 
not believe in the rationale which is behind it.  
 In particular, contractarians claim that people act rationally for the promotion of their 
own interests.  
In fact, the study of contractual relationships is based on the assumptions [Asimov, 
1988)] that these scholars have expressed through the rational choice theory. They basically 
claim that:  
 homo economicus has stable preferences;  
 homo economicus acts rationally to pursue those preferences.  
Point (a) demonstrates that economists like to make things simpler. In their opinion, 
regardless of the type of contract [James, 1979], actors “are not assumed to be governed by 
causal factors operating behind their backs” [Hedstrom & Stern, forthcoming]. When they 
negotiate contractual clauses, actors aim at increasing/maximizing their wealth.  
As regards point (b), it is asserted that “actors… are seen as conscious decision makers” 
[Hedstrom & Stern, forthcoming] because before they conclude a contract they calculate, 
they seek information, they assess all the effects that might take place, and so on. The latter 
is thought to be optimal by definition, as it satisfies parties’ preferences. 
 It is true, this rationale has been criticised by new-institutionalists for not taking into 
account – especially  in very large institutions – that the circumstances within which people 
bargained change and the relevant contractual relationship might no longer be optimal. 
 For example, in large corporations it is very common that new shareholders show up 
in the ownership structure. These might elect a new board of directors whose decisions   
might not reflect the preferences of the previous shareholders.  Hence, shareholders have 
definitely no growing up experience of what shall happen.  
Moreover, the rational choice theory is very different from “old” institutional 
scholars assumptions which maintain that the decisions of economic actors are (and must be) 
shaped by external factors which are deeply rooted in a certain culture. Among these 
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external factors there are (and there must be) the rules of law which are expected to supply 
the lack of information bore by the weaker contractual parties.  
 Thus, for “old institutional” thinkers the presence of mandatory rules in corporate 
governance is necessary to align directors decisions to shareholders and stakeholders’ 
interests, for both are not considered enough expert (shareholders) or in the position 
(stakeholder) to elaborate contractual clauses aimed at their protection.  
  The old institutional and contractarian views reflect therefore two stages of the idea 
of corporation, respectively aimed at underscoring stakeholders (and of course shareholders, 
‘50-‘60) and (only) shareholders interests (‘70-‘80-‘90).  
 For new institutional scholars corporations are now in a third stage which might be 
labelled as “socially responsible capitalism” [Wilson, 2003], implying that there must be a 
new way of thinking of management with regard to functions, duties and responsibilities of 
the corporation.  
 In particular, new institutional scholars are not actually concerned with identifying 
which interests must be followed by the corporation. It is by now commonly accepted that 
either shareholders and stakeholders deserve to be protected. Therefore, the debate for these 
scholars is “not whether corporate managers have an obligation to consider the needs of the 
society, but the extent to which they should consider these needs” [Wilson, 2003].   
 From a structural approach point of view,  similarly to contractarians, new-
institutionalist scholars have reasoned on the traditional common law notion of contract and 
have found that corporation is a nexus of incomplete contracts.  
  Assuming that in common law a contract is an exchange of legally binding promises 
to act in the future [Scott and Triantis, 2005], new institutional thinkers consider that these 
promises are contained in the by-laws clauses and in the statutory provisions.  
 The promises obviously are made by who partake to the control of the corporation 
and, therefore, by directors and shareholders.   
   The content of the promises themselves is represented by some basic rules which 
define how parties have to behave in the future, especially when a certain situation occurs. 
For example, these rules shall establish how shareholders shall vote in the meeting, how 
they shall be able to exercise their right of vote, how they shall be able to obtain dividends 
or how the directors have their obligations to follow. 
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 These rules and, therefore, the promises to comply with these rules can be deemed 
legally binding only when the obligations become defined, that is when the element of 
consideration comes out: by acquiring shares, an investor becomes shareholder of a 
corporation and in exchange of the money invested the corporation shall pay dividends; yet, 
the shareholder can not enforce the obligation to pay dividends until the financial year is 
approved. So, the contract represented by the exchange “buy share for dividends” is not 
really a contract as one of the promises – the distribution of dividend – is not legally binding 
until a certain moment, until a certain situation occurs – the decision of the financial year.  
 Seen in this way, the incomplete contract is efficient – from an economic point of 
view – so long as the obligations are well defined and so long as the law envisages a 
“mechanism that will complete the contractual incompleteness by monitoring the 
contractors” [Brosseau & Fares, 2000] 
 For new institutionalist scholars the problem in fact occurs when the rules which 
establish how parties shall behave are not envisaged.  
The fact that the contractual rights of the shareholders are enforceable only when 
directors’ obligation is defined and when the behaviour of this occurs, implies that the 
protection of their interests is and must be firstly accomplished within the corporate context 
whereas: 
a) in the opinion of contractarians, the definition of the obligation would be a 
sufficient condition for being enforced;  
b) in the opinion of new institutionalist scholars the directors’ obligations are 
expected to be established by statutory provisions and, therefore, are expected to 
protect certain stakeholders’ rights; 
c) in the opinion of old institutional, shareholders have only institutional rights 
enforceable by the corporation itself.  
If ones takes into consideration the UK Companies Act 2006 and the NYBCA then one 
easily notes that these Acts actually provide for directors’ obligations. Among these 
obligations, part are directed to protect stakeholder interests (171ss-601ss), part to protect 
shareholder interests as for example the discipline of general meeting resolutions (281 ss).  
Shareholders are supposedly not interested in enforcing the former – if for example 
they enforce the duty to protect the environment, they might jeopardize their dividends – but 
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are of course interested in enforcing the second. Yet, according to new institutionalist the 
enforcement is not as immediate as contractrian would suggest.    
For example, section 656 provides that  “where the net assets of a public company 
are half or less of its called-up share capital, the directors must call a general meeting of the 
company to consider whether any, and if so what, steps should be taken to deal with the 
situation”. 
In both the cases it is undoubtedly necessary that the situation described by the 
provision must occur for a contractual enforcement.  
The different view of new institutionalists and contractarians comes out in the 
hypothetical fact situation for which the call of the general meeting hinders a prompt 
adoption of steps potentially fit to restore or defend the social capital. 
In such a case, while for contractarians shareholders could enforce their contractual 
right to the maximization of dividends, jeopardized by the call of the general meeting, for 
new-institutionalist the behavior of directors could be challenged only if the call of general 
meeting has been announced with unjustified delay.  
This example underscores how new-institutionalist focus their accent on the respect 
of the procedures, reflecting somehow the finding of the less extreme  contractiarian 
theorists. 
However, while for the former these procedures have to be contained in statutory 
provisions and mandatory, for the second they have to be left to the free choice of the parties.  
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§ 4. THE LEGAL NATURE OF NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS 
 
While literature either economic and legal is abundant concerning theories of 
business corporation, little has been said on behalf of non-profit organizations.  
  It is true, the potential resemblance of business and non-profit organizations allows 
to analyze the nature of the latter on the basis of the studies  already accomplished on the 
former.  
The discussion on the nature of business corporation has provided the devices to 
analyze the legal nature of non-profit corporation. The aim of this section is in fact to see 
how the institutionalist, contractarian and new-institutionalist theories fit in the concept of 
non-profit corporation and therefore to find out which are the interests pursued by this legal 
scheme.  
 As done for business corporations,  the study shall take into consideration functional 
and the positive approach.    
 
§ 4.1 FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
 
§ 4.1.1 Theories on the Role of the Non-Profit Sector 
 
As done in the discussion on business corporations, the analysis shall aim at 
identifying the role played by non-profit organizations and then at detaching the interests 
concerned.  
  Chapter II had already described how from a strictly religious charity , the non-
profit sector would have finally played a pure economic role. However, this theory is not the 
only one as there are several other theories that attempt to explain the role of the non-profit 
sector.  
Since the identification of the interests depends on the role exerted by the non-profit 
sector, one can not skip the analysis of the mentioned theories.  
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One of the most authoritative theory has been provided by Professor Hansmann 
[1980] whose arguments to justify the development and therefore the function of non-profit 
corporations have been essentially underpinned on the basis of an economic analysis.  
 The scholar sustains that, for certain entrepreneurial initiatives, non-profit 
organizations  may perform better than ordinary business firms.  
 The contract failure theory, indeed, relies on the fact that sometimes patrons   are not 
technically able to evaluate the goods or services they are purchasing or financing.  
For instance, one may imagine consumers shopping in a supermarket. In that case, 
buyers may personally and directly check what they are buying. Among the stock of 
products, they easily choose the one which satisfies their preferences the most.  
In other situations, though, such advantages may not be available. The clearest 
example is represented by the Red Cross. If one of its commitments is to distribute food for 
African children, contributors will barely know if their money has been fairly employed. 
They are not in a position to countercheck for what purposes for which their aid has been 
actually utilized.  
Similar circumstances can be found when someone engages a company for flower 
delivery. Nonetheless, though consumers are not able to personally evaluate the performance 
they’ve required, they still can make sure by phone-calling the recipient. This evidently does 
not occur in the aforementioned instance concerning the Red Cross.  
It is true that, in situations where patrons would hardly realize a possible misuse of 
their money, the market alone fails to provide any tool for the problem. In other words, the 
market itself can not guarantee a fair allocation of the resources.  
When this happens, the authority of the state is expected to come into play. Through 
commercial law, it historically has been aiming at:  
 a) preventing unfair distribution of risks – above all when it is delegated to a weaker 
part, as for example the donor to the Red Cross – or;  
 b) reaching greater efficiency.  
 Accordingly, non-profit corporations have been penetrated via legal provisions 
directed to “help” the market satisfy the conditions for working efficiently. Undoubtedly, the 
most significant among them is the nondistribution constraint which, as quoted in the 
introduction, disallows to distribute any income generated by an entity’s activities.  
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Such mandatory by-law clause would ensure patrons that the money they have given 
will be employed for organizational purposes. This explains why the American scholar 
claims that non-profit organizations play a protective role   
 Hansmann [1980] therefore justifies the existence and the survival of non-profit 
organizations on the basis of the NDC, seen as an excellent device to reduce the agency 
problem occurring between patrons and directors.  
 Yet,  the rationale offered by the American scholar is complete only if one assumes 
that many “if not most, not-for-profit firms are started by entrepreneurs” [Glaeser & 
Shleifer, 2001].  
 In fact, before bringing to life any activity, the latter are expected to make cost-
benefit evaluations. Consequently, once they realize their enterprise might present problems 
related to market failure, they would find the non-profit option to be more trustworthy 
because of the NDC, that would attract more consumers than a business organization would.  
Yet,  many non-profit organizations are joined by entrepreneurs only after they have already 
been constituted. This would lead the scholars to sustain that the “protective role” would 
justify the survival, rather than the mere existence of NPOs.  
 Moreover,  the stream of thought based on Hansmann’s [1980] findings relies too 
much on the effectiveness of the NDC.  
 Such disallowance, indeed, implies penalties for whoever is found responsible, but 
this does not actually mean situations of mismanagement may not occur . 
 Ortman and Schlesinger [2002], for instance, sustain that the monitoring mechanisms 
of  non-profit corporations have historically been weaker than the business counterpart so 
that the NDC alone would not guarantee that expected management’s fairness. The legal 
provision would appear fragile even where one assumed it to be supported by other elements 
such as the altruistic and ideological motivations supposedly driving NPO directors [Ortman 
and Schlesinger, 2002]. Patrons know directors change, situations change, and behaviors 
change. The authors define Hansmann’s [1980] theory as “trust hypothesis”, underscoring 
its extremeness.  
 Rather than upon the trust element, they instead prefer to explain the market share of 
non-profit organizations upon the concept of reputation supposed to best ensure a proper 
usage of financial resources [Ortman and Schlesinger, 2002] for patrons. At the same time, 
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however, they acknowledge that reputation takes time to be formed and, moreover, would 
play its protective role just in cases where information flow among customers is good.  
Hansmann’s [2000] counter-response has insisted on the misinterpretation of his 
article. He claims that the trust hypothesis should not to be considered so strong. He outlines 
that if NDC were sufficient to guarantee interest alignment, then the agency problem would 
have been solved and the whole economy would have functioned thorough non-profit 
organizations. Accordingly, he has been keen to acknowledge the limitations of his findings, 
clarifying that he simply wanted to underscore the asymmetric information element, and 
quote one of the possible legal solutions to challenge mismanagement.  
 The contract failure theory is definitely the most popular in literature [Brody, 1996].  
However, it still has some detractors. Ones of these are Sacco and Zarri [2006]. In particular, 
the Italian authors have underscored how the co-existence within the same sector of  market 
of for-profit and non-profit firms should be the demonstration that Hansmann theory is not 
fully valid, as if it were, then only non-profit firms should survive. Another observation 
advanced by Sacco and Zarri [2006] regards the fact that the NDC can not be a warranty of 
the trustworthiness of the non-profit enterprises. These, in fact, as well as their business 
counterparts, still have to comply with rules such like minimum profit of the firm or general 
requirements of the financial year, so that their managers, although not distributing resources 
among themselves, could divert the money expected to be employed for the quantity and 
quality of the services/goods to ends related to the survival of the firm. The NDC therefore 
does not necessarily ensures quality and quantity: managers can take advantage of the 
asymmetric information to follow a management style which is quite similar to that of 
business firms. Other observations on the NDC point out that his could be envisaged by the 
founders of an enterprise just in order to obtain a particular - or rather - a relaxed fiscal 
status and that it could no ensure the trustworthiness of the non-profit firm so long as the 
stakeholders change in times – for example employees, donors, volunteers can be replaced 
by less motivated people.  
The third and last critique to Hansmann theory concerns the fact that the market 
failure due to the asymmetric information does not represent a problem that can be resolved 
only by non-profit organizations. Also State-owned firms are not indeed profit seeking so 
that they might well flank the non-profit organizations.  
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Some other scholars attempt to explain non-profit sector success underpinning the 
statutory tax advantages which are granted to non-profit entities but not to their business 
competitors [Schoenfeld, 1970 and Fama & Jensen, 1983]. 
If one took on this justification then one could ascribe a completely different role to 
NPOs. Rather than structures aimed to protect patrons in cases of contract failure, such 
entities would represent an ideal device for astute entrepreneurs to hide business activities, 
taking advantage of the fiscal benefits.  
 In this work tax exemption theory is not considered convincing enough to motivate 
the impressive increasing number of NPOs. Along with that, it is important to underscore 
the fact that non-profit entities existed long before the introduction of the income tax in the 
United States, and hence are unlikely to be a byproduct of income taxation [Glaeser & 
Shleifer, 2001]. Moreover, the rationale behind fiscal exemption in actuality has never been 
very clear. Hansmann [1981] himself has provided a very significant article in which he has 
firstly analyzed the relevant existing legal and economic theories and, secondly, offered a 
novel, perhaps more satisfying, justification for the benefits recognized to NPOs.  
 In particular, he argues that “the best justification for the exemption is that it helps to 
compensate for the constraints on capital formation that non-profit organizations commonly 
face, and that such compensation can serve a useful purpose, at least for those classes of 
non-profit organizations that operate in industries in which, for various reasons, non-profit 
firms are likely to serve consumers better than would profit-seeking firms” [Hansmann, 
1981]. Such argumentations demonstrate that Hansmann [1981] still relies on the 
nondistribution constraint element, considering it as a prerequisite for granting tax benefits 
and, therefore, confirming his idea that NPOs play a protective role on behalf of patrons.  
A more general observation referring to legal aspects, however, would explain tax 
exemption based on the fact that non-profit incomes do not match with the terms used in the 
Internal Revenue Code.  
 Anyways, as Hansmann himself claims, contract failure and tax exemption are not 
necessarily competing theories [Hansmann, no year specified]. The author, indeed, 
acknowledges the benefits of fiscal advantages to strengthen the protective role of the non-
profit sector.  
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 The Hansmann [1981] rationale to justify the existence-survival of non-profit 
organizations has been challenged also by Fama and Jensen [1983] who have stated that 
their  hypothesis that the nonprofit form is related to donor financing is more promising. 
 In particular, the latter argue that Hansmann relies too much on the nature of the 
products rather than the agency problems of donations. In fact,  Fama and Jensen [1983] 
maintain that if a certain activity must rely on donations it could not be organized in a 
shareholding structure.  For example, if a University had shareholders, donors would never 
be sure that their contributions would be adopted for the defined output (conferences, 
teaching, scientific publications etc.) as shareholders have contractual rights on the cash 
flow.  This problem of agency could only be resolved by not envisaging a shareholding 
capital. 
 It is true, Fama and Jensen hypothesis seems to not consider the agency problem that 
would therefore incur between management and donators. According to these scholars, such 
kind of agency problem would and could be resolved by adopting the strategy of separating 
decision management from decision control in the decision process. This strategy shall be 
analyzed in details in chapter IV.   
Another leading theory concerned with the development of non-profit sector has 
been provided by Weisbrod [Sacco and Zarri, 2006] who, instead of contract failures, speaks 
in terms of Government failure. A wonderful explanation of this theory has been offered by 
Sacco and Zarri [2006]: 
“the idea developed by Weisbrod focuses on the ways of supplying 
and financing public goods o services from the State. In his model, 
the authors advances specific hypothesis related to the ways to 
finance the public activities. In particular he assumes the proportion 
between the marginal contribution and the marginal benefit in 
relation to a certain public good/service can not be the same among 
citizens. Moreover, in Weisbrod theory, it is also fundamental his 
belief that the public decision making hinges crucially on the results 
of the political processes which are driven by  first-past-the-post 
electoral mechanisms, where quantity and quality of the several 
goods/services are in function of the vote.   
Therefore,  within such an economic model of electoral competition, 
the preferences of the median voter shall be relevant, since the 
political winner shall be the one that succeeds to obtain the 50% + 1 
of the votes (for this reason his model is also known as Median 
voter theorem).  
 Given the practical impossibility to render proportional  for every 
single voting citizen the marginal contribution and the marginal 
benefit related to the goods or service to be provided,  for sure some 
people shall deem the level of supply of the said good/service as 
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very high (so they shall be over-satisfied) while others shall consider 
it has too low (so they shall be under-satisfied).  
 With the majority system vote, only the median voter would be 
perfectly satisfied by the level of supply decided by the 
Government. In a political system where the candidates are elected 
through simple majority, the winner shall be the one that has 
presented the political program best aligned with the preferences of 
the median voter.  
 For what concerns the rest  of the population,  it is fundamental to 
understand if the given society is internally homogeneous or  
heterogeneous from a cultural, ethnic, religious and socio-economic 
point of view: the more a population is  heterogeneous under such 
profiles, the more there shall be un-satisfaction among the voters in 
relation to the quality and  quantity of the good/service provided by 
the Government.  
From this point of view, the Weibrod theory seems 
outstandingly actual, since many economically developed societies 
are currently more and more characterized by a multi-cultural layer, 
as consequence of massive and intensive migratory flows.  
  Thus, it is possible to guess that such growing internal complexity 
of the socio-economic, ethnic, religious and cultural layer, implies a 
higher and higher rank of heterogeneousness also in relation to the 
individual preferences for what concerns quality and quantity of the 
public goods/service to be produced.  
 How is therefore possible to answer to the minorities un-satisfied 
by the rank of the public good/services decided by the State? 
According to Weisbrod, the key solution is not      represented by an 
alternative that involves the profit-seeking enterprises operating in 
the market. In fact, the private goods/services offered by business 
firms can not perfectly replace the goods/services provided by the 
State as the former present  fruition costs much higher (although 
they present the advantage of permitting the owner to accomplish a 
personalized control on the ways the goods/services are fruited).  
  Instead, according to the scholar, the existence of non-profit 
organizations as subjects offering    public goods/services required 
by the consumers who unsatisfied by the political choices on the 
matter represents a much more promising path. In his reasoning, 
indeed, the non-profit organizations enter into the game as a 
consequence of the government failure underscored by the median 
voter system for they are able to allow the unsatisfied minorities to 
organize themselves in order to produce “from the bottom” the 
desired public goods in the quantity and quality they think fit.  
  Considering non-profit organizations as substitute of the State in 
the provision of public goods/services on behalf of the minorities 
which are unsatisfied by the choice mechanisms, Weisbrod goes on 
holding that the wideness of the non-profit sector shall depend on 
the degree of un-satisfaction of the consumers and, therefore, on the 
degree of  heterogeneous of the preferences of themselves, from the 
demand side.  
 As noted earlier, such heterogeneousness of the preferences, in turn, 
shall crucially hinge on a complex nexus of socio-economic, ethnic, 
religious and cultural factors. Weisbord model, therefore, envisages 
that within a certain Country, the dimension of the sector are as 
greater as the more the given population is heterogeneous  under the 
above mentioned parameters.  
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In this view,  as Mancinelli [2004] finds out, “in the public sector  
the advantage of the non-profit firms in satisfying the consumers 
demand is as higher as the demand is specific and restrained to a 
particular section of the population.  The State, deciding on the basis 
of the preferences of the median voter, leaves unsatisfied the 
demand of certain sub-groups of the population. Thus, there are 
created niches of sub-offer within which the non-profit firm can 
establish itself and act as alternative or additional offeror of public 
goods/services”.  
 
  On this concern,  Musella e D’Acunto [Sacco and Zarri, 2006] observe that the 
Weisbrod model leads to interpret that the atypical dimension reached by the non-profit 
sector in the United States are explained in the light of the high degree of ethnic, cultural and 
religious heterogeneous  which is typical of that Country.  
 Does Weisbrod theory have some shortcoming? There are actually two critiques 
concerned with the government failure theory.  
   The first concerns the fact that the non-profit organizations are superficially 
presented as organizations expected to supply a unique category of economic goods/services 
(although these are goods/services which are very important  for the community): the public 
goods/services.  
  However, it is well known, that the non-profit organizations are potentially able to 
commit themselves to produce private goods/services and therefore be successful also in the 
market by financing (at least to a certain extent) its own mission-oriented activities through 
the direct sale of the goods/services to consumers.  Obviously, accuracy requires to note that 
a direct involvement into the market from a non-profit firm, while it is theoretically 
compatible  with the maintaining of a mission-nonprofit oriented identity, could render more 
pronounced the risk of a “commercialization” [Weisbrod, 1998] of the firms itself. This 
circumstance would no longer reflect the real identity of the non-profit organization.  
      Actually, it often seems particularly problematic for a non-profit firm to combine 
properly “identity” and “service”, that is the “pursuance of a role of service (that has to be 
censure through an acceptable level of the organizational performance) with the maintaining 
and the continuous refresh of their original identity (that is censure by the high compliance 
of the staff and members of the organizational mission” [Ranci 1999 in Bonetti and Mellano 
2004]. 
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  Refocusing the attention on the previous question, it is necessary to observe how it 
stays unsolved the problem of a theory – the one of Weisbrod – that does not take into 
account  the capability of non-profit firms to act as producer of goods/services which are 
different from the typical public ones.  
  To begin with, one cannot not consider how the foregoing explanation is only  partial 
to the existence of non-profit organizations, for it take into consideration, at the best, the role 
of a very specific segment of the non-profit universe: that, certainly important, represented 
by non-profit bodies that seem actually to have taken existence in the attempt to give voice 
to   specific groups of citizens and social groups that are not reflected into the preferences of 
the median voter where all the whole Weisbrod idea has been set forth.  
  Anyways, it does not seem plausible the thesis of who meant to limit within these 
lines the activities that non-profit firms carry on. 
The second and stronger critique to the government failure theory is represented by the 
observation advanced by Weiss [1985 and 1986]. In his analysis, as economic actors are not 
ingenuous, are able to foresee the consequences of their own choices: in informative systems 
which are not perfect, free riders are more incentivized to show up.  
For example imagine an individual that has a very high income. Because of the 
imperfectness of the informative system, he can easily hide her real income. Now, if she 
votes for a politician whose program envisages low taxes and low level of public goods and 
assume that such politician wins the election, she will pay low taxes but she will not benefit 
of a good provision of public goods. If she votes instead of a politician whose program 
envisages high rates and high levels of public good, assumed that such politician wins the 
election, she will still pay low taxes – as she can hide her real income – and she will benefit 
of a high level of public goods.  Whereas the majority of voters are such interested free 
riders, there will be a minority that, unable or unwilling to hide her real income, shall have 
to bear high burdens of taxes.  According to Weiss, the intervention of the non-profit sector, 
would “help” the politician to envisage a softer tax program and, therefore, to stabilize the 
provision of the public goods on the level expected by the median voter. In other words, the 
presence of the non-profit sector facilitates the strategic distortion of the preferences: if there 
was no intervention of the nonprofit sector, in fact, the median voter would be unsatisfied 
116 
 
with the high level of rates and would vote the politician that would envisage a low level of 
public goods.    
Sacco and Zarri [2006] underscore how both Hansmann and Weisbrod believe that 
non-profit organizations play a significant role in providing public goods/services, but they 
also set forth how the former holds that the latter gives too much attention to this aspect. 
Hansmann, in fact, maintains that the public goods/services are just a particular aspect of his 
contract failure theory, so that this seems to be more general and embracing than Weisbrod 
one.      
Moreover, the Italian authors actually observe that Hansmann and Weisbrod, 
although providing an interesting rationale to explain the existence and, therefore, the role of 
non-profit sector, pay too much attention on the demand side of the matter. In other words, 
Sacco and Zarri [2006] argue it would not be correct to think that the non-profit sector exists 
only because there are some public goods/services that the State or the market cannot 
provide. It would be like to say that whereas State and market shall fill their gaps/failures, 
non-profit organizations would no longer exist.  
The authors think instead that non-profit organizations are necessary to the 
community as well as the State and the market. These three institutions share the same level 
of dignity.  
It means that the need of non-profit organizations, other than being explained on a 
demand side, should be explained also on a supply side.  Non-profit organizations would be 
able to offer something that is as fundamental as what is offered by State and market.  
This something is represented by the social capital, that is the set of the values, life 
styles, behavioral norms that, when the private and the public interests are not aligned, shape 
the individual choices on the promotion of the common good of the community or of the 
social group concerned39 [Ecchia and Zarri, 2005]. 
Among these values one finds the trust. Non-profit organizations role would be to 
widespread trust among the community or among the members of the organization.  
In the first case, non-profit organizations would play a bridging role while in the 
second a bounding one. The difference of these kinds of functions could be related with the 
                                                 
39 Therefore in this circumstance the expression social capital is not to be meant in the economic corporate 
sense. 
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governance structure of the organization. In fact, those exerting a bridging role are expected 
to be unowned while those exerting a bounding should present a membership structure.  
As underscored by Sacco and Zarri [2006], in both the cases the problem is still 
represented by a misplacement of the mission, that is a risk strongly connected with the 
opportunistic behaviors of whoever is in control of the organization. 
The misplacement of the mission implies indeed a danger for the real or original 
identity of the organization and, as a consequence, a danger for the widespread of trust.  
It is true, the idea of trust wide-spreader reflects the peculiar aspect of non-profit 
organizations of being mission oriented rather than profit-oriented.  
 To understand this linkage one has to assume that the trust is anything but the result 
of human behaviors not driven by individualistic purposes.  This feeling of trust or general 
trust is crucial for the fair development of the society.  
 Market without trust is inefficient. No one would safely accomplish a transaction 
while knowing that the other party could behave egoistically. State without trust is 
inefficient too. No State could ensure the provision of basic public fundamental services 
(health, education) while its people is not wishing to pay taxes because of the fear their 
money shall be misappropriated by politicians.  
  Non-profits therefore are able to widespread trust because of their commitment to 
the mission which is historically – that is by definition – not simply lawful, but more 
importantly, the mirror of the highest values existing in the nature of the human being. That 
is particularly true for the bridging missions.     
Sacco and Zarri [2006] theory certainly makes sense and is logical. Yet, it is not as 
general as the Hansmann one. Hansmann himself would express the same opinion that Sacco 
and Zarri have expressed about Weibord theory, that is to remark the fact that it can not 
explain the existence of all the non-profits . Rather, Sacco and Zarri [2006] theory seems to 
involve only a small segment of non-profit organizations, in particular those that are known 
as advocacy or support groups which in the United States they represent only the 1.8% of 
the whole non-profit sector [Salomon, 1999] 
In order to appreciate the reasoning that would lead to acknowledge the partial 
validity of Sacco and Zarri [2006] theory, one can ironically take on the same question  they 
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have advanced for detracting Hansmann  and Weisbrod explanations: would non-profit firms 
exist if State and Market were perfectly functioning? 
 The answer is yes, but only those firms whose mission is something external to the 
State and the Market, that is missions that are exclusive territory of the non-profit sector.  
 Such answer assumes that the majority of non-profit sector is represented by 
hospitals and schools. 
Thus, it is necessary to find out if these structures actually render the human being 
that come into contact with them, more accountable and less egoistic. 
As concerns the hospitals, customers expect only to be cured and not to be 
indoctrinated on certain issues. Similarly, the staff simply aims at curing the customers. The 
hospital exists because disease exists, the non-profit hospital as well as the for-profit one 
exist when the State is not able to comply with its duty of providing health care.  
For sure the hospital may represent a social organization where a structure of long 
lasting relationships, based on cooperation and reciprocity and therefore aimed at producing 
either material and symbolic values, yet this is not enough to explain the establishment of a 
hospital and the consequent survival, that is its simultaneous existence with a optimal public 
care system. People shall prefer the latter to the extent to which they shall not pay any fee to 
receive the service and to the extent to which material and symbolic values may well be 
produced also in the public structure itself.  
As regards the schools, students expect to be educated. No one could deny that an 
educated people shall better organize its social life. Still, schools as well as hospitals are 
historically structures which are intrinsic to the very nature of the State, that is people 
acknowledge the State as the best body for providing these services. No school would be 
established with the mission of creating stable and trustworthy relationships, but for sure 
these relationships would represent values that shall flank the fundamental objective-mission 
which is to provide a high cultural background to fellows.  
 For the State is not able to provide optimal education and health care, it delegates or 
it even promotes the relevant function to both for-profit and non-profit organizations. The 
latter may be preferred by the public of consumers because of the market failure suggested 
by Hansmann as well as the knowledge that non-profit organizations other than the principal 
mission –provision of health and education - follow other missions that are actually not 
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secondary, that are envisaged directly or indirectly in the by-laws and that are represented by 
the promotion of social capital as argued by Sacco and Zarri [2006]. Yet, as seen above, the 
co-existence of non-profit and for-profit schools or hospitals is one of the 
counterdemonstration of Hansmann theory.  
Once analyzed the sector of education and health care and once argued that non-
profit organizations dealing with such services would not exist if State and Market provided 
them optimally, it should be found out which part of the remaining non-profit structures 
would exist out of consideration of the role exerted by those primary institutions.  
This goal could be attained by repeating the reasoning accomplished for schools and 
hospitals for each existing category of non-profit organization.   
Following the scheme proposed by Stalteri [2002], after schools and hospitals, one 
finds the category of religious entities. These actually present the aspects pointed out by 
Sacco and Zarri. In particular religious entities basically operate as bounding organizations, 
in the sense that their fundamental mission is to tie adherents in the name of a certain culture 
or of certain values.  
The opinion that these organizations would exist regardless of any government or 
market failure is actually demonstrated by the fact that  
a) for a long time the State has forbidden their incorporation; 
b) they do not present aspects of economic redistribution as primary mission. 
As concerns point a), the prohibition obviously concerned the religious entities 
which did not belong to the established church. This means there has always existed in the 
nature of religious entities a force that expressed the need to stay together for the 
maintenance and the worship of certain traditions.  And this need can only be satisfied by a 
non-profit organization. The difference between the religious entity and the school/hospital 
is represented by the very circumstance for which the latter pursue a mission that could well 
optimally pursued by the State where the mission of the former belongs exclusively – and  
not residually – to  the people that have decided to follow it.  
The liberal incorporation of these organizations perfectly reflect the pluralistic 
principles of democratic states and undoubtedly contributes to the improvement of the social 
capital, above all if other than the bounding role, they exert also a bridging role.  
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As concerns point b), it can be said that religious entity carry on economic activities 
so that the Hansmann reasoning could be referred. Yet, the economic activity represents just 
a secondary mission with an aim to facilitate or to give credibility to the values pursued by 
the institution.  
For example, the sale of religious icons would be successful even if there were for-
profit institutions that would offer the same icons at a lower price, implying that in these 
transactions the laws of market and the theories of market failures have little to do: 
adherents would buy directly from the institution as they know their money shall be utilized 
for the worship of the tradition.   
Similarly, the charity activity of the religious entity, as for example the feeding of the 
poor of a certain parish, shall be financed not because donors rely on the NDC but because 
they know they are contributing to the promotion of certain values which can be expressed 
or supported also by the charity activity itself.  
In his categorization, Stalteri [2002] then mentions the cultural and sportive sector. 
As regards the first, one can remind: museums, galleries, libraries, theaters, festivals etc.  
 Actually the mission of such structures is to widespread culture just as it happens for 
schools40. Yet, it would not be correct to repeat the same reasoning accomplished on the 
latter since the kind of culture promoted by the museums, galleries, etc. is different. In 
particular, schools (college, universities, etc.) provide essential education while the cultural 
sector provides additional education. Additional education represents only secondarily a seat 
of learning41.  
While State and market have historically been involved in the essential education, 
that is in offering seats of learning, they would demonstrate only an indirect interest in 
additional education.  Additional education is rather a matter of people who decide to gather 
human and financial resources to promote it among the human beings.  
The difference between essential and additional education is still a question of time. 
In the future additional education might well become essential education so that State and 
market shift their interest from indirect to direct.  
                                                 
40 As regards museums see for example Hein, 
http://www.museoliitto.fi/seminaarit/museolehtoripaivat05/esitelmat/Finland-lec.1PC.pdf  
41 Id 
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The conclusion is that cultural non-profit organizations exist regardless of any failure 
of State or market as they offer public benefit/goods which are exclusively inherent to their 
nature.  
The same reasoning can be repeated for sportive organizations to the extent to which 
sport is an expression of culture whose mission, even more than mere cultural organizations, 
aims at supporting stable and altruistic relationships between people.  
The next category proposed by Stalteri [2002] is represented by entities of solidarity 
whose missions may involve the protection of animals, the elimination of racial or sexual 
discriminations, centers for advising pairs in crisis etc.  
Also in these cases, there is a service which is offered regardless of the demand. The 
service is offered because some people have decided to offer it on the basis of their beliefs 
that the service itself could improve the social capital.  
Finally, Stalteri [2002] identifies those non-profit structures whose mission is 
represented by exerting pressures on the public opinion in relation to certain social matters.  
The difference between such lobbying groups and organizations of solidarity is 
actually quite blurred, since also the latter are meant to promote a sensitization of the public 
opinion.  
The difference may consist in the fact that lobbies are more active from a political 
point of view.  
However, in describing the lobbies the Italian author makes an express reference to 
Putnam; in particular the American scholar is recalled to underscore how the more are the 
lobbies the more there are benefits for the whole community, as they function “as a device 
for the growth of the social capital by reducing egoistic behaviors of the members”.   
  Putnam has actually been quoted also by Sacco and Zarri [2006] in occasion of their 
explanation of the non-profit sector existence. If that is not a sheer chance, it follows that 
lobbies represent the sector of non-profit organizations that best demonstrate the Sacco and 
Zarri [2006] theory. 
Thus, the findings of this analysis reveal a very important point on the role exerted 
by non-profit organizations. On one hand, if one takes on the organizations that most 
represent the non-profit sector in terms of number and resources involved, that is schools 
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and hospitals, then the role can be considered as a support for the government and market 
failure.  
On the other hand, if one takes on the types of organizations involved in the non-
profit sector, one shall find out that most of such kinds – although they do not reach  a 
dominant position in terms of number and resources –, that is all the non-profit organizations 
which are neither schools nor hospitals, exert a role that can be defined as improver of social 
capital.  
Finally, it deserves to be mentioned also that literature which identifies other key-
factors involved in the development of NPOs. Two in particular are to be referred.  
 The first one is related to the general observation that, since 1960, “as Americans 
became wealthier they bought more services of all kinds” [Hammack, 2001]. The second, 
instead, is more specific and it is associated to the “world-wide quest to find alternatives to 
government in the provisions of human services, a quest largely borne out of disillusionment 
with government’s handling of the welfare state” [Gibelman & Gelman, 2000]. In 
Hansmann terms, this actually means that the cases of market failure have increased and, 
accordingly, NPOs have found more room to pursue their objectives.  
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 § 4.1.2. The Interests Involved 
 
 As seen many times, the very first difference between the current non-profit sector 
and the old one is the heterogeneousness of the former.  
This has also been demonstrated by the existence of the several theories whose findings are 
far to present a general validity. Put it differently, some theories are more adapt than others 
to explain the constitution and the survival of certain organizations of the non-profit sector 
and vice-versa. 
 This compels the analysis to make a choice, that is to decide which non-profit 
organizations are to be studied in order to identify the interests involved.  
 It is true, the attention shall be focused on the organizations that occupy the major 
share of the non-profit sector, that is health care, education and social services. In fact, in the 
United State they represent respectively the 46.3%, 21.5% and 13.5%, that is the 81.3% of 
the total of the non-profit organizations [Salamon, 1999].  
 In the foregoing discussions it has been underscored how the theory that best 
explains the establishment of these institutions is represented by the market failure of 
Hansmann who relies on the non-distribution constraint for justifying high quality and big 
quantity of goods/services offered. Yet, at the same time, it has been underscored how also 
Fazzi and Zarri observations on the values expected to be promoted by a non-profit 
organization are relevant.  
Therefore, the role of the non-profit organization identified in this work is 
represented by a structure that not only is committed with providing high quality and big 
quantity of goods/services but also with producing them by respecting the social and ethical 
values which historically have distinguished the non-profit sector, in particular when it was 
expressed by a charitable dimension.  
The very first observation on this role is that the combination of the two parameters 
tracks undoubtedly an institutional dimension of the non-profit corporation. In fact, if the 
distinguishing parameter of the non-profit sector were only the NDC , then the non-profit 
structure could represent a wonderful device for a private entrepreneur to carry on her 
business. Put it differently, if an entrepreneur had to establish a hospital, he could choose the 
non-profit scheme counting on the competitive advantage represented by the expectation 
that non-profit goods/services are better. In such a way, she could take advantage of the high 
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income to set a high salary as executive officer of the structure and, at the same time, she 
could freely take decisions that would jeopardize stakeholders of the corporation such as the 
employees. For example, in the name of the high quality and big quantity of services she 
could justify the firing of the too many workers. Yet, as here it is maintained that the high 
quality and the big quantity standards have to be considered at the same level of the respect 
of social and ethical values, then the non-profit corporation gives up to represent an optimal 
device for greed entrepreneurs.   
 From the institutional dimension of the non-profit corporation it is hence possible to 
study which are the interests involved, that is who and what is interested in the two just 
mentioned parameters.   
To begin with, it is useful to compare business and non-profit corporations and to set 
forth the differences concerning the subjects involved. 
In the former, the patrons are represented by the shareholders while in the latter the 
patrons are the donors and the consumers. In both the business and non-profit corporations 
directors, stakeholders and the corporation itself represent subjects involved in the activity.  
In the business corporation context, the interests of the patrons – the shareholders – 
may well be in contrast with those of the stakeholders and of the corporation. Therefore, the 
institutional or contractarian conception of the corporation shall be extremely important for  
directors and for  the judges that shall assess directors’ decisions. 
 In the non-profit corporation context, the interests of the patrons – consumers and 
donors – are actually not in contrast with those of the stakeholders and of the corporation. 
All these subjects are expected in fact to be interested in the accomplishment of the two 
parameters indicated above.  
Yet, there are some situations where the decision of the director is not easy. These 
are represented by those decisions within which directors have to act by considering the 
organization as a “living body” or as an institution which offers security for the community, 
provide job and improves the techniques for the scientific progress.  
Given that this kind of decisions do not affect the interests of the patrons, who are 
broadly speaking interested only in the fair administration of the funds, directors shall decide 
only on the basis of an evaluation of the interests directly involved.  
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For example, if a director of a hospital had to decide between to invest the incomes 
or to employ them to increase the salary of the staff, both the decisions could be considered 
as complying with the two non-profit parameters.  
If the same director were running a for-profit hospital, first he would have had to 
resist to the pressures advanced by shareholders who were definitely not interested either in 
the investment or in the increase of the staff salaries – they were rather interested in the 
distribution of such income as dividend – and, secondly, whereas he had resisted, he 
probably would have taken the decision that the most had reflected the shareholders’ interest: 
the investment. 
Such power of the patrons to influence the decisions of the directors represents 
another crucial difference with the non-profit sector. In fact, the donors or the consumers of 
a non-profit corporation, although they have an interest in the fair administration of the 
funds, this interest is considered a “legal” interest - that it is considered an interest in the 
sense described in paragraph “external controls” – only in certain circumstances that shall be 
described in the next chapter.  
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§ 4.2  STRUCTURAL APPROACH 
 
The institutional dimension of non-profit corporations outlined in the discussion 
developed through the functional approach is well shaped also by statutory provisions, 
judicial doctrines and common law principles.  
To begin with statutory provisions, non-profit corporations, as well as business 
corporations, have legal personality. This observation implies that non-profit corporations 
have their own interest and therefore confirms one of its institutional dimensions42.  
Another provision is directed to set forth the public interests concerned by non-profit 
firms. Yet, differently from the legal personality provision, this is not detachable in all the 
jurisdictions and, in the ones where it is envisaged, the provision itself can be subject to 
wider or stricter interpretations.  
This is the provision which establishes that a non-profit corporation must follow a   
charitable purpose, which is in re ipsa something public and as such does not leave any 
doubt of the institutional dimension of the corporations that follow this purpose.  
  This provision is not envisaged in the General Delaware Corporation Law where it 
is simply established that the corporations organized under the Act may follow any lawful 
purpose.  The lack of the provision obviously does not deny the institutional dimension of 
the “non-stock corporation”, which can be still identified in the by-laws43 other than in 
provisions such like the mentioned one conferring legal personality.  
 Yet, Delaware’s approach makes it possible that the by-laws of a non-profit 
corporation envisages a purpose which is not charitable. This would mean that the non-profit 
status shall be identified by the NDC with the consequence  it shall be possible to establish 
even a shoe store as non-profit corporation.  
  In cases like these, the institutional dimension of the Delaware non-stock corporation 
becomes significantly compressed. In fact, as underscored in the previous paragraph, a non-
profit corporation whose non-profit element is represented only by the NDC would exert a 
pure economic role. This would not only render the non-profit corporation business-like but 
                                                 
42 See for example § 717 of the New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Act, Section 8.30 Revised Model Non-
Profit Corporation Act,  
43 The bylaws can in fact contain clauses which clearly indicate that one is in front of a non-profit corporation.  
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it would also imply that the interests of the corporation and of the other stakeholders shall be 
relevant for the law only so long as they have been concerned in the by-laws.  This is just  
what happens for business corporations. The non-profit status therefore shall have 
importance only for tax law provisions.     
 As concerns the New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Act, all the purposes 
indicated by § 201 have to a certain extent a public dimension.  In particular, type A speaks 
about any lawful non-business purpose or non-pecuniary purposes such as civic, patriotic,  
political,  social,   fraternal,   athletic,   agricultural, horticultural,  animal  husbandry,  and  
for a professional, commercial, industrial, trade or service association.  
 Type B provides for charitable purposes and for other purposes that in the matter 
of facts fall within the concept of charitable. 
 Type C even establishes that the purposes of the corporation shall be public or 
quasi-public. Type D recalls the purposes indicated in the previous types in relation to non-
profit corporations formed on the basis of an authorization “by any other corporate law of 
this state”.   
 Thus, according to the New York Act, so long as it provides for many lawful 
purposes, still these purposes demonstrate a public dimension so that it would be very hard 
for example to establish a shoe shop under the Act itself.                                                           
 Even fewer doubts of this nature are to blossom if one considers the UK legislation 
of non-profit corporations, whose name already suggests its public dimension: Charity Act 
2006 and whose  section 1 provides:  
                                                                                                    
“For the purposes of the law of England and Wales, “charity” means 
an institution which  -  (a) is established for charitable purposes only, 
and (b) falls to be subject to the control of the High Court in the 
exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to charities”.  
 
 As regards the judicial decisions that shape the institutional dimension of non-
profit corporations one can remind those that conferred to the Attorney General the power to 
prosecute the non-profit directors who did not comply with the purpose of the corporation 
and with the intents of the donors.  Moreover, accuracy demands to remind that in a certain 
point of the United Kingdom history, the principles established in these decisions were 
flanked by the legislation instituting the Charity Commission underscoring once again the 
public-institutional dimension of non-profit corporations.  
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 However, it has been mentioned that some judicial decisions identified to some 
extent also a private dimension of charitable organizations. In particular, those related to the 
cy-pres doctrine.  If the aim of the judge was that of giving importance to the intention of the 
donors in relation to the enforcement of the trust, maybe a further judicial effort would have 
recognized also the intention/interest in a proper administration of the trust itself.  
  The wall between the interest in the enforcement of the trust and the interest in the 
proper administration of the latter has been smashed only lately by acknowledging the 
giving of the donor as a contract and not as a donation44.  
 In order to find out the extent to which a non-profit corporation is a contract one 
has to set forth the concept of contract in common law.  
 Although from a strict legal point of view the common law concept of contract did 
not really reflect the relationships underpinning business corporations, it had been observed 
how their by-laws could be considered contracts of special nature and how the terms which 
conferred property rights to shareholders could be actually enforced by the latter.  
   Similarly to business corporations, the relationships between donors and the 
corporation can not be considered contractual from a strict point of view, for the donation is 
not a contract in common law.  Donors moreover do not sign any by-laws as it were a 
covenant (UK Companies Act Terminology) and do not even participate in the drafting of 
the clauses.   
 As underscored earlier, for the non-profit corporations are unowned there are not 
property rights to be boasted.  
 This explains why, the only way to detach a legal relationship between donors and 
the corporation has been to deem the act of benevolence as a contract.   
 This perspective has implied the identification of a set of promises supported by a 
valid consideration, whereas the promise of the donor is represented by the giving and the 
one of the corporation is to use the funds received for certain (charitable) purposes.  
 The type of contract established in this way is by no means a charitable trust.  The 
discussion on this recent judicial doctrine shall be developed in the next chapter as well as 
the one on the trust seen actually as a contract.  
                                                 
44 This observation is obviously valid only if one deals with common law jurisdictions, for in civil law 
jurisdictions the donation is (already) a contract.  
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 Also, it shall be developed a discussion on the contractual dimension of the 
relationship between costumers and the non-profit corporation.  
 
§ 4.3 NEW INSTITUTIONALISM  
  
 The main finding of new institutionalism scholars is represented by the conception 
that the corporation is a private tool that has to take into account also public interests. The 
extent to which the latter are to be considered shall depend on the peculiar function, duty 
and responsibility conferred to the corporation.  
 For sure, the function of the non-profit corporation seems to be more economic 
than political. Therefore, if the function is to act in the market on the same level of business 
counterparts, then the interests of the patrons are to be preferred to those of the stakeholders 
and of the corporation. This approach would of course imply that the mentioned interests do 
not correspond.  
 Thus, if the non-profit corporation concerns an activity which is traditionally 
deemed as charitable, as for example a hospital, then the interests of the corporation and of 
the stakeholders might benefit enough consideration in the light of the interests of the 
output/outcome. Where instead the non-profit corporation is rather concerned with activities 
which are not historically classified as charitable, then the new institutionalism model would 
attribute to the interests of the patrons a wider consideration.  
Differently from contractarians – which deny the need of mandatory rules – and from 
institutionalists – which promote a set of mandatory rules aimed at considering the interests 
of shareholders, stakeholders and corporation on the same level – according to new 
institutionalists, the law is only expected to provide a set of rules governing the decision 
making processes.  
The law should not expressly indicate which are the interests to be protected, but it 
should only provide the procedures for the adoption of the decisions. The respect of such 
procedures would mean that the interests involved in a certain organization have been 
respected.   
Therefore, in the hypothetical fact situation within which in a hospital – that is a non-
profit corporation with a charitable purposes – the directors take a short-term decision while 
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complying with the procedures envisaged by the law, it would be hard for stakeholders to 
claim a breach of fiduciary duty. In fact, new institutionalism scholars deem that the 
decisions are shaped by all the internal and external factors involved in a certain institution 
and that these factors might change with the time. The short-term decision taken in a 
hospital and procedurally correct, shall demonstrate that the charitable dimension of the 
hospital has been lost – or has never existed.  
 Reasoning in terms of structural approach, the effort of the new-institutionalists is 
to identify an incomplete contract between patrons and directors.  
The clauses of the by-laws – mandated by the law – should describe how directors shall 
behave and, therefore, patrons would be allowed to bring suits every time they detach a 
misbehavior.  
 The external control of the patrons would represent the additional private device to 
the activity of the Attorney General which would instead represent the public (institutional) 
device.   
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§ 4.4 NON-PROFIT EFFICACY  
 
The discussion on the non-profit concept of efficiency is fundamental to evaluate 
managerial accountability for the decisions that have been taken. In the earlier analysis it has 
been seen how the purposes of the non-profit corporation are represented by two parameters: 
high quality and big quantity of goods/services and respect of the social values that 
historically belong to the charitable dimension.  
Thus, the very first observation is that instead of efficiency, it would be more correct 
to talk about efficacy of the non-profit corporation.   
In order to demonstrate why non-profit corporation must be effective rather than 
efficient, it is useful to get briefly back on the role and on the interests involved in the non-
profit activities.  
 Borzaga and Fazzi [2000] argued that these structures have undergone a rapid and 
deep evolution that have ensued a debate on their role and nature. In particular, while until 
the ‘60s they were studied mainly from a sociological point of view, after that they began to 
be seen more and more as social enterprises.  
The Italian authors underscored how this new idea of non-profit corporation had 
enriched the doctrinal background for it introduced in the non-profit sector important know-
how about managing, fund-raising techniques, marketing strategies, financial years etc.  
This implied that many scholars concerned with the study of non-profit organizations 
began to assess and to evaluate their results according to the concept of performance, that is 
began to assess and to evaluate non-profit corporations as if they were business corporations.  
For example Callen, Klein and Tinkelman [2003] measured the performance of non-
profit corporations by using three metrics: the ratio of administrative expenses  to total 
expenses, the ratio of fundraising expenses to total expenses, and the ratio of program 
expenses to total expenses.  
Similarly, other scholars maintained that the dominant model to measure non-profit 
performance of firms was focused on the assessment of the output, that is what in a business 
context represented the good conceived as the objectively measurable result related to the 
132 
 
single performance [Weiss, 1971 in Borzaga and Fazzi, 2000].  Therefore, as the 
organizational performance had to be the sum of all the single performances, the former had 
to be measured through standards like: hours of production, profits, market shares etc.  
The purely economic management and evaluation of non-profit activities uncovered 
actually a private and contractarian dimension in these structures. In fact, the exclusive 
importance posed on the outputs – that is on the quality and quantity of the products – 
demonstrated the aim of satisfying a purely material interest of the consumers.  
Put it differently, the non-profit corporation began to be conceived as a private 
device funded by donors and consumers in order to obtain quality and price advantages with 
respect to the goods/services offered by business corporations [Callen, 1994].  At 
Such conception would have detracted the fundamental assumption presented in the 
previous chapter according to which the interests of the patrons, corporations and 
stakeholders corresponded.  
  On one side, it must be admitted that patrons of non-profit hospitals and schools 
may be concerned only with the relevant output. That is quite clear as regards consumers 
who buy the services/goods. Less clear but still possible could be the fact that a donor fund a 
school since she knows one day she will take advantage of it.  
On the other side, it is hard to identify a private interest in the funding of social 
services organization such as the red-cross. Whoever finance these kind of structures, either 
as donor or as consumer, is necessarily driven by altruistic motivations/purposes. 
Whereas one can infinitely discuss on what the role of non-profit organizations – in  
particular hospitals and schools – actually is,  one could not infinitely discuss on what such 
role should be.  
For this reason social science scholars concerned with the study of the non-profit 
sector continue to accomplish efforts aimed at highlighting the real and public/institutional 
role of non-profit corporations. On this sense, it is of course especially important the 
contribution of legal scholars whose analysis should represent the base for judicial decisions.  
As regards the argumentations provided by sociologists and political scientists, one 
can first of all quote the observation advanced by Letts, Ryan, and Grossman [1998] in 
detriment of the three ratio theory. In particular, these scholars claimed that if one relies too 
much on such ratios to assess the performance of a non-profit firm, then directors would be 
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induced to dysfunctional behaviors including underinvestment in the necessary 
organizational capacity to function effectively.   
Also D’Aunno [1992] criticized the tool of financial ratio to measure the efficiency 
of a non-profit organization.  
In particular, this scholar presented an institutional theory model according to which 
non profit organizations were influenced by widely held beliefs and rules present in the 
environment, advancing an approach to conceptualize effectiveness in the light of 
organizations’ relationships with key external actors. The “ecological model or the 
participant satisfaction model defined organizational effectiveness according to 
organizations’ ability to satisfy key strategic constituencies in their environment” [Sowa, 
Selden, Sandfort; 2004].  D’Aunno [1992] moreover underscores that   those non-profit 
organizations   whose outputs or outcomes are especially difficult to measure face strong 
pressures to conform to expectations about how they should behave. Therefore, to the extent 
that the outside environment in which nonprofits operate perceives ratios such as the 
proportion of program expenses to be related to organizational efficiency, nonprofits are 
likely to adopt such ratios as meaningful performance metrics. 
Other scholars [Au, 1996 in Borzaga and Fazzi, 2000] have preferred to maintain that 
the introduction of the conception of performance into the non-profit sector did not 
necessarily imply a pure economic management and evaluation of the firms’ activity. In fact, 
according to them the discussion on the non-profit performance had always been 
characterized by a noteworthy level of theoretical ambiguity and until that moment no one 
seemed to have shed light on the point.     
Schuster [1997, in Borzaga and Fazzi 2000] shared the idea of the ambiguity of the 
conception of performance. Yet, he thought that such ambiguity did not represent something 
that was peculiar the non-profit sector.  Rather he argued that the content of the concept of 
performance strongly depended on the research interests that were pursued or on the 
scientific discipline involved.   According to this approach, therefore, to record a high 
performance of a non-profit firm could mean either that the structure was financially stable 
or that the structure offered high quality and high quantity of services/good or that quality 
and quantity of services/goods were supported by a strongly ethic and altruistic management; 
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the one of the other definition would have depended on where and in which circumstances 
the expression “performance” had been used.  
 According to Kanter and Summers [1987 in Borzaga and Fazzi, 2000], differently 
from profit-oriented firms, the actual problem concerning the assessment of non-profit 
performance was not technical in nature, but conceptual: it was not a problem about how 
measuring the performance, but which was the unit of measurement. While as concerns 
business firms this assessment is very easy for the output reflects the performance, within 
the non-profit sector the measure of the output would have not given an idea to the results 
accomplished [Forbes, 1998 in Borzaga and Fazzi, 2000]. 
Borzaga and Fazzi themselves [2000] set forth three risks connected with the 
employment of output concept to measure non-profit efficiency: 
a) the employment of the measures of production did not succeed to give an idea of 
the differences which were inherent  to the processes that bring to the realization 
of the product; 
b) the employment of the measures of production left unsolved the problem related 
to who was the beneficiary of the goods or services produced; 
c) the employment of the measures of production implied the reduction of the 
problem of the organizational performance to the one of the single performance.  
According to them, the underestimation of the process through which goods and 
services are produced led to not give the proper consideration to the relational dimension of 
the service. As underscored by Wagner [1995 in Borzaga and Fazzi, 2000], the services on 
behalf of a person are characterized, or should be characterized, expressly by the relational 
character of the service. The service, in fact, to be offered in a satisfactory way, had to 
assume a fiduciary cooperation between who offer and who receives the performance.  
Only by focusing on the relationship between firm and consumer, the personalization 
of the services, that is the capability to provide a suitable answer to the exigencies 
underscored by the social problems, became possible.  The non-profit organizational 
performance had necessarily to take into account the ways products are realized, just 
because this aspect had historically represented the very force of the sector.  
In relation to point b), a too strict analysis of the output diverted the attention from 
the problem concerning the beneficiaries of the service. If only the measures of production 
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of a certain service were known, the preferences of the consumers remained basically 
overlooked, as a logic correlation between the increase of the quantity of produced goods 
and the level of satisfaction of the consumers.  
In order to understand how a service that aims at improving the social welfare 
reflects the preferences of the community, it was necessary to verify which were the 
concrete chances that beneficiaries have to express, directly or indirectly, a position of voice 
or exit before the firms [Hirschman, 1970 in Borzaga and Fazzi 2000]. The more these 
chances were present, the higher was the chance that the service reflected the real exigencies 
of the community.   
Overlooking the problems related to the coordination, cooperation and 
communication among the consumers preferences and the firms, meant to render sterile the 
concept of performance and to promote  social work perspectives that were identified by a 
concept which does not take into account the relationship between the firm and the 
consumer.  
As regards point c), the services provided by non-profit organizations  did not reflect, 
or had not to reflect, a demand-supply criteria. Such model, in fact, would have implied that 
the final result of the activity would have been represented by the output instead of the 
outcome. The difference between these two concepts concerned the fact that the former is 
the product of every single performance, while the outcome is the overall result on the 
welfare status of beneficiaries of the services. Therefore, where the output identifies the 
efficiency of a service on the basis of an assessment of the relationship between production 
capacity and employment of the resources, the outcome referred to the efficacy of the 
intervention assessed on the basis of a comparison with a previous supply of the same 
service.  
To evaluate non-profit organization performance only on the basis of the productive 
output would have meant to not give enough importance to the services’ results on the 
consumers welfare and, hence, would limit the purpose of the organizational processes to the 
satisfaction of partial exigencies, instead of increasing the overall welfare of the community.  
Thus, according to the Italian authors the concept of organizational performance 
concerning the commercial non-profit organizations had to involve a multidimensional and 
multifactor nature, according to which: 
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a) not only is important what is produced, but how that is produced: the output of 
the productive process represents therefore only a general parameter of the 
quality of the service. This is not enough to establish how the service is able to 
satisfy the consumers; 
b) not only is important what is produced, but also who is the consumer: the social 
relationships, system and coordination, communication and control processes 
play a crucial role for understanding how the product is able to reflect the reasons 
for which it has been produced; 
c) not only is important what is produced, but its capability in not representing just a 
single performance: a performance analysis must not exclude the outcome of the 
service.  
 
The accent posed by Borzaga and Fazzi [2000] on the quality of the product confirms 
one of the two parameters offered by this work to evaluate non-profit efficacy. Less 
attention the Italian authors have instead paid to the second parameter: the respect of the 
social values intrinsically promoted by a non-profit institution.  
However, literature stressing this second parameter is not missing. Other than the 
institutional model suggested by D’Aunno [1992], also  Eikenberry and Kluver [2004] claim 
that “the non-profit model stresses the values of community participation, due process and 
stewardship”.  
As concerns the contribution offered by legal scholars in determining the parameters 
to evaluate non-profit performance, chapter V shall explain which standards directors are 
expected to comply with.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE AGENCY COSTS IN NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS 
§ 1. THE ROLE OF THE MANAGEMENT 
 
 The investigation on the nature of corporation, both business and non-profit, has 
revealed an aspect which is common to all the theories concerned with this topic: the 
presence of a group of persons charged with following certain purpose on behalf of other 
subjects.  
 The different theories, through the functional and structural approach, have done 
anything but identifying whose interests this group of persons is expected to promote: 
a) of the corporation, including shareholders and (for some scholar) other stakeholders 
according to old institutionalism;  as regards non-profit corporation, directors shall 
pursue the interests of the corporation and of the other stakeholders. The interests of 
the patrons shall be taken in consideration only when expressed in a legal form. Yet, 
the interests of the patrons are not supposed to be in conflict with those of the 
corporation and of the other stakeholders; 
b) of the shareholders according to neo-liberal economists;  as regards non-profit 
corporations, a private dimension of the structure is conceivable only when it is 
employed by an entrepreneur to pursue non-charitable purposes. That is the example 
of a structure whose non-profit element is represented only by the NDC. In cases like 
this, the neo-liberal theory would claim that the directors – that can be the founders 
themselves – might be expected to pursue the interests of the patrons.  
c) of the shareholders, of the corporation and of other stakeholders in the name of a 
socially responsible capitalism for new-institutionalism. As regards non-profit 
corporation, the importance of the rules of law shall be represented by the capability 
to resolve possible conflict of interests between the corporation and other 
stakeholders as for example the workers.  
 
Although it has already been warned that it is not correct from a legal point of view, it 
can be held that in all these relationships the group of persons is an agent, while the principal 
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is represented by the subjects indicated in points a), b) and c) according to the theory that 
one chooses to adhere.  
 Whether the principal is represented by shareholders, corporation, stakeholders etc., 
there shall be always certain problems related with the decisions of the agents. Not only they 
could undertake selfish initiatives in detriment of the interests of the principals, but they 
could be also careless in the adoption of the decisions themselves, and this could jeopardize 
the interests of the principals as well.  
  The scholars that have reasoned on the agency problems are the contractarians. In 
particular their theories have aimed at devising mechanisms concerned with the protection of 
the shareholders.  
  Theoretically, once insisted on the institutional dimension of non-profit corporation, 
it would seem in odd to apply the neo-classical theory to this kind of structures. Yet, 
assumed that the interests of the donors and customers reflect the ones of the corporation 
and of the other stakeholders, it shall be possible to apply agency theories by considering 
non-profit patrons as if they were the shareholders of a business corporation. Put it 
differently, the mechanisms that shall protect the donors and customers, shall automatically 
protect also corporation and other stakeholders because of the overlap of the interests.  
To begin with, contractarians have taken on Ronald Coase [1937] theory of the firm 
to understand why management does exist. If one understands the nature or the role of the 
management, then one might be able to think about the mechanism that may align the 
interests of this agent to those of the principals, whether the latter are the corporation, 
shareholders, stakeholders, etc.    
Coase and  contractarians believe that parties to contracts must bear costs when they 
transact [Hisiung, 1999]45.  
Setting out from this idea, Coase ends up to maintain that the management (A) is a 
necessary body of the firm (B) which in turn is a legal-economic device aimed at reducing 
                                                 
45 For example, imagine a simple contract  in a hypothetical situation where a bicycle must be sold. While 
negotiating the price, the purchaser may be willing to spend some money for an expert’s opinion on the 
conditions of the bike [information costs] Actors, therefore, reasoning in terms of costs and benefits, shall 
supposedly agree just in case the latter are higher than the former. 
These mainstream economic ideas blossomed around the ’70s-’80s, but the transactions cost theory was 
introduced fifty years earlier by Ronald Coase [1937] to justify the existence of the firm and, simultaneously, 
to disprove price system theory. In other words, Coase had already claimed that market was not costless.  
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the transaction costs (C). Thus if A=B=C then A=C, then management is fundamental to 
reduce transaction costs.  
 In fact, Coase’s argument was that firm would have replaced market since it would 
have reduced the amount of transactions and therefore the relevant costs. To understand this 
concept, one may think about how entrepreneurs may better organize their economic 
activities. Supposing they need to contract a certain number of persons out in order to carry 
on with their enterprise, they would likely incur in the costs referred to above. The latter 
may still be lower than the benefits, so that the entrepreneur may choose to continue to seek 
for agents within the market. However, contracting persons out for every single operation 
would mean to iterate the transactions, increasing the relevant expenditures.  
 Ronald Coase’s [1937] theory focuses just on these inefficiencies.  
  In Coase’s opinion, entrepreneurs would better hire their agents on the basis of long-
term contracts so that the series of contracts are substituted only by a special one which 
“corresponds closely to the legal concept of the relationship of employer and employee” 
[Coase, 1988]. The aggregate of the long-term contracts that entrepreneurs reach with their 
agents, constitutes the firm. More accurately, “firm is characterized by the existence of a 
central contracting agent and a contract whereby the factor, for certain remuneration, agrees 
to obey the directions of the entrepreneur within certain limits” [Coase, 1988].  
From a cost-benefit analysis one may underscore that on one side, it is true that the 
entrepreneur dramatically reduces the quantity of transactions, saving the relevant costs; but, 
on the other, it is correct to notice that he/she will incur in diverse expenditures “associated 
with the administrative cost of determining what, when, and how to produce, the cost of 
resource misallocation (since planning will never be perfect), and the cost of demotivation 
(since motivation is lower in large organizations)” [Canbäck, 1988]. The latter are 
denominated management costs  [Canbäck, 1988]. Accordingly, to explain the existence of 
the firm, the question is not whether management cost is more or less than transaction cost, 
but whether the sum of management and transaction cost incurred through in-house 
production is more or less than the sum of management and transaction cost incurred 
through purchase across markets, since either option entails expenditures on both cost 
categories [Demsetz , 1988].  
141 
 
Ronald Coase’s [1937] theorem, though providing a logical explanation of the 
existence of the firm, is nevertheless not sufficient to motivate the survival of the firm itself. 
It fails to accurately focus on the problems that employment relationships entail and on how 
they may be resolved. In particular, we have to bear in mind that the presence of widely held 
corporations implies that the entrepreneur is not a single homo economicus but, instead, is 
represented by thousands and thousands of shareholders. In economics, the latter are thought 
of as the owners of the firm and as such, they are the employers. Through the central 
contracting agent [Demsetz , 1988] they proceed in hiring specialized managers put in 
charge of running the business. Normally, all employees who deal with third parties are 
considered agents [LegalMatch, website]. The separation of ownership and control identified 
by Berle and Means [1932] suggests that there is a very significant information asymmetry 
between the principals and the agents. The expenditures that the principals incur for 
monitoring purposes represent what Ronald Coase [1937] overlooked [Demsetz, 1988]. 
Entrepreneurs may choose to organize their activities under a firm since they have assessed 
that managerial costs are lower than the ones to be born if they had to contract an agent at 
every instant. The organizational form is thus justified, but its survival is not. The strategy 
opted for by the entrepreneur may well work just because he/she has direct contact with 
managers. The situation dramatically changes when huge corporations are involved. It is the 
case where the agency problem naturally occurs and calls for neo-classical economists to 
study the relevant solutions [Hansmann, 2003]. 
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§ 2. THE MONITORING COSTS IN NON-PROFIT CORPORATION 
  
 Management reduces transactions costs only when monitoring costs are lower than 
those to be born if one had to hire an agent at every instant. This normally happens in 
corporate contexts, yet it has to be underscored how in non-profit corporations the 
monitoring costs are very high: even higher than business corporations. 
To begin with, differently from shareholders, patrons do not take part to the control 
of the organization for two reasons: 
a) they do not elect the board; 
b) they are not informed about the day-to-day operations of the organization. 
The only way through which patrons could (at least formally) exert control would be 
represented by supporting their donations with a deed within which they specify how they 
would like that the funds shall be employed.  
 In such case, the donors – so not the consumers – through a contractual action shall 
have the right to sue the non-profit directors whereas they detach a misuse of funds.   
Yet, the donors shall not have the right to enforce the fiduciary duties of the directors owed 
to the corporation. It is true, this would be possible only whereas the court considered the 
donation as a contract whose clauses are represented also by those envisaged in the by-laws 
of the organization.  
 Another aspect related to the high costs of monitoring is represented by the difficulty 
to find non-executive directors which have the necessary competences to ensure that 
managers shall take decisions which comply with both the parameters of efficacy and 
efficiency.   
 Also, the lack market for corporate control represents a further impossibility to save 
costs of monitoring.  
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§ 3. BOARD OF DIRECTORS AS CAUSE OF AGENCY COSTS 
  
Once identified the agency costs occurring in non-profit corporations, it is possible 
to focus the attention on the mechanisms that could reduce them. In other words, the 
mechanisms that would ensure the survival of the firm.  
To begin with, these mechanisms are to be provided by law. According to Hansmann 
and Kraakman [2005] legal mechanisms can be divided into two categories: 
a) regulatory strategies; 
b) governance strategies. 
The regulation strategies are represented by mandatory rules which discipline the 
content of the agency-principal relationship or the formation and termination of this 
relationship.  
Governance strategies are based on hierarchical and authority concepts which 
commonly characterize the agency relationships: they aim at protecting principals indirectly, 
either by increasing their power and shaping the agent incentives.  
The categorization of Hansmann and Kraakman [2005] can be compared with the 
thesis of Fama and Jensen [1983] according to which  in business corporations, the very 
fundamental tools thought to reduce the risk that agents will cheat you [Williamson, 1985] 
are represented by the market for corporate control, the free transferability of shares, and the 
board of directors. 
Their functioning presents factors which are strictly correlated to each other.  
Managers may feel the pressure of losing their jobs when the firm performs poorly.  
In cases like these, the value of the stock decreases and expose the corporation to 
investors willing to buy it out for restructuring purposes.  Yet, the takeover does not only 
mean new financial resources but also the possibility for the new major shareholder to elect 
a new management.  The market for corporate control is an economic phenomenon inherent 
to the market force so that theoretically it should not be considered a law mechanism. But 
law is essential to ensure its functioning as incumbent management could adopt measures 
aimed at hindering the tender offers of the bidders. As the role of the law should be to forbid 
the adoption of these measures or to submit them to the approval of the shareholders 
themselves, then this can be considered as a governance strategy.  
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The principle of free transferability of shares guarantees shareholders the right to exit 
whenever they do not feel comfortable with the incumbent management,  other than 
rendering possible the takeovers – if the shares could not be freely sold then nobody could 
buy out the target corporation. In relation to the first kind of protection, this can be 
considered as a regulatory strategy while in relation to the second, the free transferability is 
absorbed by the market for corporate control mechanism so that from this point of view it 
can be deemed as a governance strategy.  
Finally: the board of directors. The members of this board are expected to oversee 
the activities of the managers and to make its best effort to align their interests to the ones of 
shareholders. The power to appoint the relevant members is the result of a shareholder 
meeting.  Basically, the board of directors therefore represents an agent charged with 
overseeing another agent. This could lead to observe that its existence does not make much 
sense, as it would only duplicate the agency costs. 
Thus, in order ensure the highest level of neutrality, the law requires that the 
nomination, audit and remuneration committees must be constituted by non-executive 
directors, that is directors not directly employed by the firm  [Mace, 1971] and, therefore, 
directors that are interested at improving their reputation in order to secure their managerial 
office in another (non-competitor) corporation or to get better jobs of the same kind.  
However, it can not be denied that, if, on one side, agency theorists state that an 
effective board should be composed only of nonmanagement directors [Dalton, Daisy, 
Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998], on the other, it must be considered that the latter may not have 
all the indispensable information to control effectively. This implies that independent 
directors must include top managers in the board as well, in particular the chief executive 
officer (CEO). Therefore, once appointed after the general meeting, directors are expected to 
select, evaluate and, if necessary, remove the management [Mizruchi, 1983].  
The mandatory envisagement of the board of directors and the relevant mandatory 
criteria of its composition demonstrate that this legal mechanism belongs to point b) 
[governance] of the strategies for it is directed to shape the incentives of the agents.   
 The three legal mechanisms suggested by Fama and Jensen [1983] other than having 
been conceived while thinking on business corporations, represent by no means a 
contractarian approach.  
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This for two reasons. 
The first is that the (statutory) promotion of the market for corporate control and the 
free transferability of shares are devices that involve directly the proprietary interests of the 
shareholders. The board of directors is as a consequence expressly composed and disciplined 
to promote those interests.  
The second is the intentional choice to not consider or mention all the other possible 
legal mechanisms. In fact, this leads to guess that Fama and Jensen have thought that is 
better to leave in the hands of the shareholder, as rational homo economicus, the power to 
protect himself contractually and, therefore, to protect herself according to her own 
preferences.  
Anyway, as concerns the market for corporate control and the free transferability of 
shares, these are tools that do not apply to the non-profit sector. This is due to the fact that 
non-profit corporations are unowned so that there are no shares and, consequently, no rights 
to control or to be taken over.  
As regards the board of directors, where its role in non-profit corporations reflects 
much the same the one of business corporations –  that  is to say, members must oversee the 
activities of the management – there are very fundamental differences  regarding the 
election, the culture and the competence of the board that may interfere with the level of 
director performance.  
It has been seen that the first difference is that non-executive directors of business 
corporations are elected directly by shareholders. Since non-executives in turn appoint top-
management, in some way shareholders, at least indirectly, participate in the selection of 
executives themselves. This scheme anyway has led some scholars to talk about a 
duplication of the agency costs [Enriques, company law seminars held in Sapienza 
University, 2009], for being non-executives accountable to shareholders and executives 
accountable to non-executives.   
However, it must be added that in modern NPOs, non-executive members of the 
board are normally the constituents of the firms themselves. In those cases where non-profit 
organizations are so old that the founders are no longer living, the composition of the board 
is continued on the basis of self-perpetuation. Unlike shareholders, therefore, patrons are 
generally not involved in matters related to the control of the firm, and most importantly 
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they do not choose the members of the boards – unless they are the founders of the 
organization or self-perpetuated members that continue to contribute.  
 The second difference concerns the culture of the board. In business corporations 
executives and non-executives share the same education, and they are expected to measure 
the efficiency of the firm according to the same parameter: profit maximization.  
In non-profit corporations, on the other hand, one experiences a conflict of cultures 
which reflects a more delicate conflict of interests and which mirrors the different concepts 
of efficiency. Unlike executives, in fact, non-profit non-executives are normally not 
educated in economics. This implies that the latter, other than monitoring managers for 
possible expropriation of money, are expected to intervene every time the actions of their 
agents, though economically beneficial, do not meet the social purposes of the organization. 
In other words, those actions that may well be appreciated by business directors, may not be 
accepted by non-profit directors.  
The differences in the way members are appointed and in the internal cultures are 
closely connected to the competence of the members. Indeed, in business corporations non-
executive directors are elected by shareholders on the basis of their education. Accordingly, 
through the same criteria, non-executives choose executives. In non-profit corporations, 
instead, members of the board are community-based people who have founded the firm itself 
or have been chosen because of their ideological motivations. They therefore do not 
necessarily present some economic education which allows them to exert an effective 
control over executive directors.  
 Therefore, the Enriques’ reminder of the duplication of agency problems occurs in 
non-profit corporations through a different perspective .  
 On one hand, in business corporations the duplication is based only on the rational 
choice assumption according to which the homo economicus is self-interested and as such 
he/she tends to maximize his/her wealth in detriment of the counter contractual party – non-
executives in detriment of shareholders and executives in detriment of non-executives – . 
 On the other hand, in non-profit corporations the duplication of the costs does not 
concern the two-steps process of members’ appointment  but the circumstance by which the 
one-step process of executives’ appointment is burdened by the cost of self-interested 
behaviors plus the cost related to the different culture of the executives.  
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 § 4. CATEGORIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF AGENCY COSTS 
  
Opportunism (duty of loyalty).   
 
 All the behaviors that imply a conflict of interests can be defined as opportunistic. 
In the section regarding the non-profit board configurations, it has been reported a 
quote by Williamson [1985] referring to opportunistic behaviors: “the possibility that the 
person with whom you are transacting will cheat you”. The scholar, moreover, also provided 
a more technical description aimed at defining the concept:  
“by opportunism I mean self-interest seeking with guile…[O]pportunism refers to 
the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated 
efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse. It is 
responsible for real contrived conditions of information asymmetry which vastly 
complicate problems at economic organization”. [Williamson, 1985].  
 
Opportunism is not a concept defined by law, so that it is up to the scholars to discuss 
its dimension.  
In this work, by adopting Williamson general definition there shall be distinguished two 
categories of opportunistic behaviors. These shall refer to: a) expropriation of money; and b) 
self-dealing transactions: 
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a) expropriation of money  
This category can be associated with great wrongdoings, which other than involving 
corporate law rules – either for-profit or non-profit ones – are relevant to crime law, 
including theft and all the actions that may be recognized as such crimes.  
In order to provide a very complete description of the phenomenon it shall be entirely 
reproduced a study realized by the American Association of Home and Services for the 
Aging  [Herman, 2004]:  
“Most thieves' motivations fit into one of four categories:  
1) Greed - some people steal simply because they need money to purchase 
basics or luxury items they want and can't afford.  
2) Personal financial loss or pressure - others steal after suffering a personal 
financial loss or while under an unusual financial strain.  
3) Denial - some employees steal without believing they are doing so. An 
example is the employee who regularly takes office supplies from the supply 
room for use at home. The employee may believe that she's entitled to the 
supplies, that the items won't be missed, or that they are of minimal value.  
4) Revenge or thrill seeking - some thieves steal from their employers as a way 
of getting revenge for actions the employer has taken that the employee 
believes to be unjust, discriminatory or corrupt. And others steal to see if they 
can get away with it. Once they do, the desire to steal more frequently or larger 
quantities may become an incontrollable impulse.  
How - Some of the most common ways in which funds are misappropriated 
include the use of fictitious vendors, check forgery or theft, credit card fraud, 
theft of incoming receipts, and identity theft.  
Fictitious vendors or consultants - A common embezzlement scheme is the use 
of fictitious vendors or consultants. This plot can be perpetrated by any 
employee with authority to approve the payment of invoices. In most the non-
profit organizations the CEO is always in position to perpetrate this type of 
scheme, while in larger organizations a mid-level employee may be able to do 
it. The thief creates fraudulent vendors and deposits checks written to pay the 
false invoices in his personal bank account. In a recent case involving a large 
DC-based trade association, the CEO is alleged to have embezzled $2.5 million 
from the association over a 13-year period through recurring payments to 
phony consultants. In this case, the consultants were real people (including one 
public figure), but no services were provided and the payments were received 
by the CEO. While any theft of resources is disturbing, this case extracted a 
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particularly heavy price as the association had undergone a painful downsizing 
process-before the theft was discovered-due to its weak financial condition.  
Check theft - In a recent case involving a chapter of a prominent national 
youth-serving group, an employee obtained one of the non-profit's blank 
checks, created counterfeited copies, forged the signature of an authorized 
signatory, and attempted to pass the checks. An observant bank employee 
recognized the phony checks and stopped the embezzlement scheme. Although 
no dollars were stolen, the non-profit has spent thousands of dollars on legal 
expenses and countless hours to investigate the theft and take steps to prevent 
its recurrence. According to one source, 500 million checks are forged annually 
in the United States generating losses in excess of $10 billion. The odds are 
against you.  
  
Credit Card Fraud - In another recent case, a non-profit's accountant was caught 
applying customer refunds to her own credit card account. Credit card fraud can 
also occur with respect to use of the non-profit's corporate credit card. A 
dishonest employee may believe that the non-profit won't notice the use of the 
card for a personal, unauthorized purchase. In some cases the employee may 
view the use as a loan, and intend to pay the non-profit back in the future.  
Theft of Cash Receipts - Perhaps the simplest form of fraud committed by 
insiders is the pocketing of incoming cash receipts. Countless non-profit 
organizations have been victims of theft by staff who pocket cash receipts at the 
bake sale checkout or special event ticket booth.  
Identity Theft - Although the principal victim of identity theft is an individual, 
non-profit organizations can also suffer when the workplace provides the 
setting for these schemes. The organization could be held liable for failing to 
adequately protect the personal information of its employees. Despite the 
widespread belief that identity thieves are principally computer hackers 
working out of dark basement offices in far-off locations, each year thousands 
of Americans are victimized by co-workers. According to the director of 
security at an international pharmaceutical company, a common scheme is for a 
support staff member to respond to a credit card offer addressed to his or her 
boss, simply changing the address to which the card is mailed. Other 
workplace-based identity theft schemes involve theft of human resource 
department reports that contain employee names, social security numbers, 
annual salaries, addresses and more-documents that were left lying around, 
such as on the desk of a management employee.  
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All of the schemes described above can be perpetrated on a larger scale, and by 
volunteers in addition to paid staff members. A larger-scale embezzlement 
might involve a wire transfer of funds from the non-profit's to the thief's bank 
account. Some thieves believe it's safer to drain their employer's bank account 
in small but regular amounts. Others make bolder attempts, stealing large sums 
in one or more transactions.” (Herman, 2004: web page)  
 
        b) self-dealing transactions  
The second category of opportunistic behaviors, self-dealing, is a transaction 
between the corporation and one of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and 
another organization in which one of its directors or officers has an interest [Hansmann, 
1981].  
For-profit literature is replete of examples concerning such transactions. Some of 
these transactions present aspects which may also be relevant to non-profit corporations, and 
they include: (a) misuse of corporate property for personal gain; (b) kickbacks; (c) 
individual tax violations related to self-dealing.  
The first type of transaction, (a), refers specifically to receiving executive loans with 
no intention to pay back, and also to extraordinary personal expenses charged to the 
company. Instances of transaction (b) are represented by the award of business contracts in 
return for personal compensation. Finally, transaction (c) involves the failure to report 
forgiven loans or reimbursed personal expenses as taxable income.  
With a large margin of approximation, examples considered by point (a) and point 
(c) concern transactions between the corporation and one of its directors or officers, while 
those considered by point (b) concern transactions between a corporation and another 
organization in which one of its directors or officers has an interest46.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Through these descriptions, one may notice among the categories of examples, that  the case of the  insider 
trading has been left aside, presenting the latter aspects which are typical only to business corporations, notably 
the involvement of shares in the transactions.  
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Reasons of Opportunism.  
Both the categories of opportunistic behavior, in one way or another, represent a real 
danger to the efficiency/efficacy of the firm. This explains why neo-classical economists 
have extensively studied the circumstances in which corporate agents tend to make 
determinate decisions. In particular, scholars have been interested in investigating the 
preferences of economic actors, attempting to find out which are the factors that shape 
them.  
With this understanding, the scope of this paragraph is to borrow literature’s 
assumptions and to analyze how they play out in the very atypical world of non-profit 
organizations. Such theoretical conceptions will be taken into account in the light of two 
fundamental empirical data.  
The first concerns the fact that most of the opportunistic behaviors are due to greed 
[Gibelman and Gelman, 2000], thus the study will keep points 2, 3, and 4 of the list 
concerning “theft motivations” aside.  
The second is that public scandals basically involve top management incumbency in 
NPO boards of directors [Gibelman and Gelman, 2000]. This means that the study will not 
consider opportunistic behaviors performed by simple employees, but only those performed 
by executives with significant authority and discretional power.  
Arguing that various psychological factors characterize the economic behavior of 
non-profit agents somehow implies a revision of the original and extreme rational choice 
assumptions according to which all economic actors act to maximize wealth. Indeed, the 
idea that individuals take a large number of reasons into account when making decisions, 
which extend well beyond the stereotypical self-interested motive, is now largely accepted 
among rational-minded students [Sacconi and Grimalda, 2002]. This may lead one to think 
that directors of a non-profit organization do not necessarily act to maximize their wealth, 
but instead may reach levels of satisfaction for simply having accomplished the interest 
pursued by the organization.  
In fact, some literature claims that, for what concerns the non-profit sector, agents 
might lean more towards presenting altruistic motivations rather than self-interested ones 
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[Ackerman, 1987]. One of the arguments presented in such literature is that managers 
attracted by charities are generally more interested in pursuing an ideological aim than an 
economic one. Another is related to the fact that the selective process of managers could 
imply the choice of individual whose reputation reflects high altruistic and ethical standards 
other than administration skills [Young, 1983]. For instance, one can refer to a traditional 
non-profit corporation needing to hire business educated managers to face the financial 
difficulties that have been discussed above. Most likely, the board of directors will address 
only managers whose reputation does not conflict with the purposes of the organization. 
Accordingly, managers are expected to accept the engagement only if they share the same 
social values and ideas.  
Although these arguments present a logical and coherent rationale, it still seems 
difficult to match them to the empirical data demonstrating the existence of public scandals 
due to opportunistic management behavior [Gibelman and Gelman, 2000]. Consequently, 
the simplest solution to this discussion would be to accept that not all the economic actors 
behave to maximize their wealth and, at the same time, to neglect the fact that all the agents 
working in a non-profit organization are necessarily driven by ideological motivations. That 
is like saying: sometimes managers behave opportunistically and sometimes they do not.  
The weakness and simplicity of this observation risks to remain as such until one 
does not investigate the specific circumstances which actually drive agents towards a 
determinate performance, opportunistic or ideological. Only through a deeper study it shall 
be possible to answer the question: what has shaped the preferences of directors involved in 
public scandals?  
To begin with, one can take on the study developed by Sacconi and Grimalda [2002]. 
These scholars start from the assumption that human behavior is affected by a stable 
preference represented by the self-interested motivation. Yet, they sustain that this stable 
preference is accompanied by a conditional one which depends on conforming to other 
people’s decisions. In particular, they conclude that the disposition to comply with moral 
principals is more likely when the other participants to social interactions are also doing so 
[Sacconi and Grimalda, 2002].  
Therefore, it could be guessed that public scandals due to opportunistic behaviors 
would reveal that the first and stable preference of some members has not been influenced 
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by other colleagues’ performances. This may emphasize two aspects: the first one concerns 
the fact that the self-dealer has a personality so strong that the behaviors of the “others” do 
not truly interfere with his decisions; the second one regards the fact that the “others”, 
instead, play a role so passive that the self-dealer feels free to pursue his own personal 
interests.  
It is therefore interesting to apply such findings to the governance systems of modern 
non-profit corporations, with particular focus on the board of directors. The latter, pursuant 
of the organizational need to hire professional managers, has experienced significant 
changes in its composition and functioning.  
  As for composition, it has been earlier observed the conditions set by business 
trained managers according to which they would likely accept the office only in exchange of 
being appointed members of the board. That management penetration into the body would 
imply an increasing ratio of executive [inside] directors, among whom the CEO would stand 
out.  
Notably, the changes related to the functioning are tightly connected to the ones 
related to the composition. Indeed, the board’s role is no longer limited to a monitoring 
function or, rather, there is no longer the famous separation between management and 
governance claimed by Fama and Jensen [1983]. Through the executive committees, the 
board of directors looks after the day-to-day operations.  
On the basis of such description it is therefore possible to develop both the arguments 
indicated above. First of all, they take into account a very important observation offered by 
for-profit literature which acknowledges that the strong personality of the CEO positively 
affects the financial performance of the firm [Unquoted author, 2005]. Given this 
assumption, one would argue that if the business-like CEOs pay attention to market forces 
without losing sight of their organization’s underlying missions, and seek to use the 
language and skills of the business world to advance material well-being of their members or 
clients, then there would not be any reason to expect opportunistic actions from the other 
members of the board. The CEO’s philanthropic behavior may be explained by the will to 
conform to other CEOs involved in other NPOs, at the same time improving and defending 
his reputation, thus satisfying his primary stable interest.  
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This hypothesis would be further confirmed by the school of thought in literature 
which focuses the attention on the “leadership” question [Wallis & Dollery, 2005]. Such 
school, in fact, highlights the role of the leader of the board and his/her charismatic aspects 
that frequently influence other peers. The study brings forward several factors, as for 
instance those related to emotions and to the ways the leader uses to express himself during 
his speeches.  
On the other hand, when the professional CEO is meant to run the non-profit firm 
exclusively relying upon his business education, then the fear of self-dealing behaviors 
becomes more actual. This is basically due to three reasons. The first, most obvious one, 
regards the actions of the other members of the board who might follow their leader’s 
example. The second, which is particularly true for non-profit organizations, involves the 
passive role of non-executives, who, expected to monitor top management activities, lack 
either the incentives or professional skills to do it. The third, which is directly correlated to 
the second, takes into account the incompetence of executives themselves, who, educated to 
run business corporations, are not able to vary from their self-dealing behaviors. The latter, 
indeed, may be efficient for a for-profit organization but not efficient for a charity.  
The question related to the incompetence of both executives and non-executives, 
however, will deserve a deeper discussion through the next chapter. For now, by referring to 
the public scandals data, one is ready to point out just the answers to the previously posed 
questions.  
First of all, the fact they were public scandals already suggests that a large amount of 
money was involved and, therefore, that CEOs with strong personalities were in charge of 
the operation of such firms. This, in fact, is explained by the previously quoted theory 
according to which the strong personality of a CEO positively affects the economic 
performance of the firm. It would be right therefore to justify the prevalence of the stable 
preference setting foundation on the fact that: directors did not receive the proper influence 
to develop their conditional preference from the CEO; and directors, being aware of the 
scanty monitoring action on their operations, felt freer to pursue their first preference.  
 Of course, in the case – which is in actuality the most common – within which the 
self-dealer is represented by the CEO himself, one could sustain that his stable preference 
has dominated because of the passive role of the other members of the board. 
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Incompetence (duty of skill). Other than opportunistic behaviors, also the incompetence of 
directors implies agency costs. The costs of incompetence in a business corporation contexts 
are represented by the wrong commercial choices adopted by the officers.  
Assuming that directors are expertise and with a professional background, their 
incompetence may be uncovered only ex post.  
In fact, only after a certain decision has been taken the shareholder – on  the basis of the 
value of her dividend – shall  be able to judge if directors have been competent or not.  
Obviously, the negative effects of a managerial decision may not depend exclusively on 
their incompetence, but also on the other external factors that influence the market forces.  
In a non-profit corporation context, the costs related to the incompetence are higher. 
In fact, other than being represented by the wrong commercial choice taken by the director, 
they involve also the managerial decisions that do not comply with the social values 
promoted by the organization.  
As many times underscored, these managers are educated and prepared to run a 
business corporation so that they are supposed to tend to support a profit seeking approach, 
overlooking the efficacy conditions of a non-profit organization: quality and quality 
obtained through the respect of social values.  
Evidence of this problem is the belief of Robert Kasdin, treasurer and investment 
officer of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, who had underscored the many difficulties 
encountered by business trustees to there being asked to play roles, that in his words, “raise 
unfamiliar types of normative questions” [Bowen 1994].   
  The incompetence of business directors managing a non-profit corporation is easily 
detached within those occasions where the director has to choose between short or long-term 
solutions. Obviously, the institutional dimension of the non-profit corporation would be 
expected to drive the managerial decisions towards the second option, for the (long-lasting) 
survival of the firm represents a primary interest (of the patrons and of the stakeholders). 
    Yet, the business director – notably one whose background and whose school of 
thought adhere to neo-classical conceptions of the corporation – could reason as if he were 
running a for-profit corporation and, with the intention of pursuing the interests of the 
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shareholders, he could opt for the first solution. Shareholders, in fact, are supposed to prefer 
the short-term solution for the following reasons: 
a) their dividend is significant; 
b) they may always sell their shares as soon as they see that the corporation is poorly 
performing in the long-term. 
As regards non-profit corporations, point a) can not be discussed as there are not 
shareholders; point b) discloses the crucial difference that when non-profit corporations shall 
prove poorly performing because of a short-term decision (but also for any other 
economically wrong decision)  there will not be any investor, any market force in general, 
capable to restructure them.  
Anyway, the short-term oriented choice may not depend exclusively on a question of 
(economic) culture. As Bowen [1994] suggests, directors could take short-term decision for 
personal agendas, “to brag about what the foundation is doing”, so that in this case the 
choice falls within the opportunism problems and the relevant conflict of interests.  
Bowen [1994] continues to underscore how the business culture of non-profit 
directors could be synonymous of agency costs by stating that “individual familiar with 
(business) corporate financial accounts may find it difficult to penetrate the intricacies of 
fund accounting.  They are certainly far from alone in this respect, but because they are 
presumed to be experts in such matters, they may be especially embarrassed to acknowledge 
that they don’t quite understand the financial statement of the non-profit organization”.  
Another argumentation brought by Bowen [1994] regards the decision of 
professional directors to renounce to take a business oriented action – such as an aggressive 
fund raising campaign – because they are not actually supported or, rather, motivated by the 
non-executive directors.  Moreover, as it shall be seen in the next chapter, courts might tend 
to hold non-profit volunteer trustees on a high level of standards, so that they can simply 
walk away as soon as they realize the bad financial situation of the corporation.  
Bowen adds that the “non-profit incompetence” of professional executives is not 
anyway the only incompetence that comes out the board of directors.   
The non-executive boards, in fact, may show a too traditional approach that drive 
them to   defend  the values and the missions of the organization to the extent to which they 
end up to kill it. For example, a non-executive might fire a good professional executive 
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whose job has produced on behalf of the corporation much more benefits – not only 
economic – than those that it would have produced if she had strenuously complied with the 
social values of the corporation.  
 
Negligence (duty of care, duty of diligence). This kind of behavior also implies 
agency costs. It represents a directors’ performance that is actually neither opportunistic nor 
a result of her incompetence, still it can involve an opportunistic and incompetence 
dimension. 
It can just be considered as a performance or a non-performance through which the director 
did not show the due attention.   
 As regards non-performance, one may refer to an action that the director was 
supposed to take but that she did not take, entailing a loss for the corporation. In cases like 
these negligence has to be measured against director’s competence: did the director not pay 
attention or was she not so competent to understand that she had to take the decision? 
 A non-performance can also be synonymous of laziness as long as the action was not 
taken because the director was not in the mood to work. In cases like these, the negligence is 
voluntary and as such it fully reflects an opportunistic behavior. 
 As concerns performance, negligence is expressed by decisions that have proved not 
beneficial for the corporation (or shareholders). In cases like these, the negligence has to be 
measured against both the director’s competence and director’s opportunism.  
 In the first circumstance, the operation might be so complicated that the competence 
of the director was not expected to consider the negative effects. In the second, the damage 
to the corporation could have been the result of an opportunistic behavior of the director. 
By the way, “negligence is not measured against an abstract, but rather expectations 
and standards. These expectations and standards may be difficult to articulate, but they do 
exist. The standards may be established by generally accepted practices in the sector (or 
evolving ones after the Panel’s report), by the common law or by statute” [Burgeois, 2004]. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE PRINCIPALS  
    
 § 1. SCHEME-ORDER 
 
The foregoing discussion on the causes of agency problem is to be completed with an 
analysis of the protection devices envisaged by law. 
  These devices are manifold and work in different ways. For this reason, it is 
necessary to set an order/scheme from which the analysis must be developed.  
 To begin with, one may refer to the above mentioned Hansmann and Kraakman 
[2005]  categorization that suggests to divide the legal devices for the reduction of agency 
costs in two categories: regulatory and governance strategies. 
In particular, regulatory strategies involve: 
a) rules and standards; 
b) initiation and termination terms of the relationship; 
while governance strategies involve: 
a) selection and removal; 
b) proposal and ratification powers; 
c) trusteeship and reward strategies. 
Moreover, according to the authors, regulatory and governance strategies themselves 
may be referred to another categorization which is based on “ex post” and “ex ante” criteria, 
that is criteria considering the moment within which the mechanism works, before or after 
the action taken or expected to be taken by the director.  
   Assumed that this scheme/order is also worth for a non-profit corporation context, 
the analysis might well be set forth by studying each of these strategies and hence enriched 
by verifying if they belong to ex post or ex ante criteria.  
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However, the attention shall be focused also on the important external controls of the 
non-profit corporation.  
   For external controls one means the right to sue on behalf of patrons and the power 
of the Attorney General to intervene in certain matters of the non-profit corporation; thus to 
the extent to which the business parallels part of patrons is represented by shareholders and 
to the extent to which these are part of the corporate structure, then the relevant right to sue 
in their own name or in the corporation name (through derivative action) can fall within the 
category of governance strategies.  
The right to bring suits against non-profit directors represents a legal device that only 
lately has been acknowledged by case-law and, moreover, has been acknowledged only 
within peculiar circumstances. Before such acknowledgment, the external control has always 
been exerted by the General Attorney.  
 At this point it is important to observe that  the regulatory and governance strategies 
indicated by Hansmann and Kraakman [2005] are anything but the procedures, parameters 
and any sort of functioning criteria that the internal and external controllers have to refer to.  
In other words, law attempts to reduce agency costs first by setting monitoring 
devices – internal or external  – and then by establishing how these devices have to work or 
function.   
As the first are represented by human beings (the board members, the patrons, the 
Attorney General) and by an overseeing human activity, they can be deemed as monitoring 
devices from a strict point of view whereas the regulatory and governance strategies can be 
deemed as monitoring devices only to the extent to which they “assist” the human controller 
to carry on their activities.  
Thus, at first the study shall consider the board of directors. In particular, while at 
chapter IV, this body had been presented as a monitoring device and then studied as a cause 
of agency problems, it shall now presented as a cause of agency problems and studied as 
monitoring device.  
The examination of the board of directors and of the relevant non-profit governance 
strategies, the attention shall move on the regulatory strategies and, finally, on the external 
controls.   
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§  2. BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
According to Hansmann and Kraakman [2005] the board of directors represents one 
of the five distinguishing element of corporations47.  
That all the corporations must have a board of directors can be demonstrated by 
referring to paragraph 141  a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law and § 701 of the  
NY-BCL, both establishing  that  the business and affairs of the corporations shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.   Similarly, section 154 of the 
Companies Act 2006 provides that public companies are required to have at least two 
directors.  
 The compulsory presence of the board of directors is due to: 
a) the fact that it would be impossible for thousand shareholders to look after the 
day-to-day administration of the corporation, or it would be unthinkable to 
decided a resolution for every single transaction; 
b) the shareholders lack the professional skill and knowledge to run the business 
[Berle and Means, 1932].  
It is true, if shareholders merely empower a board of directors for the management of 
the corporation, then management behavior may well arise the agency costs analyzed earlier: 
opportunism, incompetence and non-diligence48.   
 
To avoid these problems of agency, shareholders should devise a system-mechanism 
for which the managerial decisions are more shaped on their own interests.  In particular, 
they should intervene into the decision process which, according to Fama and Jensen [1983] 
is represented by the following steps: 
a) initiation-proposal; 
                                                 
47 The other four are: 
a) legal personality 
b) limited liability 
c) investors’ ownership 
d) free transferability of shares. 
e)  
48 This is what happened in early twentieth century US corporations. There were actually scholar thinking that 
the powers enjoyed by managers represented an increase of democratization in the American society, while 
others like Berle and Means already understood that the managerial discretion would have instead brought to 
the increase of agency costs to be bore by investors [Mizruchi, 1983]. 
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b) ratification; 
c) implementation-execution; 
d) monitoring.  
Where all the steps are taken by the same agent, then point b) and point d) do not 
make any sense as it is difficult to think that an agent ratifies and efficiently monitors her 
own choices.   The only agency costs that shareholders could save in this situation would be 
represented by those related to the incompetence: as shareholders shall choose the directors, 
they shall be expected to choose competent and skilled ones.  Still such competent and 
skilled directors could be opportunistic and non-diligent.  
Because of the information asymmetry between shareholders and managing directors, 
the former could barely exert control over the decisions of the latter. Shareholders could 
realize bad-management behaviors only when they are called to decide on the financial year. 
As it is much cheaper to avoid agency costs rather than lowering them when they are 
already incurred, shareholders would better device mechanisms that restrain point a) and c). 
 One of these mechanisms is to separate management decisions (point a and c) from 
control decisions so that the board shall involve management and non-management 
directors.  
Therefore the function of the board becomes basically twofold: manage and control.  
This concept is confirmed also by other scholars maintaining that the board has three 
primary roles - control, advise/counsel, and strategic [O’Neal, 1995] and others according to 
which  the function of the board is monitoring, executive and instrumental [Baysinger and 
Butler; 1985].  It is clear in fact that the threefold dimension conferred by these scholars is 
anything but a more articulated reflection of the twofold one.  
Now, there are different ways for separating the management and control decisions: 
a) the shareholders elect non-management directors and management directors; 
b) the shareholders elect non-management directors and empower these to elect 
management directors and, hence, to include them in the board; 
c) the shareholders elect management directors and empower these to elect non-
management directors.  
Option a) is commonly adopted by shareholders to the extent to which they provide 
in the by-laws that the first directors shall have to appoint as managing directors  one or 
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more of their body. Still, nothing hinders the possibility that shareholders themselves 
appoint non-executives and executives directly. So option a) may be divided into a-1) and a-
2).  
 The option b) basically differs from a) only for the fact that the managing directors 
can be other persons than the body initially chosen by the shareholders.  
While solution a-1) and b) are often adopted by the practice, it is interesting to 
understand why a-2) is expected to be high cost solution.  
 This can be explained assuming that shareholders may basically accomplish three 
different reasoning.  
The first may be developed as follows: 
 we shareholders have incorporated our business 
organizations and now we have to establish who shall run it. Fama 
and Jensen suggested us that we better separate the functions within 
the board, some members shall make decisions control and some 
other shall make decisions management.  As we actually are not 
expertise and, hence, we are not in a condition to divide these 
functions by ourselves, we better choose a certain number of 
directors and then we shall let them decide who shall exert control 
and who shall manage the day-to-day operations.  Hence, if we were 
expertise we actually would have chosen by our own who among the 
members had to exert the monitoring function and who the 
management one.  In fact, in these conditions of scarce information 
and competence, the agency costs we bear by leaving discretion to 
the board in relation to the choice of management and monitoring 
function, shall be surely lower than those that we would bear if we 
did this choice by ourselves.  
 
 The second reasoning may be developed as follows: 
 we shareholders actually believe that the executive of our 
corporation has to be Miss X.  As we are convinced that he is the right 
person, theoretically it would be convenient for us to elect him directly.  In 
fact, in such way we would save those (little?) agency costs that we would 
bear if we delegated another person.  
Yet, we know that other than electing Miss X, we have to elect also 
who shall control her.   Assumed that we succeed to find who is happy to 
be the non-executive director in our corporation managed by Miss X, we 
actually have to consider some agency costs that could arise and that 
could be higher than those we have saved by electing directly Miss X.  In 
fact, if Miss X does some bad thing to our corporation, we are expected to 
go before the non-executives we elected and say: “hey, weren’t you guys 
supposed to control Miss X activities”; they could answer: “actually yes, 
but it is not our fault that you chose an incompetent, opportunistic and not 
diligent executive”.  
Moral of the story, if we shareholders directly elect the executive 
incur in two high agency costs represented by: 
a) the low quality of non-executives. The best non-executives shall be willing 
to elect the managing director by their own. Those who shall accept to be 
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monitors of an executive chosen by shareholders are likely to be the less 
experienced or motivated; 
b) the scarce accountability of non-executives. Although it is possible for we 
shareholders to claim their breaches of duties, still it shall be harder to the 
extent to which we asked them to control someone who was chosen by 
ourselves.  
Hence, if we shareholders are so convinced that Miss X has to be our 
managing director, then we can try at least to save the agency costs related 
to point b). We can do it by opting for a-1) solution. That is, we may elect 
Miss X among the other members of the board  and then exert some 
pressure and thus drive the board of directors’ decision to select her for 
the managing function. In this case, the board of directors would result 
more accountable to Miss X performances.  
 
 The third reasoning can be developed as follows:  
we shareholders have not the lowest idea of who could be the 
managing director of our corporation. We actually know this group 
of persons and we trust in them. We believe that we better appoint 
them as board of directors and leave them free to pick the managing 
director wherever they think fit.  
 We shareholders know that if we do this choice we incur in a 
duplication of agency costs represented by the two-steps choice of 
monitoring and management function. In fact, we have to bear not 
only the costs that are implied in the relationship between us and the 
non-executive directors but also we have to bear the costs of the 
relationship between non-executives and executives.  While in 
solution a-1) the board of directors have to select the managing 
director, the costs of this choice are for us shareholders “well 
discounted” by the fact that for sure they shall select someone that 
we have already chosen; in solution b) the costs of the second 
selection do not involve any discount so that are fully bore by us. 
Actually, the costs we incur in this second layer of directors, may be 
recovered by rendering directors more accountable before the 
management decisions. In fact, if management does something bad 
to our corporation we shall be prepared to say: “you guys of the 
board of directors have selected in fully discretion the managing 
director” and, as a consequence, it shall be easier for us to 
demonstrate a breach of fiduciary duty.  
 
Option c) does not make much sense to the extent to which executive directors shall 
appoint non-executive directors that shall barely exert an efficient and true monitoring 
function .  
 The articles of association may contain further indications related to the size and 
configuration of board, inclusive the balance between non-executive and executive directors.  
According to Fama and Jensen [1983] the separation of decision management and 
decision control represents a fundamental strategy also for non-profit corporations. In 
particular, while the scholars claimed that such separation in a business context was 
indispensable only for complex business organizations, they specified that as concerns non-
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profit sector, the said separation is necessary either for complex and non-complex 
organizations49.  
The scholars set out from the idea that the agency problem in non-profit corporations 
is more pronounced than in business corporations for three reasons:  
a) patrons do not come involved in the corporate structure;  
b)  the inexistence of the external pressure exerted by  the market for corporate 
control; 
c) boards are self perpetuated as consequence of point a).  
 This explains why even in noncomplex and small nonprofit organizations it is 
necessary to pay attention to the decision processes.  
Along with the hypothesis of Fama and Jensen, the agency problem incurring 
between patrons and board of directors should be resolved by the mandatory provision of 
independent directors in the board, just as it has been provided by the SOX Act for business 
corporations50.  
Before trying to convince the legislative power to adopt this idea of public policy, it 
should be important to verify two conditions: 
a) that the FJ thesis is tested empirically, that is to verify that non-profit 
corporations run by a board of directors involving the separation of decision 
management and decision control are efficient; 
b) that the practice of involving non-executives is not commonly adopted by non-
profit corporations; in fact, whereas the practice were represented by the 
involvement of non-executives, then there would not be the need to impose it 
through a mandatory statutory provision. 
As concerns the verification of the b) condition, the answer can be found in both the 
history of non-profit sector as well as in recent surveys. 
In the history told in the previous chapters, it has been seen how the presence of non-
executive directors represented actually the normality of the circumstances. In fact, during 
                                                 
49  In the opinion of Fama and Jensen [1983] “ noncomplex means that specific information relevant to 
decisions is concentrated in one or a few agents. (Specific information is detailed information that is costly to 
transfer among agents.) Most small organizations tend to be noncomplex, and most large organizations tend to 
be complex, but the correspondence is not perfect. For example, research oriented universities, though often 
small in terms of assets or faculty size, are nevertheless complex in the sense that specific knowledge, which is 
costly to transfer, is diffused among both faculty and administrators”. 
50 The UK Company Act does not distinguish between executive and non-executive directors.  
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the stages before the proliferation of non-profit corporations in the 60s, there was not any 
separation of decision control and decision management for the non-profit sector was 
burdened by an agency problem related only to opportunistic behaviors. These behaviors 
were not contrasted by separating control and management but simply by applying high 
fiduciary standards to the directors (who were actually seen more as trustees). 
When other than the opportunism, the agency costs began to increase for the 
incompetence of directors to raise funds, the directors themselves decided to hire and 
sometimes to include into their boards business professionals.  
The peculiarity of non-profit organizations in relation the presence of non-executive 
directors is even much clearer if one compares non-profit corporations with business 
corporations. In the latter, in fact, the circumstances that characterized the board 
composition proved just the opposite: it was the executive directors began to be flanked by 
non-executives and not the other way round.  
Recent studies [Callen, Klein, Tinkelman, 2003] have demonstrated that large US 
non-profit organizations are run by a wide board of directors whose composition envisages 
that not more than one member is an executive director. 
The historical analysis plus the recent survey would not leave room for a statutory 
intervention aimed at imposing non-executive directors so that it would be even useless to 
verify condition a).  
However, if the verification of condition a) would disprove FJ theory, it would hence 
mean that law should not have regard of the balance executive/non-executive, but rather of 
other aspects has revealed by the verification test.  
The first author that has disproved FJ theory has been Fishman [1987]: he observed 
that when a board makes a decision the information is often incomplete, for non-executive 
directors do not spend enough time looking after the corporate activity and for the latter 
having reached a very complex dimension so that a high level of expertise should be 
required to ratify and monitoring an executive decision.   
In fact, what it is incorrect in FJ hypothesis does not concern the two-fold dimension 
of the decision process: one cannot argue that splitting control and management lower the 
costs of agency related to opportunism diligence and competence. The shortcoming of Fama 
and Jensen concerned actually their idea that non-executive directors would have been 
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provided with incentives for doing their job properly. These incentives would be represented 
by reputation and by personal visibility in the light of important job offers.  
   As a consequence, the aim of the law becomes “simply” to provide mechanisms that 
render directors more accountable.  Such mechanisms are represented by the HK 
scheme/order suggested earlier.  
The literature advocating a multiple constituency approach to understanding 
nonprofits has suggested that there is no single organizational or board effectiveness 
criterion that all stakeholders perceive similarly. Rather, each group measures effectiveness 
on the basis of criteria and impressions most relevant to it. This literature has provided 
significant motivation for our study that investigates whether the data are consistent with 
donors on the board using ratios as effectiveness measures to influence the organization 
toward the donor point of view. 
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§  3. STANDARDS  
   
The standards are general clauses which shape the agents’ behavior so that their 
choices prove as much as possible aligned with the interests of the principals.    
 Because of the broad definition of the behaviors, they fall within the idea of ex post 
devices. In fact, only after a certain performance of the agent it is possible to establish if 
she/he complied with the direction provided by the standards themselves. 
 Standards are normally detachable in common law and equity rules, in the statutes as 
well as in the terms of the agreement.  
 The importance of the standards is crucial whereas one has to consider that they 
represent the parameters to which the judge shall refer to evaluate the responsibility of 
controlling and managing directors.  
 As regards the corporate context, common law standards are represented by the duty 
of care, diligence and the duty of skill while equity standards are those referring to the duty 
of loyalty and are defined as fiduciary duties; statutory standards basically reflect the 
common law and equity ones. 
For example, the Companies Act 2006 has codified the duties of directors with the 
label of general duties: 
a) the duty to act within the powers (s. 171); 
b) the duty to promote the success of the company (s. 172); 
c) the duty to exercise independent judgment (s 173); 
d) the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence (s 174); 
e) the duty to avoid the conflict of interest (s 175); 
f) the duty not to accept benefits from third parties (s 176); 
g) the duty to declare an interest in a proposed transaction or arrangement (s 177).  
The reading of the above provisions clearly reveals how only the point c) falls out the 
equitable concept of loyalty. All the other duties must be indeed considered as fiduciary 
duties.  However, this distinction is confirmed by section 178 which provides:  
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Civil consequences of breach of general duties 
(1) The consequences of breach (or threatened breach) of sections 
171 to 177 are the same as would apply if the corresponding 
common law rule or equitable principle applied. 
(2) The duties in those sections (with the exception of section 174 
(duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence)) are, 
accordingly, enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary 
duty owed to a company by its directors. 
  
   Actually, subsection 1) reveals that the remedies available for breach of fiduciary 
duties have not been subject to codification, despite the recommendation of the Law 
Commissions.  In fact, the provision states that the same consequences and remedies as are 
currently available should apply to the statutory general duties.   Where the statutory duty 
departs from its equitable equivalent, the court must identify the equivalent rule and apply 
the same consequences and remedies. The Solicitor General summarized the position as 
follows: “the consequences of a breach of fiduciary duty can include damages, 
compensation, restoration of a company’s property, rescission of a transaction or a 
requirement of a director to account for any profits made as a result. They may also include 
injunctions or declarations, although those methods are primarily employed when a breach is 
threatened but has not yet occurred. The consequences of a breach of  duty of care and kill 
may include the court awarding compensation or damages” [Morse, 2007] .  
 Subsection 2) may indicate that the remedies for breach of section 174 will be 
assessed on common law, not equitable principles, thus laying to rest the debates in that area 
[Morse, 2007].  
 The spirit of Section 2) may be explained by referring to Bristol and West Building 
Society v. Mothew, where  the Counsels Jonathan Sumption Q.C. and Glenn Campbel 
reminded that “although a solicitor has a number of fiduciary obligations to his client, not 
every duty which is owed in the context of a fiduciary relationship is a fiduciary duty 
[Girardet v. Crease & Co. (1987)]” 
 If one applies this obiter dictum to the corporate context, then one has that the 
directors have a number of fiduciary obligations and other kind of obligations to the 
corporation (assumed that the corporation is the principal).  
 Now, if the law considers the duty of care, skill and diligence as other obligations 
then remedies available for the principal can not be represented by those indicated above by 
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the Solicitor General.  In fact, the Counsel continue: “the expression “fiduciary duty” is 
properly confined to those duties which are peculiar to fiduciaries and the breach of which 
attracts legal consequences differing from those consequent upon the breach of other 
duties”. 
  Thus, for the duty of care falls within the category of “other duties”, then the 
available remedies are those provided by the common law as for example damages and not 
the equitable ones that are  primarily restitutionary or restorative rather than compensatory. 
  The consequence is that where there is a negligence performed by a director then the 
corporation is not entitled to recover the whole amount of the loss, as for the common law 
rules of causation and remoteness the corporation should demonstrate that the whole amount 
of the loss depended on the directors’ decision.  
 If the violation of the duty of care were instead considered as a breach of trust or 
fiduciary duty, then in similar circumstance the corporation would have been entitled to 
restore its previous situation.  
 Differently from the Companies Act, the General Delaware Corporation Law does 
not provide a list of the standards of behavior to be followed by directors.  
However, at § 144, the Act disciplines the transactions within which the director has an 
interest, shaping therefore the content of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.  
Moreover, in the name of its declared liberality, the Act contains a section – 
102(b)(7) – which  authorizes companies to adopt an exculpatory provision protecting 
directors from personal liability for breach of the duty of care and the vast majority of 
publicly traded companies adopt such provisions. Of course this would not be possible under 
the Companies Act 2006.  
 As concerns the NYBCA, section 717 provides that directors have the duty to 
consider the interests of the corporation and of the shareholders, so that even in this case 
there is a statutorization of the duty of loyalty.  The section continues to specifies which 
interests of the corporations deserve a particular attention from directors. The content of the 
duty of loyalty is shaped also by section 713 which disciplines the conflict of interests 
between directors and corporation.  
A peculiar difference with the Companies Act 2006 concerns the independent 
judgment in so far as in the UK legislation (Section 173) the discretion of the director must 
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not be fettered by others unless company’s constitution provide otherwise.  Moreover, 
section 717 codifies the duty of care.  
 As one would expect, law provides different standards for non-profit corporation. For 
example, at section 181 the Companies Act 2006 provides that the provisions of section 175, 
that is the duty to avoid conflict of interests, and section 180(2)(b) are modified in certain 
respects. In all the other respects, the provisions of Chapter 10 of the 2006 Act apply to 
companies that are charities in the same way they apply to companies that are not.  
 As regards the New York Non-Profit Corporation Act, section 717 codifies the duty 
of diligence, care and skill as well as the duty of loyalty which basically does not differ from 
the black letter of section 717 of NYBCA.  
   Once illustrated the sources and the nature of the fiduciary duties and the other 
duties, the aim becomes to analyze their content, that is what a duty loyalty or a duty of care  
implies for non-profit directors. This shall allow to understand if these standards – rather, 
the application of them by the Courts – effectively succeed to reduce the agency costs 
arising in a non-profit corporation context.  
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§  3.1 Duty of Loyalty (Opportunism) 
 
  According to some literature [A.C.G. 1978] “the legally required standards of 
conduct for charitable fiduciaries are generally ill-defined and often unrealistic. The 
explanation for this shortcoming in the law of charitable organizations is the failure of the 
law to keep pace with the rapid evolution of the large and complex modern charity”.  
This observation proves indeed absolutely true for what concerns the duty of loyalty. 
In fact, to measure the standards implied by the duty of loyalty in non-profit sector it is 
necessary to consider both the law of corporation and the law of trust.  
The first would apply as non-profit corporations have been for a long time organized 
as charitable trusts. This means that for a long time the law of private trust has been applied 
to the trustee of a charitable trust: the trustee of a private trust and the trustee of a charitable 
trust shared the same standards of behavior.   
 The second would apply as non-profit corporations, for the fact itself that have been 
incorporated, are corporations. Thus the director of a business corporation and the director 
of non-profit corporation would share the same standards of behavior.  
Theoretically, the identification of the applicable standard would be possible simply 
after having assessed if the non-profit corporation resembles more a charitable trust or a 
business corporation.  
If one’s opinion is that the non-profit corporation resembles actually a charitable 
trust, then one must consider that in this case the trustee owes a strong fiduciary duty of 
loyalty to the beneficiaries of the trust and must administer the trust solely for their benefit.  
This strength or highness of the standard of loyalty means that the Court shall 
enforce the fiduciary duties of loyalty in a very strict way. In fact, for the fiduciary 
relationship is a matter of moral and conscience rather than a matter of market, the 
trustee/directors are forbidden to perform many behaviors that would be permissible in a 
workaday world for those acting at arm's length [Judge Cardozo in A.C.G. 1978]. In 
particular, the high standard trust rule establishes that a trustee breaches  his duty of loyalty 
whenever he engages directly or indirectly in any sale, purchase, loan, or similar transaction 
between himself in his capacity as trustee and 1) himself as an individual or 2) a member of 
his family 3) a corporation in which he has significant interest.  
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If one’s opinion is that the non-profit corporation resembles instead a business 
corporation, then one must consider that the director of a corporation owes her fiduciary 
duties of loyalty to the corporation and the relevant administration of corporate assets may 
also imply an accomplishment of director personal interests’.  However, as it shall be seen 
below, corporate law is very strict concerning the conflict of interests:  the interest of the 
director must be disclosed so that the board, the committee or the shareholders, may decide 
to approve or not it. If the director does not reveal is interest and the transaction is approved, 
this is voidable unless the director demonstrates that the transaction was taken in a good 
faith and for the benefit of the corporation.  The strictness of this principle proves any way 
relaxed whereas one considers that the transaction of the interested trustee is instead always 
void.  
It is true, initially the duty of loyalty of corporate directors referred to the high 
standard envisaged by the trust law. The rationale of this norm was represented by the fact 
that law was meant to secure an unprejudiced advice and to avoid embarrassment to the 
remaining directors.  
When the dimension and the activities of corporations increased, the idea that 
interested transactions could actually be fundamental for the affairs of the firms began to 
influence the minds of the judges. 
In fact, as concerns the transaction between the corporation and the director, it was 
established that the contract could be allowable if a majority of disinterested directors had 
approved it and if it was fair to the corporation.  
Successively, as concerns the transaction between the director and a corporation 
within which she had an interest, the Court maintained that even only the requisite of 
fairness was sufficiently important for the validity of the transaction. 
Finally, it was established the general common law rule according to which the 
interested transaction was valid if fair to the corporation; still the Court could make a 
fairness test. The Court could even decide to validate the transaction by ordering the board 
or the shareholders to vote on it. 
The standard applied to non-profit corporation reflected the business corporation 
standard and therefore its story. This means that from the early application of the high trust 
standard, Courts moved toward the more relaxed one of corporation.  
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For example, In re Taylor Orphan Asylum [1875] the Court voided a directors’ 
transaction without even considering if the transaction itself were or not fair to the 
corporation. The transaction was voided only for being interested.  
Successively, although there is evidence that the trend moved to the more relaxed business 
standard, Courts have not actually always specified which standard applied.   
In particular, in two cases-law Fowle Memorial Hospital v. Nicholson [1925] and Eurich v. 
Korean Found [1961], while the Court validated the interested transactions, it showed a very 
relaxed approach in evaluating the relevant fairness. In other words, the application of the 
corporate standard was demonstrated by the fact that Courts would have voided only 
transactions that represented an egregious breach of duty or an enormous lack of fairness.  
Yet, between the above mentioned cases, the Court, in Gilbert v. Mcleod Infirmary 
[1951] made a more explicit reference to the corporate standard. In fact, it held that “the 
relation of trustees to the eleemosynary corporation is analogous to that of directors and 
stockholders in a business corporation. Their ability to sue for vindication of a right in the 
corporation is universally recognized when the corporation, through its executives, fails and 
refuses to so proceed” and that “the directors or other members of the managing board of a 
charitable corporation are sometimes called trustees. Their legal position is the same no 
matter by what name they are called, whether directors, trustees, or governors”. 
The legally acknowledged idea that charitable trustee were subject to the same duties 
of their corporate counterparts implied that the managerial decision had to be held voidable 
only in case it would not have been fair to the corporation.  
In the matter of facts, the Court had considered the two rules related to the 
procedural and to the fairness requirements. 
As regards the first, the Court held that although the interested director did not vote 
the transaction, he still behaved like exerting pressure on the other board members. In fact, 
the Court relied on the principle according to which:  
“the influence of the interested director is not measured by his vote alone, but his 
participation in the meeting, his arguments, and the weight of his judgment may have 
prevailed mightily with his colleagues, so that in substance he should be deemed to have 
made the contract, in part at least, on behalf of the company as well as on his own behalf”. 
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Other than the violation of procedural aspects, the Court noted that the transaction 
even did not comply with the fairness requirement. The terms of the purchase of the 
Hospital’s land accomplished by the director involved a price which was considered inferior 
to the one that could be offered by the market.  
In  Gilbert v. Mcleod Infirmary, therefore, although the Court applied the corporate 
standard and although it expressly maintained that the transaction did not present fraudulent 
perspectives, it found a breach of fiduciary duties from the interested directors for these did 
not comply with the procedural aspect and did not prove that the price agreed for the 
purchase of Hospital land was actually a fair price.  
The study of these cases has demonstrated how the hybrid position of the 
director/trustee of a non-profit corporation has basically driven judges to apply the standard 
of the duty of loyalty by referring alternatively to the law of trust and corporation law, 
entailing a scar within the principle of legal certainty.   
 This explains the above mentioned claim of A.C.G. [1978] for clearness and, 
particularly, for a separate body of law applicable to non-profit corporations.  
It is true, although the author underscored the difficulties to tailor a standard for non-
profit corporations, he held that the best solution would have been represented by the 
opinion of Judge Hedrick in Mountain Top Youth Camp, Inc. v. Lyon [1974].  
In order to vent abuse of fiduciary relationships, the court enumerated three 
principles governing business transactions between a charitable corporation and its directors: 
1. The conveyance of the property must be authorized by the corporation or ratified by it. 
2. The law presumes that such conveyances are invalid and imposes upon the purchaser the 
burden of establishing that the purchase is fair, open, and free from imposition, undue 
advantage, actual or constructive fraud. 
3. Such conveyances will not be declared void as a matter of law, but it is a question for the 
jury to determine upon all the evidence as to whether the vitiating elements enter into the 
particular transaction. 
According to A.C.G. ,  
“this standard emphasizes the principles of openness, 
fairness, and full disclosure that should govern all dealings between 
a director or trustee and the charity. Under these rules, the 
disinterested directors would have to approve the transaction to 
validate the action. Without such approval, the transaction would be 
void, unlike under the pure corporate standard where fairness may 
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still be asserted as a defense even without disclosure. In addition, 
requiring disclosure and approval reduces the burden on state 
attorneys general of detecting self-dealing transactions in general. 
Furthermore, the rules minimize the enforcement burden for those 
transactions that are not disclosed by making them void as a matter 
of law. The presumption that the transaction is invalid requires the 
trustee to show that the charity is not disadvantaged by the bargain. 
Jury determination of the fairness of the transaction ensures that 
dealings will not be approved that do not meet the public's standard 
of openness and honesty. This modified corporate rule of loyalty 
best meets the needs of the modern charity. It provides directors the 
flexibility and discretion needed to operate a charity efficiently. The 
corporate rule, unlike the trust standard, does not discourage 
responsible businessmen and professionals from serving on the 
boards of charitable organizations. Finally, the rule, with its 
mandatory disclosure requirement as well as the presumption 
against the validity of any transaction, safeguards the public's 
interest in protecting charities against the occasional untrustworthy 
director”. 
  
 As indicated, the opinion of the Court was issued in 1974 while the note of A.C.G in 
1978, dates that precede the adoption of Revised Model Non-Profit Corporation Act as well 
as other business and non-profit corporation acts which would have been concerned with the 
duty of loyalty: UK Companies Act 2006, New York Non-Profit Corporation Act and 
Delaware General Corporation Law.  
 While it is hence interesting to compare the opinion of Judge Hedrick with the 
statutory provisions contained in these Acts, it is important to remind that the comparison 
with the UK Companies Act 2006 follows objectives that are merely connected with the 
research method of this work.  
Thus, as regards the UK Companies Act 2006, the attention must be focused on 
sections 175 and 177 and therefore on section 181. The latter in fact envisages the 
modifications that apply to charitable corporations.   
 Section 175 basically establishes that the director has the duty to avoid to be 
involved in situations where her interests are in conflict with those of the corporation.   Yet, 
the board of directors may authorize this kind of matters in accordance with the company’s 
constitution. Moreover, the section provides that the duty does not apply to a conflict of 
interests arising in relation to a transaction or arrangement with the company. This latter 
circumstance is in fact disciplined by section 177 which prescribes that directors have to 
declare if they have any interest in the transaction.  
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 The difference between the circumstances related to sections 175 and 177 may be 
explained as follows:  
A director of Company X wants to buy some shares in Company Y 
which is on a list of preferred suppliers of Company X. This general 
relationship may give rise to a section 175 Duty on the part of the 
director if it can “reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a 
conflict of interest” between the director’s interests as a director of 
Company X and as a shareholder of Company Y. If it can, then this 
will need board authorisation under section 17551.    
However, if Company X and Company Y then agree to enter into a 
supply contract with one another, this will become a situation which 
is caught by section 177 (as the director may then be indirectly 
interested in a proposed transaction with Company X) and the 
director will have a duty to declare the nature and extent of his 
interest to the other directors of Company X before the supply 
contract is entered into. However, under section 177 a director does 
not need to declare an interest “if, or to the extent that, the other 
directors are already aware of it (and for this purpose the other 
directors are treated as aware of anything of which they ought 
reasonably to be aware)”. Since the director has already disclosed 
the situation and had it authorised under section 175, he will be able 
to rely on this exception in section 177 and not make a further 
declaration unless the terms of the authorisation he was given 
require disclosure to be made in the circumstances or if the facts on 
which the authorisation was given have now changed. This 
underlines the need for companies to keep appropriate records of 
conflicts and authorisations on a continuing basis as such records 
will provide evidence of interests of which the directors of the 
company are aware (Norton Rose Website). 
 
  Now, for charitable corporations, section 181 specifies that the duty to avoid conflict 
of interests does not apply to a conflict of interest arising in relation to a transaction or 
arrangement with the company if or to the extent that the company’s articles allow that duty 
to be disapplied, which they may do only in relation to descriptions of transaction or 
arrangement specified in the company’s articles.  
                                                 
51 This circumstance actually assumes that the director still has to buy the shares of company Y and for this 
reason, the potential situation of conflict of interests might oblige her to obtain board authorization. This 
dimension of the rule is actually just a codification of the common law principle according to which the agent 
can not take that action. It imposes a negative duties.  
However, section 175 adds another dimension to that common law principle, establishing that the director has 
also a positive duty to avoid the conflict of interests. For example, if director of a company X may be 
appointed as director of company Y on the basis of the approval of company X board of director. This, indeed, 
deem that company Y is not a competitor of company X so that there is no reason to disallow the director to 
hold the two offices. However, if by any chance company Y is bought-out by a competitor of company X, then 
section 175 imposes to the director a positive duty to require the board authorization to continue holding her 
offices.  
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 In other words, the business corporation director has the duty to avoid conflict of 
interests.  Yet, if the conflict of interests concerns a transaction of the company, she has not 
the duty to avoid the transaction. In fact, she may well promote the transaction as long as she 
declares her interests to the board of directors. This shall make the relevant evaluations and 
shall decide to accomplish or not transaction.  
 The director of a non-profit corporation must avoid the conflict of interests even if 
the interest concerns a transaction with the company. 
 For example, whereas the non-profit corporation X  is about to reach an agreement 
with a supplier Y, whereas the CEO of company Y is the uncle of the CEO of company X, 
the latter has the duty to not promote the transaction, unless the company articles of 
association provide otherwise thorough a detailed description of the permissible 
transactions.   
Secondly, section 181 provides that while the duty will not be infringed if the matter 
has been authorized by the directors, such an authorization may only be given by the 
directors where the company’s constitution includes provision enabling them to authorize 
the matter, and the matter is proposed to, and authorized by, them in accordance with the 
company’s constitution.  
In other words, whereas the director of the business company X has a conflicting 
interest in a certain situation, his duty to avoid this situation can be resolved by the approval 
of the board of directors.  As concerns charitable corporations, the approval of the board 
would not be sufficient to exclude the duty of the director unless the by-laws provides 
otherwise.  
A comparative analysis between the provisions of the UK Companies Act 2006 and 
the opinion held by the  Court in Mountain Top Youth Camp, Inc. v. Lyon   [1974]  points 
out that the first imposes a higher standard of duty of loyalty to charitable directors.  
In fact, while for judge Hedrick the interested director may promote all the dealings 
to the extent they are fair, open and disclosed, the second forbids these kinds of transactions. 
The strict approach of the Companies Act is mitigated only by the possibility to validate 
those transactions if accurately envisaged by the by-laws.  
 As regards the New York Non-Profit Corporation act, the provisions contained in 
section 715 envisage standards of loyalty that resemble those established by judge Hedrick. 
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In fact, point a) says that a transaction of an interested director shall not be either void or 
voidable for this reason alone. Rather, they are void or voidable if the interested director 
voted the transaction without declaring her interests.  Therefore, also the NY non-profit 
corporation act envisages an authorization from the board of directors for these kind of 
matters, paralleling in that way the provisions contained in the NYBCA.  
 It is true, the resemblance of the section 715 of the N-PCL with section 713 of the 
NYBCA has arisen some criticism among those policy makers who believe that the non-
profit scandals are (also) due to insider operations accomplished by executive directors.  In 
particular, the committee on non-profit organization of the association of the bar of the city 
of New York led by senator Leibell has approved a bill for the abrogation of section 715.  
 The proposed statute provides that the transaction involving an interested director 
may be voided or modified by the corporation or the Attorney General unless the interested 
party and the approving directors affirmatively establish that the transaction is fair and 
reasonable to the corporation at the time of the transaction. It further provides that the 
Attorney General may seek restitution to the corporation (plus interest) from the parties to 
the transaction if it was not fair and reasonable52.  
                                                 
52 Proposed N-PLC §715 would replace current N-PLC §715 in its entirety. The proposed legislation contains 
section (a) through (h), described as follows: 
(a) A transaction between a not-for-profit corporation and a director or officer or an entity in which a director 
or officer is a director or officer or has a substantial financial interest, is void or voidable by the corporation or 
the Attorney General unless the interested director or officer or any approving director makes an affirmative 
showing that the transaction was fair and reasonable at the time it was entered into. 
(b) A presumption that the transaction was fair and reasonable is created if the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
 (i) the transaction was approved in advance by the board or board committee by a sufficient vote not counting 
the vote of the interested party, and by the members, if any, entitled to vote on the transaction, with knowledge 
of all material facts by those entitled to vote on the transaction; 
(ii) appropriate data as to comparability was obtained and relied upon, and was provided to all individuals 
entitled to vote on the transaction; and 
(iii) the basis for approval of the transaction was adequately documented, which documentation must include 
the terms of the transaction and the date it was approved, the names of those present when the transaction was 
discussed and those who voted on it, the comparability data relied upon and a description of how it was 
obtained, and any actions taken with respect to consideration of the transaction by the interested party. 
Subsection (b) also provides that grants between corporations exempt from tax under Internal Revenue Code 
section 501(c)(3) otherwise falling under this statute must only meet the provisions of subparagraph (i) above 
to establish presumption of fairness. 
(c) The corporation or Attorney General may void or modify the transaction (unless that action would put the 
corporation in a worse position) in the following circumstances: 
(i) the interested director or officer or approving director failed to meet their burdens under paragraph (a) or 
failed to comply with paragraphs (e) or (f); or 
(ii) the interested party or approving directors failed to establish the fairness of the transaction. Proposed N-
PLC §715 
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 Directors of non-profit corporations organized under the General Delaware 
Corporation Law shall necessarily be subject to the relaxed standards of loyalty envisaged 
for business corporation by § 144.  
 As regards the Revise Model Non-Profit Corporation Act, section 8.31 other than 
providing that a transaction of an interested director may be approved by the board of 
directors or committee, entitles the Attorney General and the State Court to approve the 
transaction either before and after the transaction itself has been consummated.  This norm 
reflects the judicial review that had been suggested by judge Hedrick in Mountain Top Youth 
Camp, Inc. v. Lyon and is based on the idea that the capacity of the standard of loyalty to 
reduce the agency costs related to opportunistic behavior depends on its enforcement other 
than its strictness.   
  However, for opportunistic behaviors involving expropriation of money represent 
a crime rather than a breach of fiduciary duties, they must be prosecuted as such. For 
example, if someone [that can be either a manager or a director] is found stealing, the 
criminal action will be brought before the court because it breaches criminal law and not 
only because it breaches corporate [non-profit or for-profit] fiduciary duties.   
 Criminal law therefore also is involved in (non-profit) corporate matters providing 
rules (and not standard) aimed at avoiding ex ante certain director behaviors.  
                                                                                                                                                      
(c) allows the corporation or Attorney General to seek restitution from the interested director or officer or the 
approving director in amounts equivalent to those available to the Internal Revenue Service under §4958 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (“IRC”), regardless of whether the corporation is subject to IRC 
§4958 and regardless of whether the Internal Revenue Service pursues its remedies under IRC §4958. 
Restitution under IRC §4958 requires repayment of consideration in excess of reasonable amounts. IRC §4958 
also provides for penalties on the parties, which are not applicable under the bill. 
(d) The corporation, through its certificate of incorporation or by-laws, may place additional restrictions on 
contracts or transactions between a corporation and its directors, officers or other persons and provide that 
contracts or transactions in violation thereof will be void or voidable. 
(e) Compensation to directors or to officers (in capacities other than sitting on the Board), including for 
services performed on behalf of the corporation as a director or officer of another entity, must be set by the 
Board or by a Committee of the Board comprised solely of non-compensated directors, or if relevant, by a 
majority of the members, and such compensation must be fair and reasonable in accordance with the standards 
of Internal Revenue Code section 4958. 
(f) Compensation of directors for serving on the Board or any Committee must be approved by at least a 
majority of the entire Board, and must be fair and reasonable in accordance with the standards of Internal 
Revenue Code section 4958. 
(g) This subsection sets out definitions of terms used in the bill. 
(h) With the exception of compensation of directors or officers, the law is inapplicable to any contract or 
transaction of which the director or officer has no actual knowledge and which does not exceed the lesser of 
one percent of the gross receipts of the corporation or one hundred thousand dollars. 
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§  3.2 The Duty of Care, Skill, Diligence (Negligence, Incompetence) 
 
 The other standard of behavior provided by law to shape directors performance on 
principals’ interest is represented by the duty of care, skill and diligence.  
As said earlier, this standard does not fall within the concept of fiduciary duty for it 
does not involve matters of moral and conscience. In fact, differently from the duty of 
loyalty, the duty of care, diligence and skill is not really aimed at reducing the costs related 
to opportunistic behaviors, that is those behaviors that are performed while knowing that 
they are jeopardizing the corporation, rather this duty is concerned with the costs of 
incompetence and low diligence or negligence.  Of course, where the negligence is 
voluntary, the performance of the director can violate both the duty of loyalty and the duty 
of care, skill and diligence (CSD duty).  
In order to measure the content of the CSD standard, it is necessary to repeat the 
reasoning adopted for the duty of loyalty, that is considering the law of trust and the law of 
corporation.  The comparison of the judicial opinions and the statutory provisions shall 
confirm that also for the CSD the provision of a standard specifically tailored for non-profit 
corporations is needed.  
If one’s opinion is that the non-profit corporation resemble the charitable trust, then 
one reflects the old opinion held in 1742 The Charitable Corporation v. Sutton [1742] where 
it was established in substance that a director of a company owes duties to the company in 
the same measure and quality as does a trustee to a trust. 
In  particular, the duty of CSD of trustees had to be measured according to standards 
which took into account:  
 a) the level of care exercised by the trustee in managing his own property;  
 b) caution and conservation of capital [Lee, 2003].  
The high standard of the trustee in relation to the duty of CSD, was accurately 
described  by A.C.G. [1978],  
“the trustee also is bound by the duty to exercise reasonable care 
and skill in administering the trust. This duty is often expressed in 
terms of the "prudent man" rule, holding a trustee to be "under a 
duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such 
care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in 
dealing with his own property .... ". This rule translates into a 
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requirement that the trustee be held liable for breaches of trust that 
amount to simple negligence.' The duty of care also requires that a 
trustee be cautious in investing the funds of the trust."  He may not 
delegate responsibility for administering the trust or selecting 
investments.   The strict interpretation given these duties by the 
courts holds the trustee to a high fiduciary standard53”. 
 
If one’s opinion is that the non-profit corporation reflects rather a business 
corporation, then the duty of care of directors should apply. It is true, just as it happened for 
the duty of loyalty, initially corporate directors were treated as trustee and, as such, they had 
to comply with the above mentioned high standard.  
However, as professor Horsey [1994] underscored, “courts recognized the need for 
judicial restraint against imposing liability on corporate fiduciaries for mere errors of 
judgment. Here, too, the concept of limiting the liability of directors by exonerating them for 
judgemental error had its origins in English common law as old as the common law duty of 
care. The English 1742 case earlier referred to, Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, may also be the 
“father” of what is commonly referred today in this country as the so-called business 
judgment rule”.  
 The different approach of the courts was due to the consideration that corporate 
directors had many areas of responsibility so that they need to be acknowledged with greater 
discretion. The traditional trustee, in fact, was often charged only with the management of 
the trust funds and could therefore be expected to devote more time and expertise to that 
task. 
Accordingly, in the United States, courts began to deal with directors’ decisions 
bearing in mind the business judgment rule. This functioned as “a presumption that in 
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in 
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company” [Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 - Del. 1984]. The BJR implied that it was 
the interest of the principal to demonstrate the breach of duty.  The BJR was even recently 
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware in occasion of the famous In re Walt Disney 
Derivative Litigation, Case No. 411, 2005. 
                                                 
53 The fact that the scholar says that the trustee is hold to a high fiduciary standard has not to be interpreted  
that the duty of care, skill and diligence is a fiduciary duty, but simply that it is connected to the circumstances 
of a fiduciary relationship.  
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It is true, in England courts had never expressly established the business judgment 
rule. Yet, its elements and the general understanding of its functioning had been implicitly 
recognized, providing, at least facially and psychologically, a low degree of certainty to the 
directors [Berkowitz, Pistor, Richard, 2003].  This approach lasted at least until the decision 
of the Companies Act 2006 which, as it shall be seen below, codified the subjective and 
objective test of the managerial decision.  
By the way, also concerning the duty of care, diligence and skill, the courts have 
alternatively followed one or the other approach. More accurately, from the application of 
the high standard of trust, they have ended up to approach the lower corporate standard and, 
therefore, the business judgment rule.  
According to Fishman [1987], Courts had likely adopted a result oriented approach, 
that is judges had decided according to the “circumstances of the case”. 
To demonstrate this Court attitude, the US scholar has introduced the instance of 
Sibley Hospital, a charitable corporations whose liquid assets were maintained in savings 
and checking accounts rather than in treasury bonds or investment securities.  
 These investment decisions were made by the treasurer and approved by the board 
as a matter of course.  
If the opinion of the Court were that the Hospital resembled more a charitable trust 
than a charitable corporation, then it would have decided that under the trust standard is not 
possible to delegate responsibilities.  The directors, therefore, would have been easily found 
in breach of their duty of  care. 
However, the Court considered the Sibley Hospital more as a charitable corporation 
than a charitable trust, above all because of the wide size of the hospital itself.  
Thus, as the corporate standard allows to delegate some of the responsibility to the 
extent to which the delegator maintains control over the delegated, the Court had simply to 
establish if directors did or not commit a gross negligence in the exertion of their function.  
Having surveyed the authorities  and weighed the briefs, arguments and evidence 
submitted by counsel, that is the “circumstances of the case”, the Court decided that the 
directors had breach their fiduciary duty to supervise the management of Sibley's 
investments. 
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While by either applying the trust or the corporate standard the directors would have 
been found accountable, Fishman [1987] took the chance for arguing that the legal reasoning 
that distinguishes on the basis of the size of the charitable corporation had not to be the rule. 
Fishman actually agreed on the principle that trust or corporate standards are to be 
applied according to the “circumstances of the case”, however the distinguishing element 
had to be represented by the nature of the supervisory or managerial function involved  
rather than the size of the organization.  
In particular, he argued that when the managerial decision involved matters related 
with the administration of the funds such like investments, then the director had to enjoy the 
same protection conferred to the business corporations colleagues.  
 Whereas the managerial decision was concerned with the purposes and, hence, the 
effectiveness of the non-profit corporation, such like merger, dissolution, change of the 
purposes themselves, then the trust standard had to apply.  
Fishman [1987], moreover, underscored how this shifting standard theory had been 
also adopted in the business corporation context to distinguish the standards related to bank 
directors from those related to ordinary corporations.  
The Supreme Court of Delaware in Oberly v. Kirby [1991] seemed to not follow 
Fishman’s findings, rather it continued the process towards considering business and non-
profit fiduciaries on the same level. In fact, it confirmed that the business judgment rule 
applied also to non-profit corporations by stating:  “a court cannot second guess the 
decisions made by wisdom of facially valid decisions made by charitable fiduciaries, any 
more than it can question the business judgment of the directors of a for-profit corporation”.  
 As regards the statutory approach to the duty of care of non-profit directors, it can be 
seen how the UK Companies Act 2006 has extended the corporate standard to charitable 
corporations.  
In fact, differently from the duty of loyalty, whose norm for charitable companies has 
to be drawn from the joint reading of section 175 and 180 , the low(er) standard of the CSD 
duty contained in section 174 applies without distinction to business and charitable 
companies.  
In particular, the Companies Act 2006 has shed light on the common law rules 
established in Re Brazilian Rubber Plantation & Estates ltd and Re City Equitable Fire 
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Insurance Co ltd. In these decisions, in fact, the court employed either a subjective and a 
subjective/objective criteria to evaluate if a certain managerial decision violated the duty of 
care. The doubt was firstly resolved by judge Hoffmann in Normann v. Theodore Goddard 
[1991] who maintained that the common law test of a director’s duty of care was the same as 
the one stated at section 214 (4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 which was a 
subjective/objective test. As the Law Commission charged with drafting the Companies Act 
2006 thought that Hoffmann finding was the law, it promoted the codification of the 
mentioned principle.  
Under the subjective test the less knowledge and experience the director has, the less 
skill is expected from him, and the less likely he has to be held liable when something goes 
wrong.  
Under the objective test, a director must possess the skill that may reasonably be 
expected from a person undertaking those duties.  
  Unfortunately, so far it has not been possible to identify UK court decisions 
applying s 174 of the Companies Act to charitable directors.  
As regards the NYBCL, section 717 confirms the rule of prudent man which is 
corroborated by the binding precedent of business judgment rule. This is paralleled by the 
provisions of section 717 of the N-PCL.   
 The Delaware General Corporation Law, at § 141 defines the standard of care as 
reasonable.  
The Revised Model of Non-Profit Corporation Act at section 8.30 provides that the 
standard of care must be represented by both the prudence and reasonability. 
 While the concepts of prudence and reasonability express the same degree of 
standard, they have not to be confused with the concept of rationality.   
In fact, if one had to void a director decision only when it would prove not rational, 
then it would be very hard to judicially challenge such behavior. While it is common to 
characterize conduct as unreasonable, it is rare to characterize it as irrational.  In these cases, 
decisional liability would attach only where the decision itself cannot be rationally explained 
and the directors fail to provide a single rational reason for conduct such as developing a 
plant that they knew could not be operated profitably. Liability does not attach merely by 
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reason of an unreasonable decision; rather, the decision must be irrational. Otherwise, the 
process itself is the proper focus [Bishop; 2008].  
On one side, a high standard of CDS would move away professional directors from 
the non-profit context; and it is important to note that in many cases they are even not paid.  
 On the other side, the lower standard adopted by US law for business corporation 
would put at risk the public interest followed by the non-profit corporation as well as the 
economic interest of the patrons; and it is important to note that only lately the latter have 
been acknowledged with the right to sue directors . That is, a low standard plus a weak ex 
post control could leave directors with too discretion.  
According to Fishman [1987], that goal could well be reached  if law were more 
concerned  defining standard of behaviors, in particular the duty of care.  
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§ 4. RULES 
 
Differently from the standards, rules discipline ex ante agent behaviors. The most 
important rule concerning non-profit corporations is undoubtedly the non-distribution 
constraint.  
In UK this is provided by the Charity Act 1993 at section 64 other than the opinions 
held by Judge Pennycuick  in Construction Industry Training Board v. Attorney General 
[1973] and by judge  Slade J.  in Liverpool District Hospital for Deseases of the Hearth v. 
Att. General [1981]. The latter case-law actually confirmed the non-applicability of sections 
558 and 597 of Companies Act 1985. These sections, in fact, allowed the envisagement in 
the by-laws of clauses concerned with the distribution of the dividends.  
 As concerns the New York  N-PCL, the NDC is provided at § 102, subsection 5. The 
Delaware General Corporation Law does not contain provisions concerned with the NDC, so 
that the non-profit status of a corporation is relevant only for tax purposes.  
The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act forbids distribution of incomes at § 13.01.  
Rules may also be seen as devices for assessing the level of the standards related to 
the duty of loyalty and the duty of care, diligence and skill. For instance, as regards the first, 
the prohibition (and so the rule) for the trustee to accomplish interested transactions is signal 
of a high standard of behavior.  
In addition, rules aimed at preventing certain agent behaviors are also those provided by 
crime law. 
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§  5. INITIATION AND TERMINATION TERMS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
 
The second regulatory strategy is represented by rules of law that discipline the 
conditions for which the principals enter and terminate the relationship with the agents, 
while the standards and rules are concerned with the development of the relationship itself.  
This kind of regulatory strategies anyways makes sense only in a business 
corporation context where  investors need to know certain information before purchasing the 
quantity of stock desired and where investors unhappy with the management wish to get out 
from the ownership structure of the corporation.  
Business corporate law in fact compels listed firms’ to make specific  disclosures and 
ensure to shareholders the right to recede or to sell their shares.  
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  §  6. EXTERNAL CONTROLS 
 The enforcement of the non-profit directors fiduciary duties has normally relied on 
the Attorney General. Yet, a recent tendency of the US courts has recognized on behalf of 
patrons the right to bring suits against non-profit management. To be accurate, the judicial 
doctrines have recognized to donors the right to bring contractual actions while only for 
consumers it has been acknowledged the right to bring action for breach of trust.  
In order to understand the different legal reasonings developed by the Courts it is 
necessary to get briefly back on the law of trust.  
In private trust, the settlor has no right to enforce the terms of the agreement. This 
result stems from the historical perception of trusts as a conveyance of property, which 
viewed the settlor’s role as complete once the property was conveyed in trust [Houston, 
2005]. The right to stand for breach of fiduciary duties lies only with the beneficiaries.  
Accordingly, as in charitable trust beneficiaries are not certain or determined, in 
cases of mismanagement there would not be anybody entitled to bring trustees before the 
courts.  
To comply with such a problem, in Carmichael v. Bibb (1937), the Supreme Court of 
Alabama, recalling what said in 22 Encyclopaedia of Pleading and Practice, 205,  reminded 
that 
where a trust is for a public charity, there being no certain persons 
who are entitled to it so as to be able to sue in their own names as 
cestuis que trustent, a suit for the purpose of having the charity duly 
administered must be brought in the name of the state or the attorney 
general, and it seems that in all cases the attorney general may 
maintain the suit with or without a relator. Charitable trust is of public 
concern and the attorney general is the protector of the interest of the 
public, or, what is the same thing, of the indefinite and fluctuating 
body of persons who are the cestui que trust. In fact, the attorney 
general is the only one who can properly invoke the superintending 
power of the courts over the administration of such trusts. 
 
This approach has been further confirmed by decisions (O’Hara v. Grand Lodge I.O.G.T. 
(1931) 213 Cal. 131, 139; Brown v. Memorial Nat. Home Foundation (1958) 162 
Cal.App.2d 513, 538.) underlining that in common law, indeed, it is well established that the 
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settlor of a charitable trust who retains no reversionary interest in the trust property lacks 
standing to bring an action to enforce the trust independently of the Attorney General.  
Because of the conventional resemblance among the settlors of a charitable trust and 
the patrons of non-profit corporation, it follows that neither of the latter would be allowed to 
bring suits before the courts.  
In the matter of fact, the activity of the Attorney General has not proven efficient 
[Hansmann, 1981] The scarce reliability of that public office has moved legal scholars and 
courts to take into consideration solutions that reflected the private nature of patrons 
interests.  
With this perspective, judges have been setting forth a path clarifying that in 
precedent cases the principle according to which the Attorney General were the only party 
entitled to bring non-profit directors before courts was not established. In 1977, the Supreme 
Court of Alabama, in Jones v. Grant, stated that in Bibb [1937] itself, “the question of 
whether anyone else has standing to institute a suit against a charitable trust has never been 
answered in Alabama. Thus, this is a case of first impression. […] The prevailing view of 
other jurisdictions is that the Attorney General does not have exclusive power to enforce a 
charitable trust and that… a person having sufficient special interest may also bring an 
action for this purpose”.  
So, according to this, the question would have been resolved only by demonstrating 
that patrons keep a special interest. That is everything but simple. In Women’s Christian 
Association v. Kansas City et al [1898], for example, the Court of Missouri clearly stated the 
common law principle that once a gift is accomplished “all right and interest therein or 
thereto is gone forever”.  
The legal reasoning meant to recognize a special interest on behalf of patrons’ 
category had to therefore be set forth from another perspective. In L.B. Research and 
Education Foundation v. UCLA Foundation et al. [2005], the Court of Appeal of California 
observed that “although a donation may have a charitable purpose, it does not necessarily 
mean that it constitutes a charitable trust. Thus, the owner of a property may, rather than 
create a trust, transfer it to another on the condition that if the latter should fail to perform a 
specified act, the transferee’s interest shall be forfeited either to the transferor or to a 
191 
 
designated third party. In such a case the interest of the transferee is subject to a condition 
and is not held in trust”.  
This decision has fundamentally embraced the neo-classical trend that conceives the [non-
profit] firm as a nexus of contracts, where in the matter of fact patrons keep an economic 
interest that must be protected.  
As seen in chapter III, when courts are asked to deal with non-profit corporations, 
they may follow two tendencies.  
The first that is more traditional simply considers patrons contributions as instituting 
charitable trusts. In such cases, applying the law of trust, donators lack the standing to sue. 
The non-profit organization is pictured in a public dimension where only the Attorney 
General has the power to intervene to settle [public] conflicting interests.  
The second, updated with mainstream economics, regards the relationship between patrons 
and directors as based on a contract. Therefore, applying contract law, patrons would be 
allowed to sue directors but, obviously, the remedy would be against the breach of contract 
and not against the breach of duties.  
In the last quoted case [2005], for instance, Judge Hess has deemed a donation of $ 1 
million as a conditioned gift as it was intended to establish an endowed chair at a school of 
medicine. In this situation the donor could have based her civil action on the basis of 
forfeiture remedy, as directors did not meet the terms of the agreement.  
Such legal reasoning, however, is not always workable as not all the patrons are 
actually donors.  
A great number of the resources stem from consumers who purchase the 
services/goods provided by the non-profit organization. In such cases there is no doubt about 
the contractual nature of the relationship between parties. The consideration is represented 
by the exchange of the promises: payment for service/good. From a strictly legal point of 
view patrons are entitled to bring suits against directors solely for breach of the contract 
related to the transaction.  
For this category of patrons there has no been equitable remedy for breach of 
fiduciary duties until the famous controversy Stern v. Lucy Webb (1974). The US District 
Court for the District of Columbia practically introduced the principle according to which a 
class of users has a sufficient special interest to challenge the conduct of the trustees 
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operating the charitable institution on a theory of breach of trust. The problem of the 
uncertainty of beneficiaries had to be resolved through the certification as a class under Rule 
23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
The difficulties to acknowledge patrons with the standing to sue, however, are not 
still completely resolved. In fact, courts are not really free to conceive a gift as a contract.  
To begin with, the analysis must take on the common law principle according to 
which a contract necessarily involves consideration. Truth is, donors of non-profit 
organizations barely provide funds in exchange of something on their behalf – otherwise it 
would a bargain and contract law would apply. They rather provide funds in exchange of 
something to be done on behalf of third, uncertain beneficiaries. 
The logical solution to the question would be to consider all donations as 
consideration lacking and, therefore, to deny their contractual nature. Yet, there can be some 
exceptions.  
One is represented by the pledge of donation contained in the deed. The sanctity of 
the act may help the donor to specify his/her own wishes about the administration of the 
funds he/she provides without worrying about the lack of consideration. Charitable 
donations accomplished in that way, in fact, are “valid contracts even though there is no 
valid consideration” [Lloyd, 2007].  
In other words, if the organization accepts the gift, it binds itself to observe and 
respect what was envisaged in the agreement. The protection of the donor against directors’ 
abuses would be ensured by the application of gift law. In the very famous case of Lee 
Brass’ donation on behalf of Yale University, the former was entitled to rescind the donation 
when the latter admitted it would not have respected the conditions agreed [Brody, 1996].  
The second exception concerns the material transfer of the gift. In these cases the 
donations are deemed as executed contracts, regardless of the presence of consideration 
[Sloane, 1913]. These contracts are therefore conceived as complete, since the donation is 
absolute and mere. Donors are not legally acknowledged with right to sue directors, as the 
latter have no obligations to perform at all. The contract is executed and not executory, 
meaning that the relationship ends with the transfer of the gift. 
The last exception regards a specific norm envisaged by US legislation. The relevant 
provisions (section 90, subsection two, of the Restatement [Second] of Contracts) establish 
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that, in determinate circumstances, significant promises concerning charitable donations are 
to be considered binding, notwithstanding the lack of consideration [Archibald, 2004]. In 
other words, the discipline provides that contract law applies regardless of the use of the 
deed and the material transfer of money. Accordingly, the donor who does not put under 
seal his/her pledge to restrain the employment of the funds will be anyway acknowledged 
with the same protection as if he/she had made a deed promise. An unrestrained promise will 
otherwise not guarantee to donors the protection for breach of contract.  
None of the mentioned exceptions reflect the actual problem posed by this work. The 
hypothetical fact situation that is at issue concerns a mere donation, materially accomplished 
without any solemn form (deed) and the basic point defended in this discussion, is that such 
donation is not an executed contract but rather an executory one, as the donor expects a 
performance in exchange of her contribution.  
The extent of the legal effort directed to identify a consideration into the transaction 
realized by the donor is quite evident. In fact, common law traditions have always based the 
whole system of analysis of contractual relations on the parole evidence rule, which imposes 
on the interpreter to draw the terms of an agreement by using only the written document and 
its literal meaning [Peratoner, 2003]. Such an approach implies that if the donor him/herself 
does not specify his/her preferences, or specify just some of them, then the directors’ fund 
administration is not restrained at all, or it is restrained only in part – to the extent of the 
specified clauses.  
This principle has been confirmed in the quoted Judge Hess decision where it is 
openly argued that courts will generally construe a conveyance as one upon condition rather 
than upon trust only if the donor clearly manifests an intention to make a conditional gift. 
Only in these cases will the intention be honored.  
To conclude the discussion it is worthwhile to point out two fundamental findings: 
a) patrons who are donors are legally entitled to sue non-profit directors for breach of 
contract. The acknowledgment of the contractual dimension of the relationship 
hinges on certain legal circumstances; 
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b) patrons who are consumers are legally entitled to bring suit against directors for 
breach of fiduciary duties under the condition they represent a certified beneficiary 
class having a special interest.  
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CHAPTER VI 
ITALY : COMPARATIVE LAW ANALYSIS 
§1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Italy reached its unification only in 1861 whereas the Kingdom of England, as 
sovereign State, dates back to 927. The latter originated  from the kingdoms of the ancestral 
English, the Anglo-Saxons, which were carved out of the former Roman province of 
Britannia. In 1033 William I of Normandy defeated Harold II and commenced a process of 
feudal (re)organization that would have strongly influenced the English legal system.  
William I was the last “ruler” that succeeded to invade the Isle. Even Napoleon and Hitler  
failed to do so.  
The relationship between the law (the comparison) and the moment of the formation 
of a united kingdom (history) is clear: while Italy would have continued to apply Roman and 
Canon law until the adoption of the Civil Code in 1865, in England the Courts of 
Westminster would have developed a distinguished legal tradition since the XII century.  
This implies that until the establishment of such courts the discipline of charity in 
England and in Italy had to be the same.  Thus, in both the countries the Church was 
expected to dedicate a quarter of the almsgiving to the poor and in both the countries the   
Codex Theodosianus and Iustinianus had to apply with their provisions concerning the 
primirary role of the Church in the administration of the charitable funds and concerning the 
right to sue administrator, acknowledged to all those who had an interest in the charitable 
fund.  
Actually, the reading of an article written by Foresi [2001] would suggest that during 
the Early Middle Age, in the Italian territory, the role of the Church in providing charity  
might be even more important than in the English one. In fact, as the author [2001] 
underscored  
 “the socio-historical context where the investigation of our 
Pontifex is set, is characterized by a very bad crisis. The Italian 
peninsula had been hardly damaged by the twenty years gothic war 
conducted by Belisario and Narsete for emperor Giustiniano’s will. 
The latter was indeed eager to reorganize the Roman Empire in its 
integrity.  On one side, the successful conclusion of the conflict in 
553 freed Italy from the  Ostrogoths domination,  yet on the other 
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side  the Constantinopoli unification of Italy had left a deeply 
devastated land, first of all because of the abandonment of the 
agricultural activities and following famines that had reduced 
population in malnutrition conditions.   
After only fifteenth years of peace, in 568 another invasion 
upset the peninsula: directed by King Albonio, the Lombard after 
having given the Pannonia up, penetrated into Italy and extended the 
already existing scars brought by the previous war.  
For many years Italy was characterized by a follow one 
after the other military campaigns, single actions of guerrilla and 
short and unstable periods of peace. The crisis state of the Byzantine 
Empire even worsened the Italian conditions.  
In fact, the majority of the resources was finished in the 
previous  re-conquest campaign so that the Byzantine Empire was 
more concerned with the Persian threat than with the protection of 
the Italian peninsula.  
In such circumstances, the only institution able to face the 
incumbent Lombard pressure was the Church. This committed itself 
in defending Italy from the barbarians, directing military operations, 
negotiating peaces and prisoner  ransoms, and looking after people 
spoiled by war events.  
The best Church commitment  was represented by the 
direction of Gregorio Magno (590-604), whose pontificate coincided 
with the crucial period of the mentioned crisis. The Pope personally 
managed the military operations, appointed the captains of Nepi and 
Naples (592) garrisons, negotiated peaces and paid the ransoms to 
rescue prisoners,  replacing in these duties the absent Empire.    
Further, it is worth to underscore that Gregorio went 
beyond war and political actions: he attempted to relief the 
distresses of the victims caused by such situations, not only poor 
classes victims but also upper class ones.  
The Pope followed the latter purpose basically through 
charitable entities called diaconie, whose first evidences are 
contained in the Gregorio Magno Encyclical and whose name is 
thought to come from directly from the Greek verb diaconeo, which 
correspond to the Latin word Minister (to supply, to provide), 
therefore no linkage with the Latin word Diaconus which since the 
III century has referred to a particular Holy Order.  
The first diaconia certified in the Encyclical results to be 
located in Pesaro: in February 595  the Pope wrote to the notary of 
the Roman Church, Castorio, who was staying  in Ravenna as 
responsible of the local archbishop. The letter asked to Castorio to 
resolve a testamentary case-law occurring in Pesaro. Here, in fact, a 
certain Adeodato was died and had bequeathed all his properties to 
the poor.  
Difficulties showed up in relation to the execution of the 
will as some individual were eager to illegally take possession of the 
decuius resources.  
Castorio was therefore charged with ensuring the correct 
execution of the will and, therefore, with ensuring that the properties 
were donated to the local diaconia in order to be assigned to the 
assistance of poor. It is then clear that such diaconia was supported 
by private citizens legacies.   
Another diaconia is certified in the city of Naples: in 
March 600, the Pope Gregorio sent a letter to claim against the 
prefect of the “pretorio d’Italia”, Giovanni. The Pope argued that 
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Giovanni had suspended the supply of the annonae (foodstaff ) and 
of the consuetudines (cash money) destinated to the Napolitan 
diaconia.  
The Napoletan diaconia had not to be thought as depending 
on the financial administration of the province, directed by Giovanni: 
the argumentations of the Pope were indeed based on a custom 
rather on a administrative law irregularity.  
In December 600, Gregorio Magno appoint as director of 
another diaconia, whose location is not specified, the religious 
Giovanni. This looks like to be immune from the ecclesiastic and 
imperial authority control. The qualification of “religious” does not 
allow to establish if he was a lay or an ecclesiastic, as such term is 
employed by Gregorio for both the categories.  
The total immunity that Giovanni benefited seems to 
suggest that the diaconia did not depend on the Roman Church and 
for this reasons we would imagine he was a lay  man. As the 
diaconie of the Gregorio period did not belong to the imperial 
financial administration, probably these were institutes founded by 
local authorities and, because of their charitable purposes, they were 
under the protection of the Pope”.  
 
The discussion of Foresi [2001] other than underscoring the important role of the 
Church in providing assistance within the Italian peninsula, mentioned an institution that this 
study did not come across in occasion of the analysis of the English history: the diaconia.  
It seems these institutions were originally established in Egypt by the cenobitics for 
the  provision of social or public services.    
According to Bertolini [1947] the diaconie were  established in the Italian peninsula 
during the VI century and survived only until the VIII century. The reasons of such 
transplant were represented by the need of decentralized and independent institutions. In fact, 
the several ecclesiastic structures that had been existing since the early middle age, such as 
xenodochia, orphanotrophia, brephotrophia, nosocomia, gerontocomia, were all 
administered by the central office of the Church.   
  Thus, on one side the diaconiae actually exerted the same functions of their 
ecclesiastical parallels, that is supporting the poor, providing food and assistance. On the 
other side, the diaconiae differed from the ecclesiastical structures in that they were   
financed either by the State and by private or ecclesiastic legacies.  Moreover, even Pope 
Gregorio Magno demonstrated a certain favor for these institutions.  
However, it is still unclear who established and who administered them. They 
probably were established by the monastic orders and administered by some of these 
ecclesiastical officers.  
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In Rome the situation was different from the rest of the Italian territory. The 
diaconiae, were introduced only in the VII century and actually they took the name of 
monasteria diaconiae. In this case there are no doubts that they were created by monks who 
also elected the administrator. This was chosen among those that the monks deemed as the  
fittest to exert that kind of functions.  Although they had legal personality and, therefore, 
they were independent from the monasteries, their administrator was usually a monk of the 
monastery.   
The Church welcomed the independence of these institutions  for it was – for the first 
time –  experiencing very difficult financial situations.  
The monasteria diaconiae became even more fundamental in the following century 
(the VIII), when the Roman Government sought private resources for the provision of social 
services and when the Church had resolved its economic problems and decided to get 
directly involved in the administration of the diaconiae.  
Although the most important among the social/public services was the assistance and 
charity of the poor, the roman diaconiae – differently from the Egyptian-like ones – were 
concerned also with the other classes of the population that hardly succeeded to obtain 
foodstaff. By the end of the VIII century anyway the diaconiae were totally absorbed into 
the ecclesiastical system.  
 Differently from England, where in 1528-1536 King Henry VIII completed the 
process of Reformation and secularization of charity, in Italy the ecclesiastical system  
continued to exert a leading role in the provision of relief.   
This is demonstrated by a Terpstra [1994] article which told how in the period 
between 1490 and 1530 a small group of patrician families took control of the Bologna’s 
confraternital hostels, infirmaries, orphanages, and foundlings homes. In fact, set aside these 
forty years and the peculiar situation of Bologna city, that is apart such exception, since the 
early Middle Age the charity activity had always been exerted by the Church throughout the 
whole Italian territory.  
This meant that while in England the discipline of charity had to develop along with 
the need of ensuring a fair administration of the funds, in the Italian territory the Roman and 
Canon law remained more concerned with the right of the Church to obtain the 
administration of charity resources.  
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For example, in the Foresi [2001] account, one can identify the case that occurred in 
Pesaro in 595 when a certain Adeodato drafted a will according to which his son and his 
house servant were designated as heirs.   
 As they were still underage, the testator charged a certain Tommaso with being the 
executor of the heritage and with transferring it to the heirs as soon as they reached the legal 
age.  
Most importantly, the will contained a clause according to which if the heirs died 
when still underage, Tommaso would have had to give the properties to the poor. 
 As the heirs died before the legal age, certain people held that the will of the decuius 
could not be satisfied so that Tommaso was not legally permitted to administer the 
properties [Gregorio Magno, 595].  
 For this reason, Pope Gregorio Magno sent a letter to his Notary Castorio asking him 
to protect and to defend Tommaso for this succeeding to comply with the Adeodato will. In 
addition, in his letter the Pope specified that there were some rumors about the fact that 
Tommaso was meant to buy something in the Diaconia established in the city and urged 
Castorio to do his best for allowing Tommaso to accomplish such task.  
 It is clear how the request of Pope Gregorio Magno did not aim at enforcing 
Tommaso obligation to employ Adeodato resources on behalf of the poor. Rather, the 
intention of the Pope  was to make the resources flowing into the Diaconia, that is an 
institution which presented strong linkages with the Church.  Since the early Middle Age, 
therefore, the concern of the Church remained to devise legal solutions to ensure that 
charitable bequests did not remain in secular hands.  
This did not represent an easy task for the Church. The figure of Tommaso, in fact, 
as a person between the testator and the heirs was not conceivable under the Roman Law. 
Tommaso was a tutor of the heritance, but such qualification of tutor had not to be meant in 
a legal sense.  
The Roman Law institutes that the most approached to the function of the tutor were 
the fedecommesso and the  legacy burdened by a modus. 
 The first was an institute according to which the testator begged the heir or the 
beneficiary of a legacy to do something on behalf of another person. The second implied a 
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legacy whose function was to involve an action on behalf of the testator itself (for example 
to pay the funeral, burying etc.).   
This means that according to the Roman Law, Tommaso had to be necessarily  
considered as a heir or as a legatee. The problem for the Church was just the fact that both 
the heir and the legatee had only a moral obligation to comply with the intentions of the 
donors.  
The Church therefore had to devise a new legal institute capable to render 
enforceable the obligations of the tutors.  
Initially,   the Church codified a Canon Law rule according to which the bishops had 
the right to enforce the fideicommissarios. Yet the ecclesiastical authority actually never 
exerted a right of control. Rather, very often the testator expressly forbade the bishop to 
interfere into the function of the will [Melchiorre, 1913].  
 Thus, to contrast the excessive powers of selfish tutors, the Church introduced the 
institute of the esecutore testamentario. In particular, according to the Capitulum XIX 
Titulus XVI of the Liber Extra (1234), that is a collection of Canon law rules published 
thank to the intervention of Pope Gregorio IX, the “exsecutor testamentarius, qui suscepit 
illud officium, exsequi compellitur”. 
 On one side the introduction of this legal institute did actually facilitate the Church in 
obtaining resources to be destined for charitable purpose; on the other side, it did not prove 
as capable as the English trust to be employed to constitute secular charitable institutions.  
In fact, while at first glance, the figure of the esecutore testamentario could in many 
respects resemble the figure of the trustee, there were fundamental differences because of 
which secular charitable institutions proliferated in England whereas in Italy they did not.  
As underscored by Manes [2002] both the institutes involved fiduciary obligations, 
both were concerned with the administration of properties on behalf of third parties, both 
implied the split of the personal properties from the properties received in trust.  
  Yet, there were crucial differences which were related to this third aspect. 
To begin with, the trustee at common law was the legal owner of the properties while the 
esectuore testamentario had only the possession of them.  
 In particular, the trust fund (or the trust assets) involved a complex of legal 
relationships which, although belonging to the trustee, because of their specific purpose 
202 
 
were considered by the law as distinguished from all the other legal relationships belonging 
to the trustee himself [De Guglielmini, 2006].  The Canon Law also treated the assets 
entrusted to the esecutore testamentario as distinguished by his personal properties, but this 
only to the extent to which personal his personal creditors might not boast any claim on the 
bequests. The legal owners of the latter were indeed the heirs. Thus, if the testator had 
indicated that an executor would have had to administer the goods on behalf of the poor, as 
the poor could not be the owner for they were an uncertain class, then the heir would have 
been the Church. 
 Thus, it is clear that the institute of trust allowed testators (but also donators) to 
entrust their properties to secular trustees who, for they were legal owners, would not have 
had any legal questions with the heirs (if any designated) and would have complied with the 
intentions of the testators only according to their personal good sense.  
 Most importantly, the institute of trust would have permitted the perpetuity of the 
charitable donation. It is true a donation could be represented by different objects. For 
example, the donor could simply require to the trustee to employ the £ 500 to buy food for 
the poor of the county. In that case, he would not have established a permanent charitable 
trust, rather this would have finished once the sum had been spent. The donor could also 
device lands or incomes stemming from these for charitable purposes and not provide any 
term in the will/deed. In cases like these, the settlor would have specified not only who were 
the trustees but also the mechanisms to perpetuate the control over the charity. In case the 
donor did not mention anything about that, still the survivors of the trustees, as heirs, would 
have taken the control of the charity. Whereas this was not possible or the survivors did not 
want to, the Court of Chancery would have thought to fill the vacuum up.  
 The perpetuity of the charity was therefore rendered possible by the peculiar legal 
nature of the property which could pass from a hand to another, still it remained burdened by 
the charitable intentions of the donors.  
 As seen, this could not be obtained through the institute of esecutore testamentario 
as the Church would have advanced a claim stating its right of succession.  
Still  a citizen of the Roman Republic or the pagan Empire who wished to found or to 
endow a hospital, an almshouse, or a school, could (only) do so by indirect means.  
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  This indirect mean was represented by the bequest on behalf of already established 
“corporations” as they were for example the towns or more in the past the collegia, solidated 
and universitates.  Since these “corporations” were permanent institutions, then bequests on 
their behalf would have lasted for all their existence.  
Of course, as one would easily imagine, another solution for instituting secular 
“charitable trusts” was represented by establishing a foundation. Yet, foundation is a legal 
concept whose meaning is as new as the legal personality of corporations.  
The institute of foundation had to involve the acknowledgment of the legal 
personality on behalf of the assets entrusted to a secular administrator. The late middle age   
Roman Law was still not that theoretic for accomplishing this important step. Only physical 
persons could be subject of private law. In fact, the towns, collegia, solidated and 
universitates mentioned above, represented a very exception for these were kind of public 
institutions.  
Sanfilippo [2002] maintained that in the late middle age, the Canon Law set the basis 
for the personification of the assets – universitas bonorum – in relation to the already 
discussed pious causes. By the way the concept of foundation was introduced in Italy only 
with the civil code of 1942.  
  The strong influence of the Church and the lack of a proper legal device to establish 
secular charitable entities were the fundamental cause for which the non-profit sector 
maintained in Italy an extended religious charity dimension until the unification occurred in 
1861. 
 Such historical event brought somehow the same consequences that had brought the 
process of Reformation in 1533-1536.  
 In fact, also in Italy the government began to pass laws aimed at expropriating 
Church properties.  
 The first of these laws was decided in 1866. This led to the expropriation of about 
1,800 religious institutes and allocated the relevant properties to local public authorities. 
 The second law was passed in 1867 and other 25,000 institutions saw their estates 
confiscated and sold at auction.  
 A third and last law even more reduced the influence of the Catholic Church on 
Italian society and created a welfare system controlled by the State.  It was approved in 1890 
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and became known as the Crispi law, after the prime minister in office when the law was 
passed [Barbetta, 2000]. 
 The Crispi law subjected the Opere Pie that provided  health, welfare, educational 
and vocational training services to governmental control.  
  The attempt made with these laws to secularize Italian society was nevertheless far 
from being sufficient; in fact the religious élite and the welfare services that they managed 
retained a considerable degree of autonomy in the decades  that followed.  
   Such autonomy was actually secured during the fascist period on the basis of the 
agreement that Church and State reached in 1929 (Patti Lateranensi).  
 In the matter of facts, what happened was that the religious institutions acquired a 
semi-public religious/secular status.  
   The very great difference with the Reformation promoted by Henry VIII during the 
XVI century was that in England, the Statute of Charitable Uses set the legal basis for 
establishing private secular charity.  Also in Italy the attempt was to secularize charity, yet 
the secularization did not go towards the private side, rather towards a major involvement of 
the Government into charity activities.  To sum up, while in England the poor laws aimed at 
establishing a private-public partnership, in Italy the 1860-1890 laws and the Patti 
Lateranensi aimed basically at centralize the charity services in the hands of the State.  
 Along with the “Italian Reformation”, the pre-modern era conception according to 
which the “needy” were defined as those suffering poverty when this gives rise to extreme 
and generic manifestations of distress changed dimension. In fact, the needy became to be 
defined according to their more specific manifestations: war and labor invalidity, old age, 
unemployment and hardships of children, that is pathologies whose cure had to rely with the 
intervention of the State.  
 At least from a legal point of view, this pure public dimension of charity lasted until 
the adoption of the new Constitution in 1948, where at art. 38 the freedom to provide social 
services was finally acknowledged.  
 The constitutional article actually was expected to automatically abrogate the Crispi 
law whose art. 1 expressly prohibited to private bodies to provide social services. Yet, this 
did not happen until the 1998 as, according to Cavaleri [in Barbetta, 1997], “the 
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contradiction was tolerated for so long by the Church as the Crispi law itself had provided 
IPABs with many advantages”.  
 The Istituzioni Pubbliche di Assistenza e Beneficienza represented in fact the 
nationalization of the Opere Pie, but far from being “secularized”, they substantially 
continued to be run by ecclesiastical authorities in accordance with governmental directions.  
 The freedom of establishing private and secular charitable institutions consecrated by 
a constitutional norm and the civil code discipline on the foundations and associations 
theoretically set the basis for the development of a new non-profit sector in Italy.  
 Yet, this did not actually happen.  
 The non-profit sector in Italy is one of the smallest if considered on a world-wide 
dimension. Its employees represent under 2 percent of total employment, and the sector’s 
share is estimated at 1.1 percent of the GDP. The Italian sector does have a significant 
number of volunteers, whose hours increase total employment to 3 percent [Hodgkinson, 
1999].  
 The Italian tradition that has seen a significant participation of the State in the 
provision of social services must be taken in consideration for explaining the increase, 
although as already mentioned small, of the private and secular non-profit sector since the 
70’s.  
 In fact, in that period there was the first real crisis of the social state whose lack of 
resources obliged to rely on private efforts for replacing the provision of social services. 
Literature [Borzaga and Fazzi, 2000] has defined that period as the period of contribution, 
meaning that the public authorities chose to support private non-profit organizations in way 
that did not actually comply with stable and rationally defined criteria. In other words, the 
governmental units used to finance the non-profit supplier in consideration of the generic 
social utility of the provided services. 
 Since the 80s’ onwards, the period of contribution gave way to the period of contract, 
that is a more rational and scientific way to finance private non-profit institutions. This 
strategy would have implied competition among the suppliers and, thank to the contractual 
specifications, it would have reduced the agency problems – related to both efficacy and 
efficiency – between the State and the organization itself.  
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   The  participation of the State in the financing of non-profit organizations uncovers 
the different role played by the Italian non-profit sector in comparison with the US one. In 
particular, in Italy non-profit organizations are more likely called to resolve the government 
failure  described by Weisbroad [1988 ], while in the US they are more bent to resolve the 
market failure described by Hansmann [1981].  
  This difference is extremely important in relation to the agency problems whereas 
one considers that the State – as patron  – might have different interests from those of the 
US donors and consumers.   
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§ 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
§2.1  Functional Approach 
 
 In chapter III it has been introduced the approach aimed at uncovering the interests 
involved in the non-profit corporation. In particular, setting out from the general definition 
of the interest provided by Jaeger – that is a “relationship acknowledged by the law” –, 
through the functional and structural approach it has been studied which relationships are or 
should be acknowledged by the law within the corporate context. Put it differently, the 
investigation on the legal nature of the corporation, had to disclose the interests involved.  
 This approach cannot be adopted if one has the objective of finding out which are 
the interests that directors have to pursue within Italian non-profit organizations. That is 
because, in Italy, as in all the civil law countries, legal persons are not distinguished on the 
basis of the process of incorporation, rather on the notion of causa.     
Hence one has two consequences.  
To begin with, to have legal personality in the United States means inevitably that 
one has a corporation, whereas to have legal personality in Italy means many things. For 
example one can have a foundation, association, società per azioni, società a responsabilità 
limitata, impresa sociale, cooperative, etc.: all these represent different legal 
structures/schemes.  
 The second is that while in the US the legal dimension of the interests identified 
through the functional approach – the investigation on the role of the non-profit sector – 
must be supported by the theories on the nature of corporation, in Italy the legal dimension 
of the interests identified through the functional approach must be supported by the legal 
device adopted in a certain circumstance. In other words, while in US the role (and so the 
interests) of non-profit sector is in function of the theories of the corporation, in Italy it 
happens just the other way round: the theories of the legal device adopted to constitute a 
certain non-profit are in function of the role of the non-profit sector.  
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That means in Italy, the choice of the legal device shall depend on the role exerted by 
the non-profit sector. In fact, once identified the legal devices through the study of the role 
of the non-profit sector, the structural analysis of those shall reveal which are the interests 
involved.  
In order to have a general understanding of the role of the Italian non-profit sector, it 
must be noted that in Italy there are around 221.000 non-profit organizations  whereas in the 
US the number is approximately 1,5 million54. 
Despite the great difference in terms of quantity, there is a very important aspect 
which is common to the two countries.  This is the circumstance for which the institutions 
that generate more incomes are hospitals, schools and social service organizations. The latter 
anyway represent just a small percentage if compared with the first two. Moreover, in both 
the countries, these structures represent a minor share in terms of quantity of established 
units.      
Another meaningful observation regards the non-profit impact on the GDP. In the US 
it accounts for 5.2% while 8.3% of paid salaries and wages. In Italy, the impact on the GDP 
is 2.1% while 1.8% of the employment55.  
These data already suggest that the Italian non-profit sector does not occupy an 
important share in the market. This is supported also by what has been said in the previous 
paragraph, that is the fact that the existence of Italian non-profit organizations is better 
explained on the basis of a government failure rather than a market failure theory.  
In particular, the government failure in the education field represents a phenomenon 
that only lately has shown up.  
Especially important is the situation concerning the Universities. In Italy the 
Universities have been normally public institutions. The private ones have presented a 
strong public authority interference. Just to give a quick example, the by-laws of a famous 
private University, the LUISS Guido Carli, at art. 3 clearly establishes that the supervision 
of the activities is exerted by the Minister of Education.  
                                                 
54 See http://foundationcenter.org/getstarted/faqs/html/howmany.html and 
http://www.oltreventure.com/public/files/il%20non%20profit%20in%20italia.pdf  
55 See http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/311373_nonprofit_sector.pdf and  
http://www.espertidi.it/it/info.php/view/noprofit  
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According to the art.  6 of the  Legge 9 Maggio, 1989, the Universities, either public 
or private are disciplined by statutory provisions that make express  reference, other than 
their own by-laws and internal regulations.  The Act, moreover, at art. 1 specifies that 
Universities have legal personality under art. 33 of the Constitution of the Republic. The 
Italian Universities therefore have a special legal status that can be defined as “cultural 
institution” as provided by art. 1 of the LUISS by-laws.  
 However, this situation might change very soon. In fact, the regular inefficiencies of 
the public structures have reached an unsustainable degree after the global financial crises.  
The impossibility for the Italian government to further intervene for the restoration of the 
financial stability has led policy makers to adopt the art. 16 of the Decreto Legge 19 
Dicembre 2009 according to which public Universities can be transformed in private 
foundation.  
 This is the first example that demonstrates how the role of the non-profit sector (to 
replace the state in its fundamental duties) identifies and suggests which legal structures 
could best express its functions.  
 The functional approach in relation to the University field would therefore lead to 
identify the interests involved through the investigation on the nature of the foundation, with 
the important reminder that so far the transformation has not taken place yet.  
 Another example of how the non-profit sector has suggested and selected legal 
devices still concerns the field of education, and in particular the primary, secondary and 
high school education.  
 In fact, also this sector of the education has normally been characterized by a public 
administration. This is proved by the fact that until the decision of the  Legge, 10 Marzo 
2000, n. 62,   private schools could not issue diploma with legal validity.  They could offer 
educational courses but the students would have had to sit before a public panel in order to 
obtain a legal diploma.  
 The above mentioned Act actually represented a chance for entrepreneurs to 
penetrate deeper or to start a business into the market of lower education.  
Differently from the legislation concerning the University, the law did not mention or 
choose any particular legal structure, neither it mandated private schools to have a “non-
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profit” status. Yet, those firms that would have presented the latter, would have received a 
special fiscal treatment.  
Also as regards the health care sector the government failure is nearer and nearer. In 
particular, a political debate on the need to adequate the public hospital performances to the 
changed demand of health has been hold among policy makers. The demand in fact goes 
more and more beyond the simple first necessity services. The debate sets forth the necessity 
to implement a serious process of reorganization of the structures, introducing managerial 
criteria that allow to ensure a high quality and great quantity of services/goods.  
 The solution might well be represented by “going private” as in the case of 
University and lower education schools. Therefore, the legal model to be referred would be 
represented by the foundation.   
 Yet, a very important remark has to be made in relation to the health care. The right 
to the health indeed is by no means the most fundamental among the rights ensured by the 
Italian Constitution. The right of health is the only one expressly labeled as “fundamental 
right” (art. 32 Cost.).  
 This means that insomuch the health goes private, the State shall be always expect to 
maintain the primary role in providing such service.  
 Along with this perspective, the model proposed by Bellezza, Meneguzzo and 
Zanetta [NoYearSpecified] is defined as Fondazione di Partecipazione, that is a foundation 
participated by the State as well as by private economic actors.  
 The preoccupation underscored by the authors in elaborating such model resembles 
the one already detached in US non-profit corporation, that is the one characterized by a 
conflict of culture which renders very hard the identification of an equilibrium between 
efficacy and efficiency.  
 In fact, the model implies a foundation administered by public and private subjects. 
The foundation shall constitute a profit-seeking company and shall hold the majority of the 
shares. The rest of the shares shall be distributed among the investors. The constituted 
company shall of course provide the health care services.   
  On one side the foundation’s control shall ensure the respect of the public and social 
values from the company. On the other side, the presence of investors in the economic 
structure of the company shall exert the necessary pressure to keep the firm efficient.  
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 The capacity of the legal device foundation of being adapted for the efficient 
administration of schools, universities and hospitals is basically due to the change of its 
function. 
 In fact, whereas foundations were traditionally marked by a charitable element, since 
the ‘50s their by-laws more and more often began to contain clauses that other than 
identifying a public purpose, indicated a strong involvement of the founders into the 
administration. 
 As Zoppini [1999] reminded, from a concept of Fondazione-Erogatore (“Supplying 
–Foundation”) the legal literature commenced to speak about Fondazione-Organizzazione 
(“Organizational Foundation”). Such expressions aimed indeed at specifying that from 
foundations that represented just an asset established mortis causa and bound to a charitable 
scope, the attention had to be focused on the foundations constituted by business firms 
through inter vivos acts for egoistic purposes rather than charitable.  
 The change of the function of the foundation leads to two observations: 
a) it confirms the above mentioned thesis according to which in Italy the role of the 
non-profit sector chooses and defines the legal device. In fact, in the United States 
the concept of corporation has not experienced a change. The institutional or 
contractarian theories represent established points of view: even if the institutional 
scholars have always thought the corporation as an institution while the 
contractarians as a contract, the function itself of the corporation has never changed. 
Thus, in the US the employment of the corporate structure from non-profit 
organizations meaningfully shapes the interests involved, whereas in Italy the 
interests are determined by the causa of the contract or the legal act.  Therefore, if 
the causa of the act of foundation was to pursue charitable purposes, the interests 
involved shall be different from those involved in a foundation whose cause was 
represented by (also) an egoistic purpose; 
b) it confirms the non-applicability of the theories on corporation to identify the 
interests involved in the Italian non-profit sector. In particular, the discussion on the 
legal personality must be taken into consideration only to the extent to which it 
allows the foundation to act as a person. The ideas of fictio juris or real person can 
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not be employed for identifying the interests involved as they specifically referred to 
corporations, that is structures with a well defined function.   
 
The last field of the non-profit sector included into those that generate more incomes 
is represented by units that provide social services. These firms are normally constituted as 
social cooperatives and their role is represented by mutual benefit.   
 
§ 2.2 Structural Approach 
 
 As seen in the previous paragraph one of the legal devices identified by the role of 
the non-profit sector is represented by the foundation.  
 Soon it can be observed a fundamental difference between the US and Italian legal 
concept of foundation.  
 Whereas in the first country the foundation not necessarily has a legal personality, in 
Italy a foundation must be a legal person.  
 The reasons of such difference are evidently related to the existence of the trust 
institute. This common law device in fact renders possible a separation of ownership rights 
according to which certain assets of an individual shall be – obviously, in case of 
foundations – characterized by burdens concerning the administration. 
 As this separation of ownership cannot be conceived by a civil law system, then the 
solution is represented by acknowledging the asset itself with the legal personality and, 
therefore, rendering it capable to be subject of rights and obligations.  
 Although the difference is very crucial, the fact that US foundations normally apply 
for incorporating renders more feasible the comparative study with Italian foundations. In 
other words, it is possible to verify if the Italian legal personality of the foundations and the 
US corporate foundations imply legal differences in relation to the interests to be pursued.  
 To begin with, the acknowledgement from the Italian order of the legal personality 
implies both the limited liability of the administrators56and the accountability of the latter to 
the organization [art. 18 Codice Civile]  just like it has been provided by  § 717 of the New 
                                                 
56 See DPR 10 febbraio 2000, n. 361 
 
213 
 
York Not-for-Profit Corporation Act or Section 8.30 Revised Model Non-Profit Corporation 
Act. 
 In order to establish when directors are accountable to the foundation it is therefore 
necessary to identify which are the interests – the “legal relationships acknowledged by the 
law” – implied by such legal device.  
 It is true, before the adoption of the D.P.R. 10 Febbraio, 361/2000, it was possible to 
constitute a foundation only by obtaining the concession of the public authority. Such an 
approach involved that the interests to be pursue had necessarily to be public [Nuzzo, 2006].  
With the adoption of the mentioned Act, foundations acquire legal personality simply 
by filing in the registro delle persone giuridiche, assumed that the scope is lawful, possible 
and that the amount of the assets is sufficient to pursue the scope itself.  Put it differently, 
the foundation may now pursue whatever scope.  
Thus, if the by-laws confers to the foundation a traditional (charitable) function – 
fondazione erogatrice –, then the administrators shall manage the funds in the interests of an 
indefinite class of beneficiaries; if the by-laws confers to the foundation a egoistic function – 
fondazione organizzazione – then the duties of the directors shall be due to the a well 
definite class of beneficiaries who are normally represented by the funders.  
 This ductility of the legal device foundation depends on the fact that differently from 
the Internal Revenue Code, according to which foundations (must) pursue charitable 
purposes, the Civil Code does not longer give any hint about the purpose for which the fund 
has been established.  Hints were actually provided by articles 12, 16 paragraph 3, 17, 23, 
25, 26, 27 paragraph 3, 28, 31 of the Civil Code; yet, after the adoption of the DPR 
361/2000, some of these have been abrogated; the surviving ones, being now systematically 
interpreted with the DPR provisions, cannot be red as to express public interests anymore.   
 These observations clearly demonstrate how the Italian discipline dedicates now less 
attention to the public dimension of the foundation structure.  
Suppose for example that an American entrepreneur decides to establish a hospital 
and to envisage in the by-laws the NDC for she thinks the this clause, as Hansmann [1981] 
suggests, shall provide to the firm a competitive advantage. As seen, for the law, the NDC 
plus the charitable purpose shall characterize the firm as a foundation. Moreover, the 
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complexity of the activity shall lead the entrepreneur to incorporate, so that one has a 
corporate foundation.  
 According to Hansmann [1981], and to the contractarians of the non-profit sector,  
the interests that have to be protected are only those represented by the quality and quantity 
of the goods/services. These interests basically belong to the donors (a future buyers) and to 
the consumers, as buyers.  
 Such an approach would imply that self-dealing transactions, short term and anti-
workers decisions cannot be challenged so long as the output is ensured. In addition, 
according to this approach, the only person that could have an interest to initiate this kind of 
challenges would the Public Attorney. Donors and consumers, indeed, are supposed to be 
interested into the firms’ output.  
 Yet, the belief that donors do not do benevolence as future buyers of the 
services/goods and that the choice of the private entrepreneur to employ a non-profit 
structure cannot deny the very nature of the foundation, can be supported on a legal 
background.  
 In particular, the statutory duty of the director to follow the interest of the 
corporation, the statutory provision that identifies in the foundation a charitable element and, 
finally, the unquestionable public dimension of the charitable purpose that derives from the 
definition offered by the old Statute of Charitable Uses 1601, would allow the Public 
Attorney, and in particular cases also the other stakeholders, to challenge an economic-based 
managerial decision taken in detriment of the non-profit efficiency.  
 This solution could not be devised on the basis of Italian law. Similarly to the US 
entrepreneur, the Italian entrepreneur can establish a foundation to provide health care 
services. Also in this case the choice of a non-profit entity depends on the fact that the 
NDC 57  can ensure a higher level of output in terms of quantity and quality with the 
consequence that the structure proves an ideal partner for the State in filling the vacuum left 
by the government failure.  
 Whereas the directors of such foundation take decisions of the kind quoted above, it 
is going to be very hard to challenge them for they do legally not jeopardize any interest.  
                                                 
57 It is interesting to note that the NDC for foundation is only implicitly envisaged by the Civil Code. The norm 
can be drawn from an ex adverso reading of art. 2247 of the Civil Code.  
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 The interests involved in the Italian legal device foundation, in fact result to be only those 
envisaged by the by-laws and, in particular, by the causa of the act.  
  The causa of the act is to provide health services, therefore so long as the foundation 
provides health services nobody could claim a violation of interest.  
 The only public dimension of the Italian foundation is represented by the supervisory 
role exerted by the governmental authority under the art. 25 of the Civil Code. The norm 
establishes that the public authority can remove and appoint another director when this is 
found liable for not having complied with the purpose of the foundation.  
 Whereas such action is promoted by a public authority, still it does not imply that the 
interest meant to be protected is public. If the scope of the foundation is represented by 
providing health care services, the public authority shall initiate claims only when it realizes 
that directors have failed to comply with their duties.  
 The reasons for which such action relies in the hand of a public authority are simply 
due to the unowned character of foundations.    
 To sum up, where US legal order provides the structural support for identifying 
further interests than those concerning the purpose of the corporation, the Italian seems to be 
very bound to the notion of causa and, for this reason, it protect only the interests that the 
causa represents. Therefore, where it is hard to protect stakeholder interests in a socially, 
ethically and altruistically responsible conduct of a foundation established by a private party 
meant to obtain peculiar advantages, it shall be easier to protect the mentioned interests in a 
foundation established for the traditional purpose. In fact, as in this latter case, the causa 
would be represented by to do benefit on behalf of the community, then managers are 
expected to consider the output purpose on the same level of the respect of social values in 
occasion of the organizational decisions.  
 
§ 3. The “Impresa Sociale” 
 
 The Code Civil discipline of foundations basically reflects the same problem deeply 
discussed in the chapter about the US non-profit role,that is distinguishing a non-profit 
organization from a business one only with regards to the NDC. 
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 While in the United States such risk has been averted by relying on the legal concept 
of corporation and the relevant directors duties, in Italy the protection of the very nature of 
the non-profit sector would have been possible only by a legislative intervention.  
 This exigency was felt by the legislative power which, having considered the worsen 
of the government failure, thought opportune the State to be flanked by firms that would 
have pursued the same interests of the public firms.   
Thus, through the adoption of the d.lgs. n. 155, 2006, the Parliament introduced the 
institute of “impresa sociale”. 
 According to some literature [Racugno, 2009] the legislation did not actually 
introduce a new model of firm, yet the documents of the preparatory studies accomplished 
by the Italian parliament affirm the contrary: the “impresa sociale” would set forth a new 
“company model”. 
  It is true, the second remark would prove more correct. In fact, in the opinion of Prof. 
Diego Corapi [2002 and 2003], the current Italian commercial law focuses on a distinction 
between types and models.  
The types are those legal institutions that are clearly defined by mandatory rules. So, 
in civil law systems, the società per azioni, the società a responsabilità limitata, the 
fondazione, the associazione, all represent organizational types for their fundamental 
features are compulsorily envisaged by law.  
The models represent the configurations that the types may present and, for this 
reasons, they are defined by default rules. 
For example, according to the Italian Civil Code, the type società per azioni, other 
than mandatory rules that define its structure, i.e. the presence of a board of directors, the 
legal personality, the transferability of shares, etc. may be configured as a dualistic model, 
monistic model, or traditional model. It is up to the parties to choose one or the other model 
according to their preferences.  
It is true, the “impresa sociale” does not introduce a new type of corporation, rather a 
model. In fact, all the corporation types might adopt the impresa sociale as a model.  
Therefore, the type foundation, whose fundamental mandatory rule is represented by the 
existence of a fund which is burdened, may well represent an “impresa sociale” if the 
founders choose it as a model.  
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As quoted above, the choice of the “impresa sociale” model confers to the 
foundation a public dimension that would attract a meaningful number of interests which, in 
turn, would flank the charitable purpose represented by the high quality and great quantity of 
services/goods provided.  
To begin with, the model “impresa sociale” establishes the fundamental principle 
according to which the appointment of the directors can not be reserved for subjects who are 
external to the firm. The rationale of the norm can be explained by the following example. 
Suppose that an entrepreneur wants to take advantage of the government failure and to 
establish her own foundation. To look more trustworthy to the State, she chooses to adopt 
the “impresa sociale” model. Now, she has two solutions. The first one is to appoint 
directors which are also directors in the business firm which she controls. Such choice is 
expected to not be successful since the public authority, which maintains the right of 
supervision, might deny the “impresa sociale” status whereas it notes that the foundation 
was actually established for personal purposes. The second choice for the entrepreneur is to 
choice directors which have a high reputation in terms of social and ethical values. In that 
way she would deserve the acknowledgment of the public authority and it would be 
effectively working as an “impresa sociale”. Now, if the legislation had not provided the 
above mentioned prohibition, the entrepreneur, once obtained the qualification of impresa 
sociale for her foundation, could well provide in the foundation by-laws that she – or her 
firm – would have appointed the subsequent directors. This possibility would have brought 
into the foundation what earlier has been defined as a conflict of cultures.  
To secure and corroborate the just described principle, the legislation provides that 
directors compulsorily must comply with high parameters of honorability, professionalism 
and independence.  
Very important is then the norm that mandate the imprese sociali with more than: 
a) 50 employees; 
b) 7.300.000 Euro of profits; 
c) 3.650.000 of assets 
to include a supervisory board (collegio sindacale).  
 This norm is particularly important from a comparative law perspective. In fact, also 
concerning US non-profit corporations, some part of literature has promoted the idea to 
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apply business corporations requirements to non-profit ones. In particular, for this literature 
has suggested to apply the SOX Act to non-profit corporations [Foye in Gilkeson, 2007].  
Just as the Italian “imprese sociali” also US non-profit corporations would therefore 
be subject to the audit committee verifications.  In addition, the application of the SOX 
would mandate non-profit corporations to hire an external auditing firm that would control 
the financial year books.  
Of course, whereas the idea of extending the SOX Act to non-profit corporations is 
accepted by policy makers, for sure the law shall provide some minimum parameters 
regarding size, workers and assets.  
Anyway, it must be observed that normally the audit committees’ verifications, 
accomplished either by the internal and by the external one, would not actually concern the 
managerial decisions concerning the corporate policies. In fact, the audit committee is not 
expected to control if the managers do a short-term or a long term choice. Rather, the audit 
committee is more tailored for preventing abuses. 
In other words, the establishment of audit committees would be more successful in 
reducing the agency costs related to misappropriation of money, that is a problem which in 
the non-profit sector has concerned much more the US than Italy.  
This explains why the art. 11 of the d.lgs. n. 155 provides that the internal auditors 
have an affirmative duty to make verifications also in relation to the accomplishment of the 
purposes and social values promoted by the organization as they are clearly understandable 
from the reading of the Act.  
 Another extremely important norm that defines the interests involved in the “impresa 
sociale” model is the one provided by art. 12 that mandate the participation of the workers 
into the administration of the firm.  
  The described mandatory rules of the default model “impresa sociale” are not the 
sole aspect that would confer to the foundation a public dimension.  
The further aspect is in fact implied by the legislation. In particular, the adoption of 
the model would render possible the application of the institutional theories of corporation. 
It is true, it has been seen how the Italian Civil Code distinguished the organizations 
disciplined in the Libro I (Associazioni, Fondazioni and Comitati) from those disciplined in 
the Libro V on the basis of causa, that is the distribution of firms’ profits among the 
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participant in the social capital.  According to this distinction, indeed, the corporate types 
società per azioni,   società a responsabilità limitata could never be employed for purposes 
that would have not envisaged a distribution of profits. In other words, a società per azioni 
could never be a non-profit organization. This limitation of the Italian discipline was 
basically due to the fact that the causa of these types was represented by a “subjective 
profit” and not by an “objective” one.  
The difference between these two kind of profit is represented by the fact that the 
second regards the profit of the firm.  
Therefore, with the adoption of the d.lgs., the legislative power has introduced for the first 
time an organizational model whose causa is represented by the objective profit, reducing 
meaningfully the distance between the types disciplined in Libro I and Libro V.  
Now, if the causa of the foundation which has been established as “impresa sociale” 
is represented by the profit of the firm, it means that the firm becomes entitled to boast an 
interest. 
The legal personality of the “impresa sociale” plays the same role of the legal 
personality studied in occasion of the discussion about the theories of corporation.  
It is true, the common law concept of corporation has normally been associated with 
civil law types such as società per azioni, società a responsabilità limitata, that is subjective 
profit seeking complex organizations. Thus, all the theories of corporation had to apply only 
to these structures.  
Yet, already with the coming into force of the EU law, the concept of corporation 
began to be associated with the concept of firm rather than subjective profit seeking 
organization. In fact, art. 48 of the Treaty established that “companies or firms’ means 
companies or firms constituted under civil or commercial law, including cooperative 
societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private law, save for those which are 
non-profit-making”. 
          The last sentence “save for those which are non-profit-making” is, obviously, to be 
meant as that each organization is to be regarded as a company if it carries on economic 
activities, regardless of whether such organization has a non-distribution constraint [Hopt, 
2006].  
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To conclude, if the foundations established as “impresa sociale” are firms and firms are 
companies, then it is possible to apply the institutional theories of the corporation to such 
entities with the consequence that directors duties shall be due also to the foundation itself.  
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§ 4. Agency Costs and Legal Protection of Patrons 
  
The different role exerted by US and Italian non-profit organizations implies a likely 
different arising of agency problems. 
To begin with, it is a question of relationships. While the US market failure role involves 
that resources are for the most provided by private parties, as donors or consumers, the 
Italian government failure role involves that the majority of the finances are provided by the 
State.   
 This means that the agency problems related to fiduciary aspects are more 
pronounced in the US than Italy. In the latter country, in fact, the State uses to establish 
contracts with non-profit organizations and, therefore, it succeeds to exert a more incisive 
control regarding the appointment of directors.  Thus, in American non-profits patrons do 
not appoint directors, in Italian ones they do or at least they have the possibility of indicating 
them.  
 Maybe that explains why non-profit scandals involving misappropriation of money 
(so fiduciary aspects) such as the United Way,  the Association for Cancer Research, the 
Foundation for Peace and Justice, Toys for Tots, Irish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Children, and the National Baptist Convention  [Gilkeson, 2007 and Gibelman, 2000] 
have not so far threaten the Italian non-profit sector. Actually, if that shall happen the 
problems to be studied shall be more concerned with the corruption of public official rather 
than agency problems among private parties.  
 Set aside this difference, it can be hold that the problems not concerned with the 
fiduciary aspects, as for example diligence and competence, present the same characteristics: 
in particular, either in the US and Italian non-profits, it is rather difficult for directors to find 
equilibrium between efficacy and efficiency.  
 As seen, legal standards are expected – rather, the judicial application of legal 
standards is expected – to drive directors to take the most appropriate decision. While in 
common law jurisdictions there exists a clear as well as traditional distinction between duty 
of loyalty and duty of care, diligence and skill, in civil law jurisdictions this difference has 
been “acknowledged” only lately.  
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In France, for example, two decisions of the Supreme Court de Cassation have set the duty 
of loyalty: 
a) Cour de Cassation 27/02/1996, JCP éd. G 1996 II, n. 22 665 – in this case a director 
bought an amount of shares of the not listed company he himself used to run; he paid 
each share 3.000 Francs and, some days after, he sold them at 8.000 francs each. The 
commercial Chamber considered that the director broke his duty of loyalty owed to 
individual shareholders to the extent to which he did not disclose any information; 
b) Cour de Cassation 24/02/1998, JCP éd. E 1998 n. 17, 637 – in this case a company 
director resigned and then he incorporated a newco trying to involve the best 
employees of the company he used to run. The tribunal acknowledged liability for 
damages to the company on the basis of a breach of a duty of loyalty owed to the 
company itself.   
In Portugal, the acknowledgement of the distinction between the duty of loyalty and duty of 
care, diligence and skill has instead occurred through legislative provisions. The former 
article 64, labeled as duty of diligence, of the Codigo das Sociedades Comerciais, provided: 
“Managers, administrators, or directors of a company have to execute their functions with 
the diligence of judicious and businesslike man, in the interest of the company, and taking 
into consideration the interests of the shareholders as well as the workers”. 
According to the new article 64 labeled as Fundamental Duties, “managers or administrators 
of a company must comply with: 
a) Duty of care …; 
b) Duty of loyalty…; 
In Germany, the AktG makes just a minor reference to the duty of loyalty; in other words it 
provides the duty of loyalty only indirectly: § 88 hinders the competition between the 
director and the company he/she runs; § 93 prescribes a duty of confidentiality. Yet, legal 
literature and legal doctrine hold that a duty of loyalty does exist, as demonstrated by the 
Introduction to the German Code of Corporate Governance [Gomes, 2007]. In general, it is 
accepted that the duty of loyalty obliges to comply with standards of behavior which are 
higher to those envisaged by the general principle of good faith in the execution of contracts; 
yet, the duty of loyalty is limited to the relationship between directors and companies.  
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In sum, the duty of loyalty is currently a legal institute well acknowledged by the majority of 
jurisdictions, and this demonstrates how the penetration of common law dogmas into civil 
law orders is strong. 
  Also the Italian legal order has been influenced by the distinction between duty of 
loyalty and duty of care, diligence and skill.  
 While in the US the contrast between efficacy and efficiency had to be resolved 
through a compromise between the application of the law of trust and the law of corporation, 
the Italian Civil Code at art. 18 clearly establishes that the standards to be complied by the 
directors are those related to the discipline of mandato. 
The article applies even if the foundation obtains the status of the “impresa sociale” 
for this model does not provide any norm concerning the liability standards. In fact, whereas 
the model “impresa sociale” was adopted by a società per azioni, then the standard would 
have been much higher for article 2392 establishes that the diligence of directors must be 
measured against the nature of the office (objective criteria) and against their personal 
competences (subjective criteria).  
Therefore, similarly to the US approach, but differently from the UK one, the Italian 
legal order defines a quite relaxed standard for the administrators of foundations, whether 
“impresa sociale” or not.  
For sure, the more relaxed standard envisaged for the foundations depends on the 
circumstance that, so far, there is not alarming track of great violations of the duty of 
diligence in the Italian case law. Indeed, whereas the non-profit sector keep growing and 
involving more and more quantity of money, the liability of foundation directors could be 
extended just as it has happened for the standards of società per azioni directors. The above 
quoted art. 2392, in fact, before the 2003 reform, also envisaged the standard of the 
mandatario58.   
                                                 
58 It is interesting to consider the norms provided by other legal orders on corporate directors standards: 
Germany: §§ 73, 76 and 93 of the AktG (Public Company Law) set high standards: the care and diligence 
must be the one of a judicious and businesslike man.  
Spain: articles 127 and 132 of the Ley de las Sociedades Anonymas provide as high standards as the German 
ones; 
Portugal: art. 64 of the CSC (Codigo das Sociedades Comerciais) provides also high standards of performance 
and (as seen) establishes a clear difference between duty of loyalty and duty of care.  
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 It is true, the discipline of the mandato contract provides that the responsibility of the 
mandatario – what would correspond to an agent or trustee – is that of the “buon padre di 
famiglia”, that is an expression to mean prudent and reasonable man (art. 1710).    
Where this norm could correspond to the common law duty of care, nothing is 
expressly said about the duty of loyalty. Yet, this duty is not absent from the Civil Code 
discipline. In fact, the Supreme Court, with the decision n. 16707, 2004   clearly explained 
that “the directors of a company, even when the art. 2392 provided the mandatario standard, 
can not be considered as mandatari of the company: they belong to a body which is 
fundamental for the existence of the entity and, as such, they represent the figure of the 
entrepreneur within the multi-individual firm. Their activity is represented by the 
management of a business firm and such commitment involves the professional conduct of a 
complex economic activity. Such professionalism is naturally connected with the duty of 
care and diligence. What has just been remarked implies that a fundamental aspect of the 
director management is as well represented by a profile of loyalty to the company he runs. 
This duty owed to the company is of primary importance, so that for every action or 
omission that is aimed at realizing a different interest or in contrast with that one, one has 
without fail a violation of the duty of loyalty which is inherent to his office: this violation 
may well generate liability for damages regardless of the fault that can be detached in the 
board decision and of the discipline concerned with the challenge of the decision itself (art. 
2391)”.  
As it can be easily understood, the Supreme Court decisions was issued in relation to 
companies (società per azioni) and not to foundation. However, the discussion that has been 
developed earlier on the meaning of the legal personality for foundations that adopt the 
model of “impresa sociale”, allows to accomplish an analogical interpretation of the Court 
decision and, therefore, to acknowledge the duty of loyalty also on behalf of foundations.  
 However, whereas it has been possible to take advantage of the Supreme Court to 
identify the duty of loyalty also concerning foundations, it would prove rather forced to 
similarly extend the discipline of interested transactions provided by art. 2391. 
 In fact, on one side “impresa sociale” foundations and società per azioni have in 
common the fact they are firms. Since according to the Supreme Court the duty of loyalty is 
due to the firm, the it is due to the former as well as to the latter.  
225 
 
 On the other side, foundations and società per azioni differ for the circumstance that 
the latter, other than an objective profit, pursue a subjective profit. Thus, art. 2391 has been 
provided to protect both these interests. Moreover, the principle according to which the 
procedural elements of self-dealing transactions must be expressly provided for non-profit 
organization can be confirmed by the fact that US business and non-profit corporation law 
provide separate norms. 
 The conclusion is that the duty of loyalty of “impresa sociale” foundation’s directors 
must be maintained at a high standard and to date it can be measured against the social 
values that are envisaged by the d.lgs. n. 155, 2006.  
   Finally, a very important remark has to be done in relation to the enforcement tools. 
In fact, if by one hand the legal reasoning developed throughout this work has succeeded to 
identify – or better uncover – interests that were somehow hided, by the other such effort 
could be worth zero if the protection of those interests lack judicial remedies.  
 To begin with, in common law jurisdictions it is much easier for a plaintiff to prove a 
breach of a strict sense fiduciary duty  – that is a duty of loyalty – than “other duties”  such 
as the duty of care.  
 As it has been discussed in chapter III, to claim a breach of the duty of loyalty one 
does not need to demonstrate a loss for the corporation while, to claim a breach of CSD duty 
one has to do so. 
 Therefore, in case a director takes a self-interested decision without complying with 
the procedural requirements provided by corporate law, the plaintiff shall have to prove only 
that the director had an interest in the transaction. Of course, if the plaintiff chooses this 
solution, the Court can only award rescission, equitable compensation or accounting for 
profits.   
The rescission aims at a restitutio in integrum. Therefore, the parties involved in the 
transaction must restitute what they have transferred. 
Whereas that is not possible, the Court may acknowledge an equitable compensation, 
that  is a monetary value that the judge in a discretionary way recognizes to the corporation. 
The latter, in fact, has not suffered any loss, but for a question of conscience it is fair and 
just that it obtains some restoration for the breach of trust.  
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 In addition – and not in alternative – to the rescission or the equitable compensation, 
the plaintiff may claim for an accounting for profits. In practice, the plaintiff asks the Court 
to compel the self-dealer to restitute what he has earned by acting selfishly.  
Now, the above referred director’s self-interested decision may well have brought a 
loss to the corporation. In cases like these, the plaintiff can file suits alleging both the breach 
of fiduciary duty (of loyalty) and the breach of the duty of CSD. Because of the BJR – 
which in the US applies also to non-profit corporations – it shall be quite difficult for the 
plaintiff to succeed in demonstrating that the loss of the corporation was caused by a 
negligent managerial behavior. Anyway, should the plaintiff be able to demonstrate that, 
then he could obtain damages other than the equitable remedies envisaged for the breach of 
the duty of loyalty.  
Therefore, the fundamental difference between equitable and common law remedies 
is represented by the fact that the former are primarily restitutory and restorative rather than 
compensatory whereas the second are primarily compensatory.  
In the light of this brief description, it is possible to discuss which would be the 
remedies against a violation of the social values promoted by a US non-profit corporation. 
Suppose for example that the non-profit director decides to fire 40 employees to preserve the 
financial stability of the organization.  
 It can be hold that such decision can violate either the duty of loyalty or the duty of 
SCD. As concerns the duty of loyalty, the director could be thought to betray the social 
expectations of the corporation in order to maintain secure her job.  
As concerns the duty of SCD, the director could be thought to bring to the 
corporation a loss in terms of efficacy.  The nature of the office of a non-profit director 
would indeed require that she has the due competences to understand that a non-profit 
corporation must pursue social values other than the mere outputs.  
 For the attorney general would be very hard to prove a violation of duty of SCD for 
the simple circumstance whereas it is extremely difficult to demonstrate a loss of efficiency, 
one can easily guess how much more difficult would be to demonstrate a loss in terms of 
efficacy.  
 Therefore, the only way which would be feasible for the Attorney General is to claim 
for a breach of duty of loyalty.   
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However, also the proof of the breach of duty of loyalty is not as simple as it would appear. 
This is due to two reasons.  
 The first one, is that law speaks about “contract” or “transaction” between “the 
corporation  and one or more of its directors or officers, or between the corporation and  any 
other  corporation,  firm,  association  or other entity in which one or more of its directors or 
officers are directors or officers”. Thus, a) the firing of employees is not a 
contract/transaction but a termination of a contract and b) even if one could consider the 
termination of a contract as a contract, then one has also to consider that the law does not 
mention contract between the corporation and officers that do not take part in the decision.  
 The second reason is a consequence of the first. In fact, for the interest of the 
director in the decision of firing is not expressly referred by the law, it follows that the 
relevant procedure requirements do not apply. In other words the director is not expected to 
show up in the board meeting and to declare: “if we do not fire these employees, my and 
your salaries shall suffer a significant reduction”.  This depends on the peculiar nature of the 
interest of the director. The rationale of the norm that compels the director to disclosure an 
interest is based on the fact that the board meeting might not know that the decision is going 
to adopt shall favor the director that promoted it. In the case of  the interest in securing the 
job and the salary, the board very well know that the decision of firing the employees shall 
represent a safe harbor for the selfish director.  
  The result shall be that in order to obtain a judicial intervention, the Attorney 
General shall have to consider the board decision as valid from a procedural point of view 
and, therefore, he himself shall be charged with proving the unfairness to the corporation.  
Most importantly: in a “normal” self-dealing case where the director has disclosed his 
interest and nevertheless the transaction has been adopted, the Attorney General shall have 
only to prove that the decision was unfair; in the example concerning the firing of the 
workers, the decision adopted by the board does not refer to any self-dealing aspect. This 
implies that the Attorney General has firstly to prove the selfish element and therefore the 
unfairness to the corporation.  
 If the public authority succeeds to demonstrate both the elements, then the court is 
expected to issue the equitable remedy represented by the rescission: to void the firing 
provision.  
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 It is true, the equitable remedy can be preferred by the Attorney General even in 
those cases where one is in front a clear violation of the duty of care. Suppose for example a 
wrong economic choice made by the director.  
 Since because of the BJR shall be very hard to challenge the managerial conduct, 
the Attorney General could actually claim a breach of fiduciary duty from the non-executive 
directors that authorized the transaction. As it can be seen, in this case it is difficult to find 
and prove a selfish element. However, a recent development of judicial doctrine has 
considered that the duty of loyalty implies also a duty to act in good faith. In other words, 
the non-executive directors are expected to seriously and actively control the executive 
operations. Now, there are several discussions on the correctness of such approach as well as 
it is debated if the duty to act in a good faith represent a third independent duty59.   
 The fundamental difference between the US corporate foundation and the Italian 
“impresa sociale” foundation in relation to the judicial remedies is represented by the fact 
that within the latter the “Ministero del lavoro e delle politiche 
sociali” has strong power of inquiry and of correcting abuses. Therefore, in the above 
mentioned example of a managerial decision involving the firing of 30 workers, the public 
authority could more easily prevent the misconduct. It has to be remarked anyway that 
decisions against the protection of workers are even more rare in the Italian “impresa  
sociale” for the d.lgs. n. 155 provides an active participation of employees in the 
administration of the firm.  
 As regards the decisions more concerned with the economic activity of the firm, the 
protection against losses is ensured by the recovering of the damages, so there is not 
substantial difference with the common law jurisdictions.  
  
§ 5. External Control  
 
The discussions on the historical and functional approach have demonstrated that the 
agency problem between donors/customers and the managers of a non-profit corporations 
are less pronounced in Italy than in the US.  
                                                 
59 For a detailed discussion on the triad duty of loyalty, duty of care and good faith see Strine et al. [2010].  
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In fact, in Italy the main funder of non-profit organizations is the State or a private 
party that has been contracted by the State.  
However, also in Italy donors and customers finance non-profit organizations and 
where they are not in control of the structure, their contributions have somehow to be 
protected by managerial misbehaviors.  
Actually, in Italy there is not any statutory provision or court decision that so far has 
dealt with the right to sue directors on behalf of the patrons.  
The legal reasoning that could lead to this opportunity is to conceive the patrons 
contribution as a donazione indiretta.  
A “donazione indiretta” is represented by a gratuitous act meant to reach a scope that 
goes beyond the mere enrichment of the other party [Cendon and Baldassarri, 2007]. In the 
case of patrons’ contributions to non-profit organizations, it is clear that the scope of the 
former is to provide advantages for the beneficiaries of the activities; yet patrons do not  
accomplish donations directly to the beneficiaries, they rather use non-profit organizations 
as intermediation device. In doing that, they do not realize a mere donation – that is, their act 
does not comply with the requirements provided by the articles (769ss) concerned with the 
contract of donation; instead, they set up another kind of contractual relationship that reflects 
the scheme of the “mandato” [this contractual scheme somehow presents features that in 
equity law are related to the relationship of agency and/or trust].  
This study claims that the gifts conferred to non-profit organizations are just a 
mandato contract whose specific terms are contained by the clauses of the by-laws.  
As such, the norms that apply to the relationship between patrons and directors are 
those envisaged by the Civil Code itself for this contractual type [Torrente, 2006].  
This basically means that if directors do not execute the contract according to the 
(actually) low standards set by art. 1710, they can be sued for misfeasance, implying the 
termination of the contract (art. 1453) and the relevant compensation for patrons (art. 1218).  
If on one hand this legal effort succeeds someway in recognizing a private protection 
to patrons, by the other it could hardly justify a civil action for those patrons who are 
consumers of a non-profit organization. In fact, in such a hypothesis, the hermeneutical 
effort should assume that the contract has a two-fold causa:  
a) the purchase of the performance (services or goods);  
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b) the funding on behalf of the organization in order to improve the performances offered.  
It is pretty obvious that point b) represents an implied contractual term that is likely 
impossible to enforce.  
As said, the Italian legal order as well as Italian courts still have not faced directly 
the problem of private patrons protection. Yet the assumption that civil law traditions are 
supported by a complete system of norms suggests that, should any case arise, judges will be 
able to find the path for enforcing directors duties.  
The comparison between US and Italian approaches clearly underscores that in the 
former country a legal doctrine has already developed. Of course, this is because of the 
significant share that non-profit organizations occupy in the American market and the 
consequent greater chances that patrons can be unsatisfied with non-profit managerial 
decisions.  
With the decision taken in 2005, the Court of Appeal of California has eventually 
acknowledged a contractual dimension to the donations realized by patrons. However, the 
rule of law pointing out from this sentence establishes that not all the patrons are entitled to 
apply to the Court for breach of contract, but only those who have specified the 
subcondition of their gift.  
It is likely that Courts will make another step towards a still more liberal approach, 
considering the subcondition as an implied contractual term that derives from the articles of 
association.  
In Italy, the non-profit sector is still in an evolving stage. Different from the US, 
universities and hospitals are normally run by the state and, therefore, with public money.  
Whereas the trend of transforming these structures into non-profit organizations became 
more significant, civil actions against directors misfeasance are expected. As seen, according 
to Italian law, it would be easier to recognize the contractual dimension to the relationship 
between patrons and directors through an extensive interpretation of art. 809  (donazioni 
indirette). This would entitle the former to sue the latter for violation of the norms concerning 
the mandato.  
At the same time, the legal reasoning grounded on the concept of donazioni indirette 
could not work on behalf of those patrons who are consumers of the non-profit organization. 
From a strictly legal point of view, their contribution merely represents the amount due for the 
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services or product they buy. The causa of their transaction, that is the socio-economic function 
(funzione socio-economica), is to exchange money for a specific performance. Only concerning 
such specific performance, a misfeasance may entitle consumers to sue the organization for 
breach of contract. This underlines how the American approach, based on the idea that those 
beneficiaries who keep a special interest may apply to the Court for breach of fiduciary duties 
(independently from the existence of a contractual relationship which would allow to apply for 
breach of contract), would ensure a more complete system of monitoring devices. 
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